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SHARMA, SAGAR. Ph.D., Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Wright State Uni-
versity, 2019. TOWARDS DATA AND MODEL CONFIDENTIALITY IN OUTSOURCED MA-
CHINE LEARNING.
With massive data collections and needs for building powerful predictive models, data
owners may choose to outsource storage and expensive machine learning computations to
public cloud providers (Cloud). Data owners may choose cloud outsourcing due to the
lack of in-house storage and computation resources or the expertise of building models.
Similarly, users, who subscribe to specialized services such as movie streaming and social
networking, voluntarily upload their data to the service providers’ site for storage, analyt-
ics, and better services. The service provider, in turn, may also choose to benefit from
ubiquitous cloud computing.
However, outsourcing to a public cloud provider may raise privacy concerns when it
comes to sensitive personal or corporate data. Cloud and its associates may misuse sen-
sitive data and models internally. Moreover, if Cloud’s resources are poorly secured, the
confidential data and models become vulnerable to privacy attacks by external adversaries.
Such potential threats are out of the control of the data owners or general users. One way
to address these privacy concerns is through confidential machine learning (CML). CML
frameworks enable data owners to protect their data with encryption or other data protec-
tion mechanisms before outsourcing and facilitates Cloud training the predictive models
with the protected data.
Existing cryptographic and privacy-protection methods cannot be immediately lead to
the CML frameworks for outsourcing. Although theoretically sound, a nave adaptation of
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and garbled circuits (GC) that enable evaluation of
any arbitrary function in a privacy-preserving manner is impractically expensive. Differen-
tial privacy (DP), on the other hand, cannot specifically address the confidentiality issues
and threat model in the outsourced setting as DP generally aims to protect an individual’s
iii
participation in a dataset from an adversarial model consumer. Moreover, a practical CML
framework must ensure a fair cost distribution between the data owner and Cloud with by
moving the expensive and scalable components to Cloud while limiting data owner’s costs
to the minimum. Therefore, constructing novel CML solutions, which maintain a good
balance among privacy protection, costs, and model quality, is necessary.
In this dissertation, I present three confidential machine learning frameworks for the
outsourcing setting: 1) PrivateGraph for unsupervised learning (e.g., graph spectral anal-
ysis), 2) SecureBoost for supervised learning (e.g., boosting), 3) DisguisedNets for deep
learning (e.g., convolutional neural networks). The first two frameworks provide semantic
security and follow the decomposition-mapping-composition (DMC) process. The DMC
process includes three critical steps: 1) Decomposition of the target machine learning algo-
rithm into its sub-components, 2) Mapping of the selected sub-components to appropriate
cryptographic and privacy primitives, and finally, 3) Composition of the CML protocols. A
critical aspect of these frameworks is the identification of the “crypto-unfriendly” subcom-
ponents and their alteration or replacement with “crypto-friendly” subcomponents before
the final composition of the CML frameworks. The Disguised-Nets framework, however,
due to the intrinsically expensive nature of deep neural networks (DNN) and size of the
training images, relies on a perturbation based CML construction. By relaxing the overall
security and disguising the training images with cheaper transformations, Disguised-Nets
enables training confidential DNN models over the protected images very efficiently. I
present the formal cost and security analysis for all three CML frameworks and back them
with extensive experiments. The results show that these frameworks are practical in real-
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Introduction
Thesis: Constructing confidential machine learning (CML) frameworks for outsourcing
involves carefully choosing or designing algorithms that are crypto-friendly 1 and map-
ping them to an assortment of cryptographic and privacy primitives to optimize the overall
cost. However, when the target machine learning algorithms are intrinsically expensive
or require massive data scalability, one may be forced to relax the desired security level
and adopt the more efficient perturbation and transformation mechanisms to preserve the
confidentiality of related data and models.
Data-driven approaches, including machine learning, have become the major trend in
research and applications across diverse domains. With the growing amount of collected
data, we can build more complex analytic models for tasks ranging from social networking
and healthcare informatics to entertainment and advanced science and technology. How-
ever, due to the limited in-house resources and expertise, data producers (e.g., users) and
data owners (e.g., parties who are collecting and mining data with users’ consent) often
utilize somewhat untrusted cloud provider to store and process their sensitive data. Cloud
computing is extremely beneficial to the data owners and results in a sense of infinite stor-
age and abundant analytic capabilities triggering overall progress in research, services, and
quality of human lives. However, when the associated data is sensitive (e.g. human-related,
proprietary, or confidential), use of the untrusted Cloud brings-forth privacy concerns.
Most privacy concerns are rooted in the data owner’s lost control of data and computa-
1mappable to a cryptographic or privacy primitive and practical cost-wise
1
tions when outsourcing to Cloud. To assume that the cloud provider will respect the privacy
of the data owners and the corresponding data contributors while storing and running an-
alytics over their data would only be wishful thinking. For example, the adversaries (e.g.,
insider attacks [1, 2]) at the untrusted Cloud may be interested in exploring the gathered
data to build powerful data analytics models for unwarranted objectives and benefits. They
may also share with or sell these data and models to other parties for commercial gains.
Furthermore, to assume that Cloud will apply stringent measures to secure their infrastruc-
tures from external adversaries and breaches would also be naive as demonstrated by recent
big-profile security breaches that lead to severe privacy compromises [3, 4]. These risks
boil down to one critical problem faced by the data producers and data owners — how can
one avail from cloud computing for storage and powerful model learning while preserving
the confidentiality of the sensitive training data and the learned models.
Several laws and regulations are aimed at preventing privacy compromises by un-
trusted platforms and are growing in scope and numbers. However, they have proved to
be inadequate as depicted by recent news of privacy compromises. The only viable and
reliable solution to the alarming privacy problem, therefore, is through the incorporation
of privacy and cryptographic technologies in designing analytic frameworks that involve
public Cloud. These frameworks must protect both the data and models from the untrusted
party throughout the phases of storage, computation, and sharing or transmission. Most im-
portantly, these frameworks must enable learning powerful analytics models over encrypted
or protected data. However, designing such confidential frameworks for complex machine
learning is not straightforward and involves critical design principles and strategies. Fur-
thermore, it requires a careful assessment of the intricate trade-offs amongst privacy, utility,
and practicality.
In the following subsections of this chapter, I will position this dissertation across the
details of 1) the real-life scenarios that motivate the use of the public cloud providers and
significance of privacy frameworks; 2) the contemporary privacy laws and their limitations;
2
and 3) adaptation of privacy technologies in frameworks involving untrusted cloud party
and the corresponding challenges. Then, I will summarize the overview of my dissertation
which will focus on the composition processes for constructing CML frameworks, and the
three CML frameworks of PrivateGraph, SecureBoost, and Disguised-Nets that effectively
address the challenges of building practical CML frameworks.
1.1 Motivating Scenarios
As cloud computing has become more economic and popular, data owners with insufficient
in-house computing resources opt to rent public cloud resources for storage and data pro-
cessing (e.g., a 100-node cluster built with small virtual machine instances in Amazon EC2
costs only less than 10 per hour). This relieves the data owners from having to purchase and
maintain expensive infrastructures. As sensitive data and models leave the trusted bound-
aries of data owners or the data contributors, the design and adaptation of CML frameworks
for machine learning outsourcing become more relevant.
Generally, a data owner aggregates data from its trusting subscribers or users and is
trusted to respect their privacy. Individuals subscribe to mobile, web, or cloud applica-
tions such as Facebook, Spotify, and Netflix, and voluntarily upload their personal data
and data aggregations to the service providers [5, 6]. The service providers use such data
in building global and personalized models beneficial to both the users and the service
provider, for example, models that deliver better movie recommendations or effective ac-
tivity tracking. However, as data size and complexity and number of analytics increases,
the service providers outsource their work-load to third party cloud providers. Figure 1.1
shows a rather sensitive framework where a healthcare informatics provider collects elec-
tronic health records (EHR) from authorized health providers, monitors events and mes-
sages from the subscribing patients’ cell phones and medical devices and provides analyt-
ics and services that benefit the patients, clinicians, and researchers [7, 8]. In a different
3
setting, a data owner may generate large data on its own, e.g. if the data owner is a research
or scientific institution running large scale experiments that generate a massive amount of
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Figure 1.1: A healthcare informatics provider gathers data from subscribing patients. It
relies on a cloud provider for storage and analytics hence is wary of possible privacy com-
promises at the cloud provider’s site [7, 8].
1.2 Legal Approaches and Limitations
Laws and regulations are crucial in protecting the confidentiality of data owners and the
data contributors from the untrusted service providers. However, laws and regulations alone
cannot address the confidential learning problem as they face several limitations. Next, I
describe some prominent laws and regulations and summarize their limitations.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [10] safeguard personal
health information (PHI) of patients from fraud, breaches, and misuse. HIPAA mandates
the data collectors (e.g. healthcare provider) ensure a certain level of security during storage
and transactions of individuals’ health data. It considers any confidentiality violations seri-
ous and enforces hefty fines. Online privacy protection act of California (CalCOPPA) [11]
requires any commercial website or service providers that collect personally identifiable
information (PII) disclose their privacy policies. They must disclose the kind of informa-
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tion that is being collected, including the “do not track” flag and any information sharing
or trade with third parties. General data protection regulation (GDPR) [12] is a more re-
cent and comprehensive law aimed at protecting the data owners residing in the European
Union. The significant terms of GDPR that pertain to use of untrusted platforms are: 1) the
service providers must promptly notify the involved data owners and users any incidents of
privacy breaches or leakages; 2) the service providers must integrate privacy from the very
early phase of design and implementation of its frameworks; 3) the service providers must
either encrypt or pseudonymize users’ data at storage; 4) the service provider must estab-
lish an expert data protection officer inside the company to monitor internal compliance of
the privacy laws.
Limitations. Although punishable by fines and probation, implementation of privacy
laws and regulations depends on human monitoring and intervention; thus, many viola-
tions may go unnoticed. Untrusted providers who are self-regulated can be motivated to
hide their failures in keeping up with the legal requirements in fear of fines and punish-
ments. Similarly, due to the scale and variety of data the untrusted providers deal with,
it becomes cumbersome for them to build processes that oversee compliance to laws and
regulations throughout the phases of storage, computation, and sharing. More importantly,
laws and regulations cannot revert the damages and ramifications of privacy violations. Fi-
nally, when it comes to building confidential frameworks, the existing laws and regulations
do not address the involved complexities of building privacy-aware frameworks.
1.3 Technical Approaches and Challenges
While the use of untrusted Cloud is inevitable, providing the data owners more control and
authority over their data, computations, and models while mitigating the associated privacy
concerns is challenging. Laws and regulations are insufficient to tackle this problem. Can
we technically support data-owner-controlled confidential data analytics when using un-
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trusted platforms? One way to address the privacy concerns is by enabling confidential
machine learning (CML) in using untrusted platforms. CML allows the data owners to
protect their data with encryption or other data protection measures and enables learning of
predictive models over the protected data using untrusted platforms.
Existing cryptographic and privacy-protection methods cannot be applied out-of-box
in building CML frameworks. Although theoretically sound, a nave adaptation of fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) [13] and garbled circuits (GC) [14] that enable evaluation
of an arbitrary function confidentially is impractical. Furthermore, a practical CML frame-
work must minimize the client-side (e.g., data owner’s) cost and maximize utilization of
the untrusted platforms, for example, by moving the expensive and scalable components to
Cloud. Finally, a CML framework must balance the trade-offs amongst associated costs,
model quality, and confidentiality. Therefore, confidentiality in outsourced machine learn-
ing is only possible with novel construction methods for composing CML frameworks.
One can observe that most CML frameworks that rely on the cryptographic primi-
tives follow the decomposition-mapping-composition (DMC) process which involves: 1)
decomposition of the target machine learning algorithms into their components, their map-
pings to cryptographic or privacy primitives, and final composition of the CML frameworks
with the confidential components. The DMC frameworks carry on the semantic security
of the cryptographic primitives they use. Until recently, most confidential frameworks re-
lied on one cryptographic or privacy primitives — a “homogenous” composition strategy
[15, 16, 17]. Although easily composed, these frameworks suffer from cost bottlenecks
and disadvantages associated with the privacy primitives they rely on. As a way to over-
come this problem, a few recent studies [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] started blending (mixing
and switching) multiple privacy and cryptographic primitives and adapted some special
privacy architectures to work around the performance bottlenecks related to the individ-
ual primitives —a “hybrid” composition strategy. Although promising, composing a CML
framework with the hybrid mixing and switching strategy is not straightforward either.
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The practicality of the hybrid composition is limited by the complexity of the tar-
get learning algorithm. One may notice that not all algorithms and their decomposed
sub-components are crypto-friendly, i.e., easily translatable to their confidential versions
with a practical cost. Therefore, it is critical to alter the crypto-unfriendly algorithms and
components or replace them with their crypto-friendly counter-parts before the final CML
composition as seen in the first two DMC frameworks [21, 22, 23]. However, when deal-
ing with intrinsically expensive target algorithms (e.g. deep neural networks) or super-
massive datasets, the DMC process may become impractical. For such resource-intensive
machine learning, the only viable workaround would be to completely avoid the expensive
primitives such as SHE and GC altogether and rely on cheaper perturbation techniques
for privacy protection [24, 25, 26]. This will be our strategy for the CML framework for
deep neural network learning (the Disguised-Nets frameworks). Although efficient, these
“non-cryptographic” frameworks may result in some loss to the model quality and provide
slimmer security guarantees.
Note: In an orthogonal setting, there are approaches based on differential privacy (DP)
that deal with the privacy leakages from releasing (not learning) models, data, and inter-
mediate parameters. These approaches assume a different threat model intending to pro-
tect any individual’s private information in the training datasets when releasing the trained
models to the adversarial consumers. Exposure of the models in these approaches makes
them vulnerable to several model-based attacks [27, 28, 29, 30]. I leave out the DP-based
approaches from my discussions in this dissertation. This dissertation revolves around
the confidential frameworks for outsourced machine learning, which have different threat
model and purposes. The three proposed frameworks protect the confidentiality of data,
models, and the intermediate results from an adversarial platform which takes over storage
and the computational burden from a data-owner.
Next, I summarize the challenges of composing effective CML frameworks involving
cloud providers:
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1. Naive adaptation of FHE and GC to construct CML frameworks homogeneously is
theoretically sound but impractical.
2. Differential Privacy (DP) does not meet the outsourcing requirements as it is based
on a different threat model that involves untrusted data and model consumers.
3. Hybrid composition of CML frameworks with the DMC process is promising but
presents major challenges: 1) Decomposition of the target algorithm and successful
mappings to crypto/privacy primitives may not always be straight-forward, 2) Deal-
ing with “crypto-unfriendly” components and algorithms that cause cost bottlenecks
and increase complexity of constructing CML frameworks; and 3) Switching/mixing
between different primitives is challenging as it should preserve computation char-
acteristics such as data encoding and precision and avoid any privacy leakages.
4. The DMC process becomes impractical when it comes to the Intrinsically expensive
algorithms, such as DNN learning, and when dealing with massive data scalability.
Use of perturbation techniques alternatively may provide weaker security protections
hence requires extensive analysis and experiments to back the frameworks that rely
on perturbation techniques.
5. Balancing trade-offs amongst simplicity of implementing algorithms, costs, quality
of learned models, and cost distribution may require assessment of several architec-
tures and algorithmic protocols.
6. Fair distribution of cost amongst the involved party is crucial with the Cloud taking
over the heavier computation and storage burdens.
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I present the three confidential frameworks for outsourced machine
learning: a) PrivateGraph — for unsupervised spectral analysis, b) SecureBoost — for
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supervised boosting, and d) Disguised-Nets — for image-based deep learning.
The first two frameworks, PrivateGraph and SecureBoost, follow the decomposition-
mapping-composition (DMC) process for composing CML frameworks and provide se-
mantic security. These frameworks use a different assortment of cryptographic and privacy
primitives such as homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, randomized sharing, and in-
termediate perturbation techniques and provide semantic security. Crucial to these two
frameworks is the identification of the crypto-unfriendly components and their replacement
with their crypto-friendly alternatives. The DMC process along with the crypto-friendly
components simplify the learning in these protocols and provide desired cost efficiency
and model quality.
The third framework, Disguised-Nets, however, avoids using the expensive crypto-
graphic primitives altogether due to the inherently expensive nature of deep neural network
(DNN) learning and the size of training data. I propose using perturbation mechanisms
such as multi-dimensional transformations, permutation, and additive noise to disguise the
training data and the learned models in the framework. Although the framework provides
desired cost efficiency and high-quality models, it can only provide relaxed security.
The three frameworks in this dissertation aim to address the critical challenges of
constructing CML frameworks in the outsourced setting. These frameworks provide cost
practicality and scalability for real-life settings. They preserve both data and model pri-
vacy. They ensure the cost distributions are in accordance to the law of cloud computing
with heavier storage and computations carried out by the cloud provider whereas the in-
volvement of the data owner or distributed users limited to linear computations. I present
the formal cost and security analysis of the frameworks along with the experimental results
to assess/analyze the cost, privacy, utility, and scalability of the frameworks in this disser-
tation. I have implemented the demo systems or working prototypes for these frameworks
for the empirical studies.
Outline. I devote Chapter 2 to provide the background for this work. I elaborate
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some of the system-level architectures that lay the foundations for building outsourced
CML frameworks including the different real-life privacy scenarios, the parties involved,
the threat models, and privacy assets at risks. I also provide a foundation to the crypto-
graphic and privacy primitives which sew together the different components of the target
machine learning algorithm to the system architectures.
In Chapter 3, I introduce the two unique process of composing CML frameworks – the
DMC process and the perturbation-based process. I elaborately describe the DMC process
and common sub-components of machine learning algorithms, explore various construc-
tion methods for the confidential versions of these basic components with different privacy
and cryptographic primitives along with the associated advantages, disadvantages, or bot-
tlenecks. These confidential components are the bricks that build the complete CML frame-
works with the DMC process. Chapter 4 and 5 present the two DMC-based frameworks of
PrivateGraph and SecureBoost. Chapter 6 present the perturbation-based Disguised-Nets




In this chapter, I provide the background for confidential machine learning (CML) in the
outsourced setting. In Section 2.1, I present several system architectures, the included par-
ties, and their roles. In Section 2.2, I present the threat models and some notable attacks
applicable to the system architectures in the outsourced machine learning frameworks. Fi-
nally, in Section 2.3 I quickly go over the several cryptographic and privacy primitives that
enable confidential computing in the CML frameworks.
2.1 System Architectures
In this section, I review several system-level architectures that map to the common-world
privacy scenarios. First, I define the involved parties in these architectures; then, describe
the architectures; and finally, cover the threat models.
2.1.1 Involved Parties
These parties are common in contemporary cloud outsourcing paradigms. The involved
parties may include cloud (infrastructure) providers, cryptographic service providers, the
data owners/application service providers that collect users’ data upon user consent, and
data and model consumers.
Data Owners (DO) or Application Service Providers (SP). A data owner owns the
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data that feeds to the complex analytics. It may be a big institution holding data about its
finances and businesses or a research lab with myriads of scientific results and experiment
logs. It may be a hospital managing its patients’ information, including their demography,
diagnosis, and prescriptions. A data owner may be an application service provider, such as
a social media service provider or a movie streaming service provider, which gathers and
analyzes data from the service subscribers. It may gather information such as user click-
throughs, comments and review, and other online interactions from the service interfaces.
A data owner may build different global and personalized machine learning models over
the accumulated data to improve its services, increase its revenue through advertisements
and user-targeting, and scientific studies.
Cloud Provider. A cloud provider is a resource-abundant party that rents or leases its
infrastructures to the clients with a pay-as-you-use (utility) billing model. With a service
level agreement (SLA ) it guarantees storage and computational resources to the clients,
usually a DO with a large dataset and needs for resource-intensive analytics. Cloud relieves
its clients from owning and maintaining abundant resources by renting out its raw hardware,
specific-purpose systems, and even expertise to the clients. Cloud providers are online
24/7 and have back-ups and security measures applied. The cloud provider is bound to
government laws and privacy policies.
Cryptographic Service Providers (CSP). A CSP is an arbitrator-like party that man-
ages public keys, distributes the public key to the parties that demand privacy, and safe-
guards the secret keys [19, 18, 23]. The CSP may assist the cloud provider in its com-
putations by conducting intermediate decryption and lightweight plaintext operations. Al-
though the CSP manages the keys and is usually a proponent of privacy, it is not a fully
trusted party either. Therefore, a CML framework must safeguard the privacy assets from
the CSP as well, and any interaction between a Cloud and the CSP should not lead to any
privacy compromises.
Data and Model Consumers. Data and model consumers do not directly generate or
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collect data. They instead are authorized by the DOs to use their data and the generated
models. Researchers, businesses such as pharmaceutical companies, and the data-driven
advertisers are some examples of data consumers. Data consumers may sign certain agree-
ments with the data owners and must respect the confidentiality of the involved data and its
subjects. Sharing models with untrusted data consumers may be problematic as the models
can be misused or reverse-engineered to breach the privacy of the data used in training the
models. The CML frameworks in the outsourced setting must protect the models from any
adversarial party, i.e., the untrusted platforms, however, consider model consumers trusted.
Note: Differentially private data and model publishing is a way to tackle adversarial data
and model consumers, however, this will not be the focus of our work.
2.1.2 Representative Architectures Used by Applications
Now, I will look at three different architectures and their variations that fit in the privacy
scenarios described in Chapter 1 Section 1.1. Most of the confidential data analytic frame-
works proposed so far can be cast onto these architectures with some alteration or exten-
sions.
Data Owner Outsourcing to a single Cloud Provider.
A data owner may depend on a cloud provider for storage, processing, and building an-
alytics models. Cloud outsourcing relieves the DO from maintaining expensive in-house
infrastructures. However, the DO has to ensure Cloud does not compromise the propri-
etary data or data of the users who trust it with their data. For example, a few FHE-based
frameworks of Graepel et al. [15] and Lu et al. [16] present protocols for training machine
learning models over encrypted data with one party and with almost no engagement of the
data owner. However, the associated restrictions and cost makes these protocols unrealistic
in real-life scenarios. An alternate strategy is to make the data owner conduct minimal
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tasks intermediately to simplify the complexity of outsourcing. Figure 2.1 depicts such a
setting where a DO employs a cloud provider to aggregate and analyze large graph data
gathered from multiple users, as adapted in our PrivateGraph framework for confidential
graph spectral analysis (See Chapter 4).
Partial or partitioned Outsourcing. In some scenarios, a data owner may prefer
to outsource only a portion of the training data and learning to the cloud provider due to
privacy concerns [31]. The data owner safeguards the sensitive records or features and
carries out the learning involving those records and features locally. We will see such a
setting under consideration in our Disguised-Nets framework in Chapter 6.
Figure 2.1: A data owner outsourcing to an untrusted cloud provider for learning graph
spectral clustering ([22]). The data contributors directly submit their encrypted data to
Cloud. Cloud carries out all computations over the encrypted data.
A few notable characteristics and requirements of this architecture are: 1) The DO
must ensure there is no privacy leakage to the cloud provider, i.e., prevent cloud from
misusing sensitive data or deriving models for its commercial gains; 2) Submissions to
the cloud either must be encrypted or protected with some perturbation techniques; 3) The
cloud should be able to learn the desired machine learning over encrypted or protected data
with some help from the DO; 4) The protocols must maximize the use of cloud provider (i.e.
heavier storage and higher complexity computations) whereas limit the DO’s engagement
(i.e., linear-complexity computations only).
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Data Owner Outsourcing to Two (or more) Cloud Providers.
As complex machine learning over encrypted or protected data becomes expensive and
impractical, a DO may rely on two or more cloud providers to simplify the learning frame-
work. Such a setting saves Cloud from having to compute the entire complex machine
learning algorithms over protected data, which is an expensive endeavor. The second party
may be equally capable as the first party [21], or in case of a cryptographic service provider
(CSP), limited to lesser computing resources [18, 19]. It simplifies the CML frameworks
and contributes to cost-optimization. It may perform intermediate decryptions, assist cloud
in computations, construct garbled circuits, and facilitate mixing and switching of differ-
ent privacy primitives during protocol execution. The two parties in this architecture carry
out secure two-party computations without compromising the confidentiality of both data
and trained models. Such a setting assumes that the two parties do not collude with each
other. Figure 2.2 shows our two-equal server-based SecureBoost framework which uses a
randomized secret sharing approach to user data submission [23], which we will present in
Chapter 5.
It is noteworthy that the introduction of the second server lowers the weight of privacy
in the cost-privacy trade-off by design. Although the non-collusion assumption is quite
acceptable for real-world CSPs such as certificate servers, such an assumption on arbitrary
cloud providers may not be smart.
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Figure 2.2: A data owner outsourcing to two honest-but-curious non-colluding servers. The
second server may be as equally capable as the first or may take the role of a light-weight
cryptographic service provider (CSP).
.
2.2 Threat Models
In this section, I examine the widely accepted threat models in existing confidential ma-
chine learning frameworks for outsourcing. I will discuss the following important aspects:
1) the assumptions on the adversaries, 2) the confidential assets, and 3) some notable con-
fidentiality attacks.
Assumptions on Adversaries.
Most CML frameworks [23, 21, 18, 19, 15], including the PrivateGraph, SecureBoost, and
Disguised-Nets frameworks presented in this dissertation, adopt the popular honest-but-
curious (semi-honest, or passive) adversary model to describe the untrusted cloud provider.
Honest-but-curious parties, by definition, perform their share of tasks obediently, i.e., guar-
antee data and model integrity and follow the pre-defined protocols exactly; however, they
might surreptitiously snoop the storage, interactions, and computations for information.
The semi-honest assumption has some advantages. Specifically, it allows one to simplify
the CML protocol design and tackle the more serious malicious adversary progressively.
In real-world scenarios, this assumption is justifiable as long as the untrusted platforms
hold some level of credibility. A concerned data owner may deploy a simpler check strat-
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egy which assesses the quality of the models returned by the semi-honest parties to decide
whether to consider the adversarial party integrous.
In contrast, a malicious adversary may actively seek to breach data and model con-
fidentiality. The ways an active adversary may compromise a framework is unbounded,
for example she may inject false records to the training dataset and track them to attack
other training records as in the SecureBoost framework in Chapter 5, include only the tar-
get user’s data in learning [19] and draw inference from the produced results or models,
alter the confidential components such as the garbled circuits to disclose the private in-
puts [21], or return false results in the confidential architectures. Similarly, the frameworks
that do not protect the trained models are vulnerable to some novel attacks by a malicious
adversary leading up to compromise to data confidentiality as we will discuss later.
Graepel et a. [15] consider a semi-honest cloud provider in their MLConfidential
framework, however, provide a verification strategy to deal with a computationally bounded
malicious cloud provider. The proposed strategy is quite naive. The data owner holds
some labeled test data that it probes the model stored at the cloud provider’s site to see if
the model performs as expected. Similarly, Nikolaenko et al. [18] consider a malicious
recommender system (RecSys) service provider that may utilize the unprotected models
learned from the protected data. They address one specific scenario where the RecSys
replaces all ratings except those from the target user with dummy ratings. This way, the
RecSys learns from the output model the items that were uniquely rated by the victim user.
The researchers address this bounded malicious attack with a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) keys verification protocol. Users sign each rating submissions with a one-time
MAC key provided by a CSP, and a garbled circuit verifies if any of the submissions were
altered or changed by the RecSys. In the SecureBoost framework, in chapter 5, I examine
a scenario where an adversarial CSP may actively plant an anchor vector to the training
data. The CSP’s goal is to analyze a certain leakage to identify records in the training
dataset that are closer to the anchor vector. However, the researchers show that the leaked
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characterization vectors are useless in inferring proximity of the original training data.
In addition to the semi-honest and malicious nature of the adversaries, the CML frame-
works often assume non-collusion between the involved parties, for example, between
the cloud provider and the CSP [18, 19, 23] or the two cloud providers [21] in the two
server frameworks. Some frameworks assume no collusion between the data-generating
users and the untrusted servers. However, it is usually permissible for an adversarial cloud
provider(or a CSP) to imitate an end-user participating in the CML framework. Therefore,
CML frameworks must address such collusion.
Furthermore, most CML frameworks assume properly secured infrastructures and
communication channels. Such an assumption allows researchers to concentrate on the
unique challenges of CML. Finally, the CML frameworks that rely on encryption or the
garbled circuit schemes aim for semantic security, i.e., immunity against chosen plaintext
attacks, whereas frameworks that rely on the perturbation techniques may assume weaker
security e.g. ciphertext-only attacks in the Disguised-Nets framework in Chapter 6. [25].
Note that the CML frameworks may assume that any data and model consumers are
trusted and consider privacy-preserving data and model sharing as an orthogonal problem
usually handled with differentially private mechanisms. [32, 33].
Confidential Assets at Risk
An adversarial party may be interested in sensitive data or the generated models. Leaked
data can directly breach the data owner’s (or the data contributors) privacy confidential-
ity. An adversary may misuse leaked model in unauthorized tasks, and in some cases,
reverse-engineer them to cause inference of associated training data. Sometimes, the in-
termediate results, for example, the intermediate representation in a convolutional neural
network learning, may also reveal information about the private data. I explain the three
important confidential assets next.
Sensitive Data. The modeling data may include sensitive or personally identifiable in-
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formation. For example, an individual’s health-related information, her address and social
security number, demographic class (age-group, salary range, and gender), political inter-
ests, and location. Datasets for supervised machine learning also include labels which may
be sensitive on their own. Almost all CML frameworks regard the training features sensi-
tive, however, some frameworks expose the labels to simplify their modeling tasks, [15, 19]
with the assumption that knowing labels will not bring significantly more information to
adversaries.
Generated Models. Various types of machine learning models can be learned on
sensitive data. Contrary to the earlier assumption that leaking a model is not as harmful
as leaking the data does not hold true anymore. As shown by the recent studies on model-
based attacks [27, 34], a leaked model can be used by an adversary to probe into sensitive
training data. Using techniques of model inversion attacks (MIA) [27, 28], membership
inference attacks [30], and generative adversarial network (GAN) attack [34], the adversary
may generate records which resemble the training data or infer if a certain individual or
record was included in the modeling task. Most CML frameworks that generate unprotected
models [15, 19, 16] do not consider model private assets hence are susceptible to these
attacks. However, the leaned models must be released only to the trusted data owner or
the authorized model consumers. The three frameworks that I present in this dissertation
specifically address the problem of model confidentiality in the confidential frameworks.
Intermediate Results. Confidentiality of the training data and the final models is not
enough. Sometimes, the intermediate results of model learning may be equally revealing.
For example, leakage of the intermediate representation in a convolutional neural network
learned over image datasets will reveal the content of the images [35]. It is essential to
ensure that an adversary cannot garnish any relevant information about the training data or
the final model from the intermediate results. Some metadata about the learning process
itself, such as the convergence of a model, the number of iterations, the size of the model,
etc., may not directly relate to the sensitive information. However, careful security analysis
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is still required to show that the exposed information does not lead to data and model
confidentiality breaches. For example, in the SecureBoost framework [23] (Chapter 5), we
encounter a leakage which we carefully analyze and show with experimentation that the
leakage cannot lead to violation of data or model confidentiality.
Notable Attacks
Most CML frameworks use data protection methods with provable security. The data pro-
tection methods and the associated security parameters address any attacks on the modeling
data. Other attacks to the modeling data or the intermediate results are usually specific to
frameworks and due to some leakages that an adversary can exploit. Researchers handle
such attacks on a case-by-case basis. Next , I describe the rather pressing model-based
attacks that may compromise the confidentiality of training data despite the data protection
mechanisms. Any machine learning framework that reveals the final models are suscepti-
ble to these attacks. An adversary may probe an exposed predictive model and breach the
confidentiality of the training data. Therefore, unlike traditionally, data owners cannot tol-
erate unrestricted usage of models by any untrusted parties. I discuss the two model-based
attacks that must be fought against when constructing CML frameworks: 1) the model
inversion attacks, 2) membership inference attacks, and 3) generative adversarial network
based attacks.
Model Inversion Attacks. Model inversion attacks [27, 28, 29] reverse engineer a
machine learning model to explore the private training data. Given access to a machine
learning model, some background about the training data, and the class confidence values
(or just labels) the model generates for arbitrary inputs, an adversary can estimate or infer
the private training data. Ateniese et al. [29] and Fredrikson et al. [27] reverse-engineer
models that predicted medical doses for patients to reveal the patients’ genetic markers.
Fredrikson et al. [28] reverse-engineer facial recognition models to explore the training
images of individuals.
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Membership Inference Attacks. Given a data-point, its label, and a target machine
learning model, the membership Inference Attacks [30] predict if the data-point was part
of the model learning, i.e., if the particular data-point was in the model training dataset.
Membership to the training dataset can be sensitive, for example, knowledge of member-
ship of an individual’s data-record in a training dataset used for a cancer study reveals that
the individual in the dataset suffers from the disease. An adversary trains several shadow
models that resemble the target model with shadow datasets (either synthesized or publicly
available). Then, he trains an attack model which takes the shadow models’ outputs to
predict if a record was in the shadow training sets.
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) attacks on the partitioning setting. A
GAN [36] places a discriminative network (D) against a generative network (G) to interact
in a zero-sum game. As the game evolves, D gets better at telling real images from the fake
images (maximize the classification capacity), whereas G gets better at producing pseudo-
images that resemble the original images (minimize the difference between the real and the
forged images). The game stops when D is no longer can distinguish between the real and
the forged images, i.e. when G succeeds. Hitaj et al. [34] show that anyone participating
in a collaborative deep learning environment can become adversarial and launch a GAN-
based attack to victimize other participating parties. The adversary attacks by manipulating
the actual model learning process by injecting mislabeled images targeting the labels in sole
possession of the victims. Eventually, the adversary generates images associated with the
labels that exclusively belongs to the victim party. This attack can be easily replicated in
the cloud-client partitioning framework with the cloud taking over the role of the adversary
and the parameter server (PS).
The success of the model-based attacks is rooted in the adversary’s unrestrained access
to the models. A sensible way to prevent these attacks in the outsourced setting is by
protecting the entire models from the adversarial parties. The idea is to prevent free usage
of the trained models by the adversarial parties. In the PrivateGraph framework, the final
21
model is known only to the data owner at the end of the learning process. Another approach
is to split the models into two components shared by two parties in a Cloud - CSP or
a two-server architecture [21]. The SecureBoost framework [23] (Chapter 5) takes this
approach. Another approach is to train the models on a transformed message space with
the transformation keys hidden from the adversaries [25, 24, 1]. We take a similar approach
in our deep learning framework Disguised-Nets (See Chapter 6) [25]. Differentially private
deep learning frameworks [32, 33], however, were shown to be vulnerable to model-based
attacks despite satisfying ε-differential privacy [34] as the models are revealed to the cloud
provider if used in the outsourced learning setting.
In Chapter 6, I present a new model-based attacks known as class-membership attack.
Given access to a machine learning model, an adversary may probe the model with arbitrary
test data and analyze the model’s output distribution. For a well-performing model, the
adversary can easily observe if the target model classifies test images from the same class
to a single class consistently or not. The former observation infers the target class was
present in the training dataset, whereas the latter infers the opposite. Any machine learning
framework that reveals its model is susceptible to this attack. However, we show that with
our image disguising techniques in the Disguised-Nets framework, such attacks fail.
2.3 Cryptographic and Privacy Primitives
In this section, I describe the fundamental building blocks of CML frameworks for out-
sourced machine learning — the cryptographic and privacy primitives. A confidential
framework relies on one or more of these primitives. Some of the primitives are more
expressive meaning they can implement many functions, however less efficient. On the
other hand, some of the primitives are more efficient but less expressive. I aim to famil-
iarize the readers with the basic idea behind some representative primitives and highlight
their advantages and disadvantages. This section will serve as the background to the later
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sections where we will show the construction of CML frameworks with these primitives
and the functions these primitives play in balancing the tradeoffs amongst cost, privacy,
and utility.
Additive homomorphic encryption (AHE). HE schemes (e.g. Paillier public-key
encryption [37]) allow the additive operation over encrypted messages without decryption.
Conceptually1, with one of the operands unencrypted, the “pseudo-homomorphic” multi-
plication between two messages can be expressed as several additions. With the homo-
morphic addition and the “pseudo-homomorphic” multiplication, one can derive pseudo-
homomorphic dot-product of vectors, matrix-vector multiplication, and matrix-matrix mul-
tiplication. However, the unencrypted operands in these operations either need to be non-
sensitive information or protected with some masking and de-masking mechanism. ElGa-
mal, Goldwasser-Micali, Benaloh, and Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystems are some addi-
tional examples of AHE schemes [38].
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE). Although there are many encryption
schemes in this category (e.g., BV, NTRU, GSW, BFV, and BGN [38]), we concentrate on
the ring learning-with-error (RLWE) scheme. The RLWE scheme is a lattice-based cryp-
tosystem which relies on the intractability of the learning-with-errors (LWE) problem in
specific polynomial rings [39]. It allows both homomorphic additions and multiplications.
Theoretically, it supports arbitrary levels of multiplications, therefore, considered to be
fully homomorphic. However, due to the large cost for multiple levels of multiplications,
the RLWE scheme is more suitable as a SHE scheme (i.e., when used for 1-3 levels of
multiplications only). Message packing [39]enables packing multiple ciphertexts into one
polynomial which considerably reduces RLWE’s ciphertext size. With message packing,
matrices and vectors can be stored in a special format to accomplish efficient dot products,
matrix-vector multiplications, and matrix-matrix multiplications [40].
Garbled Circuits (GC).Garbled Circuits (GC) [14] allow two parties, each holding an
1Paillier allows more efficient multiplication.
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input to a function, to securely evaluate a function without revealing any information about
the respective input data, as a secure two-party computation. A GC can express arbitrary
functions using several basic gates such as AND and XOR gates. One party constructs the
circuit and the other evaluates it. The GC constructor encrypts and garbles the entries of the
truth table for each gate in the circuit to avoid information leakage to the circuit evaluator.
All inputs to the circuit are labels and their secure transmission happens via the 1-out-of-
2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) [41] protocol. Several GC optimization techniques have been
developed, such as Free XOR gates [42], Half AND gates [43], and OTExtensions [41],
however, GC still incurs high communication costs, requiring careful and minimal use in
confidential frameworks. FastGC [44] and ObliVM [17] are two notable GC implementa-
tions available out there.
Randomized Secret Sharing. The randomized secret sharing method [20] protects
data by splitting it into two (or multiple) random additive shares to be held by two (or
multiple) non-colluding untrusted parties. Fundamental operations such as addition and
multiplication are straightforward and produce results that are also random shares. Multi-
plication, however, is expensive as it has to depends on the beaver triplet generation method
[20, 21] which depends on expensive AHE or Oblivious Transfer (OT) schemes to exchange
the intermediate results securely.
Perturbation Techniques. With perturbation techniques, data owners inject noises
into sensitive data for confidential outsourcing. Data perturbation can protect either the
original data [45, 46, 26] or the output of certain computations, e.g., in differential privacy
[47]. In confidential learning frameworks that require training models over the actual data
in protected form, additive perturbation and differential privacy have a more restrictive use
— typically, limited to masking intermediate results before decryptions by an adversarial
party [48, 22]. Some multiplicative perturbation methods, such as rotation perturbation
[49], random projection perturbation [46], and geometric data perturbation [26], are rele-
vant in outsourced confidential mining. These methods enable learning of several “pertur-
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bation invariant” analytic algorithms over the transformed data. Although more efficient
than the cryptographic methods, the perturbation techniques may not provide semantic se-
curity and rely on empirical security analysis.
Note: Most cryptographic primitives such as the AHE, SHE, GC, and Randomized
Secret Sharing provide semantic security2 the perturbation techniques do not.
2 Nothing can be learned by an adversary about a plaintext from available ciphertext that could not be




I devote this chapter to formalize and elaborate the two construction process for confiden-
tial machine learning (CML) frameworks for outsourcing. The decomposition-mapping-
composition (DMC) process for constructing CML frameworks decomposes the target ma-
chine learning algorithm into its sub-components and maps those sub-components to differ-
ent cryptographic and privacy primitives before composing the final CML frameworks, as
I will elaborate in Section 3.1). The frameworks constructed with the DMC process carry
over the semantic security provided by the ingredient cryptographic and privacy primitives
hence provide stronger privacy guarantees. Alternatively, when the DMC process and at-
tempting to guarantee semantic security in CML frameworks become impractical hence one
may have to rely on cheaper perturbation techniques to construct the CML frameworks in
Section 3.2. These techniques increase the cost-efficiency but lower the privacy guarantees
in the CML frameworks. Whenever the semantic security delivered by the DMC process is



































Figure 3.1: The decomposition-mapping-composition (DMC) process for constructing con-
fidential machine learning frameworks.
3.1 The DMC Process for Semantically Secure Frameworks
This section focuses on the decomposition-mapping-composition (DMC) process for con-
structing CML frameworks for outsourcing. I establish the DMC process to systemize
the construction process of several existing CML frameworks. The DMC process decom-
poses the target machine learning algorithm into its sub-components and maps those sub-
components to different cryptographic and privacy primitives before composing the final
CML frameworks. Figure 3.1 depicts the DMC process. First, I examine the decomposition
of machine learning algorithms into their sub-components. Then, I explore their mappings
to different cryptographic and privacy primitives while examining the associated advan-
tages, disadvantages, and cost bottlenecks. I then describe the two distinct strategies one
may take in composing the CML frameworks: 1) the homogenous composition strategy of
relying on a single cryptographic or privacy primitive and 2) the hybrid strategy of mixing
and switching between several cryptographic and privacy primitives. Furthermore, I intro-
duce the crucial idea of replacing expensive or difficult to implement algorithms and their
sub-components with their crypto-friendly alternatives before the final composition of the
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CML frameworks.
3.1.1 Decomposing Machine Learning Algorithms into the Basic Com-
ponents
Be it unsupervised (clustering and dimension reduction) or supervised (classification and
regression), machine learning algorithms are useful across areas ranging from healthcare
and education to entertainment. Some of these algorithms are more simplistic, for exam-
ple, perceptrons and linear means classifiers (LMC), whereas some more complicated, for
example, Adaboost, SVMs, and deep neural networks. The complexity of these algorithms
boils down to the complexity of their sub-components. It also directly relates to the ease
and practicality of constructing the corresponding CML frameworks for these algorithms.
Some of the sub-components are easier to translate to their confidential versions whereas
some more difficult (or even impossible). The success of CML frameworks depends on the
decomposition and efficient mapping of the sub-components to their confidential versions.
Here, we briefly review the common sub-components of different machine learning meth-
ods — from arithmetic operations to linear algebraic operations. It will be the doorway
to the next sections in this chapter where we will examine how researchers translate these
components to their confidential versions.
Most of the machine learning algorithms can be broken down into linear algebraic
operations such as transpositions, vector dot products, matrix/vector additions/subtractions,
matrix-vector multiplications, matrix factorizations, and inversions, and functions such as
exponentiations, sigmoid, ReLu, tanh, and softmax operations. In non-vectorized form,
these operations can be further broken down to simple arithmetic operations like additions,
subtractions, multiplications, division, and comparisons.
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3.1.2 Mapping Basic Components with Cryptographic and Privacy
Primitives
With the knowledge of different cryptographic and privacy primitives and decomposition
of machine learning algorithms to their sub-components, we now slowly immerse into the
construction methods the CML frameworks take. We devote this subsection in inspecting
the mapping of the foundational sub-components of the target machine learning algorithms
to their confidential versions. We observe that some of these mappings are practical or
crypto-friendly, whereas some may face cost-bottlenecks and other limitations. The dis-
cussions around crypto-friendliness of the algorithms and their sub-components will even-
tually determine the actual composition strategies researchers take in composing the CML
frameworks as we will discuss in the following sub-section.
Arithmetic Operations
Simple operations of additions, subtractions, and multiplications are fundamental compo-
nents of any data-analytic algorithm. One can map these operations to different crypto-
graphic and privacy primitives and construct their corresponding confidential versions.
With AHE or a SHE encryption scheme, one can conveniently add two encrypted inte-
gers. With a special integer encoding, subtraction is straight-forward with encrypted addi-
tions. SHE schemes allow homomorphic multiplications over encrypted integers. RLWE-
like crypto-systems allow several rounds of multiplications and additions, however, with
growing noise, cipher size, and cost. On the other hand, the AHE scheme requires one of
the operands be unencrypted, which lets one express multiplication as a series of summa-
tions. The only caveat of using AHE-multiplication is that if the unencrypted operand is
privacy-sensitive a mechanism to hide it for example masking needs to be augmented, the
masking recoverable after the multiplication is complete [22, 18], as exemplified by our
PrivateGraph framework (See Chapter 4).
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Additions and subtractions are trivial with randomized secret sharing, in the multi-
party setting. Each party performs additions and subtractions on respective shares of data
and share the results for recovery. A GC-protocol for addition requires two parties to con-
struct O(l) many AND gates and carry out O(l) communication, encryptions, and decryp-
tions along with O(l) oblivious transfers when adding two l bit integers. Multiplication
with randomized secret sharing involves a costly multiplicative triplet generation scheme
that relies on Oblivious transfer or AHE [20, 21]. For example, the AHE-based scheme in-
curs transmission of 2 encrypted integers between the parties and performing 2 homomor-
phic encryptions, multiplications, additions, and decryptions by each party. Multiplying
two integers of l bits with GC, on the other hand, requires construction and evaluation of
O(l2) AND gates involving O(l2) communication, encryption, and decryption.
Comparison
Comparison is essential in sorting vectors, building binary trees, training perceptrons and
k-nearest neighbors, and applying activation functions such as ReLU, Sigmoid, and Tanh
crucial to deep neural networks. Unfortunately, comparing two encrypted or protected
integers is not trivial. Graepel et al. [15] pose the complexity of comparison as the reason
to avoid algorithms like perceptrons and logistic regression in their FHE-based confidential
ML framework. Do we have to avoid comparisons altogether in CML frameworks? Can
we perform at least a few comparisons confidentially? These are some decisive questions
one faces in the composition of many CML frameworks.
Thijs Veugen [50] presented a client-server interactive comparison protocol for two
encrypted integers based on the AHE scheme. Given two encrypted messages which are l
bit integers at most, the solution involves server-client iterative process involving compu-
tation and transfer of l many AHE-encrypted bits. For each comparison, the scheme incurs
O(l) homomorphic multiplications for both client and server and O(l) encryption for the
client.
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Lu et al. [16] uses the technique of “greater than” protocol [51] optimized with the
message packing of RLWE scheme for comparing two encrypted messages, in a 2-party
setting. However, the complexity of the proposed operation is outrageous O(2l/h) ho-
momorphic additions for comparing two l− bit integers while packing h messages in a
ciphertext.
With GC, a comparison between two l bit integers is possible with a l AND gates
and O(l) communication, encryption, and decryption by the two parties. Since GC-based
comparison for full integers can be expensive, an efficient one-bit sign checking protocol is
possible [21, 23] by encoding negative integers as two’s complement. We take this strategy
SecureBoost framework however only minimally.
Division
Integer division of the form q = n/d has a special value in analytics. Its usage varies from
computation of simpler mean to implementation of complex algorithms such as K-means
[52], and Levenshtein distance [53]. Despite its prevalence and importance, translating
division to its confidential version is difficult and is often a bottleneck [54]. As a result, Iin
our frameworks, we limit divisions to plain-text operations only.
Veugen [55] presents a protocol for exact division in a client-server scenario, using the
AHE scheme and additive noise masking. However, the divisor has to be public knowledge.
Despite that, the protocol requires O(l) homomorphic comparisons and O(l) encrypted
communication. Dahl, Chao, and Tomas [56] present two AHE-based division schemes
with Taylor approximation in a secure multiparty setting. For l bit integers, the schemes
still brought expensive O(l) encrypted communication and O(1) homomorphic operations.
It is possible to perform integer divisions with GC when the two parties hold the numerator
and denominator respectively in a 2-party setting [54, 19]. However, even with several
optimizations, for two l bit integers, this involves construction and evaluation of a circuit
with O(l) non-XOR gates [54].
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Linear Algebraic Operations
As vector data is the most common form of modeling data and most machine learning al-
gorithms are vectorizable, the CML frameworks must realize the linear algebra operations,
efficiently and securely. Linear algebra operations, such as vector products, matrix-vector
multiplication, and matrix-matrix multiplications are simply extensions of the arithmetic
operations we discussed earlier and are used extensively, including the CML frameworks
we present in this dissertation. As matrix and vector additions are quite straightforward to
implement with the primitives, we will skip them and focus on vector dot products: xTk yk,
matrix-vector multiplication: (Ak×nbk), and matrix-matrix multiplications: An×kBk×n.
More complex operations such as matrix inversion and decomposition are non-trivial and
must depend on novel protocol designs to achieve practical costs.
A dot product xTk yk involves O(k) element-wise homomorphic multiplications and
additions. Similarly, a matrix-vector multiplication involvesO(nk) homomorphic multipli-
cations and additions, and a matrix-matrix multiplication involves O(nkm) multiplications
and additions. If one utilizes the message packing feature of RLWE-like SHE scheme, the
vector and matrix operations can be vectorized with message packing resulting in more
efficiency [40]. With the AHE scheme, one of the operands must remain unencrypted for
these multiplicative operations. Jiang et al. [57] present a more optimized matrix-matrix
multiplication with only O(k) complexity for symmetric matrices of k dimensions.
Randomized secret sharing enables linear algebraic operations with the multiplica-
tive triplet generation approach in a multi-party setting. However, this involves the ex-
pensive AHE or OT based multiplicative triplet generation schemes as used in [21, 20].
Therefore, the CML frameworks that deploy the randomized secret sharing based matrix-
multiplication regard the triplet generation process as an offline phase and the faster plain-
text local steps as the online phase. In computing a matrix-vector multiplication Ab, each
party is responsible for O(n + k) encryptions and upload, O(nk) homomorphic multipli-
cations, O(nk + n) homomorphic additions, and O(n) decryptions.
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Linear algebra operations can easily be mapped to garbled circuits. GC-based vec-
tor and matrix addition/subtraction require O(kl) and O(nkl) AND gates and O(kl) and
O(nkl) communication, encryptions, and decryptions respectively, where l is the number
of bits in the vector and matrix elements. GC-based dot product for two l bit vectors with
k dimensions is a collection of sub-circuits for multiplication and additions which consist
of O(kl2) AND gates, each involving O(l2) encryption and decryptions, O(l2) encrypted
communication. The GC-based dot product can be extended to matrix-vector and matrix-
matrix multiplication quite easily. In general, GC-based linear algebra solutions are more
expensive.
Empirical Comparison of Different Confidential Components
Now, I present an empirical comparison of the confidential versions of the basic compo-
nents of machine learning I presented above. This will aid us in understanding the trade-
offs of opting for a certain cryptographic or privacy primitive when designing the CML
frameworks.
I use the HELib library [58] for the RLWE encryption scheme, implement the Pail-
lier cryptosystem [37] for the AHE encryption scheme, and use the ObliVM (oblivm.com)
library for the garbled circuits. I use the AHE schemes for the multiplicative triplet genera-
tion when using randomized secret sharing method. I pick cryptographic parameters corre-
sponding to 112-bit security and all schemes allow at least 32-bit messages-space overall.
The RLWE parameters allow 32-bit message-space overall, 1 full vector replication, and at
least 2 levels of multiplication. Note again that the GC and SecSh cost are for a two-party
setting and involve communication between the two parties. We encode all messages with
32-bit precision. I run the experiments on Intel i7-4790K CPU running at 4.0 GHz using
32 GB RAM and running Ubuntu 18.04.
Table 3.1 compares the related cost of arithmetic operations over integers. We ob-
serve that the AHE scheme results in the most efficient arithmetic additions and multi-
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plications. However, when it came to operations of comparison and division, the 2-party
garbled circuits are the only viable option. Table 3.2 compares the costs for the linear
algebraic operations. The observation is consistent with the simpler arithmetic operation
of additions and multiplications. As one can fit multiple messages in a ciphertext when
using RLWE scheme, the vectorized additions and multiplications are much more efficient
than the non-vectorized additions and multiplications. The RLWE with message packing
realizes homomorphic additions more efficiently when compared to the Paillier scheme.
The RLWE costs for dot product and matrix-vector multiplication involve the ciphertext
replication costs. Although better than without message packing, RLWE scheme with the
vectorized linear algebraic operation is still not as good as the Paillier solutions. Random-
ized secret sharing is almost free for vector addition but involves higher computation and
communication costs for the dot product and matrix-vector multiplication. Garbled circuits
appear to be the worst solution for the confidential versions of the linear algebraic operation
with higher computation and communication cost between the two parties.
Table 3.1: Costs for arithmetic operations for different privacy primitives at 112-bit secu-
rity.
Operations
AHE (Paillier) SHE (RLWE) Garbled Circuits Secret Sharing
Comp Comp Comp Comm Comp Comm
Addition/Subtraction 0.01 ms 0.2 ms 37 ms 2 KB 0.0 0.0
Multiplication 0.05 ms 39 ms 138 ms 40 KB 1 s 2 KB
Comparison 429 h 105h 37 ms 2 KB - -
Division - - 208 ms 46 KB - -
Table 3.2: Costs for linear algebra operations for different privacy primitives at 112-bit
security. v100×1 and M100×100.
Operations
AHE (Paillier) SHE (RLWE) Garbled Circuits Secret Sharing
Comp Comp Comp Comm Comp Comm
Vector Addition 0.6 ms 0.2 ms 36 ms 192 KB 0.0 0.0
Dot Product 6 ms 39 ms 5 secs 4 MB 7 s 195 KB
Matrix-vector Multiplication 1 s 3 mins 8 mins 396 MB 7 s 290 KB
Note: The choice of confidential components for CML frameworks affects the data
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owners as well. The data owners are responsible for encrypting or protecting and uploading
the modeling data to the untrusted platforms. Generally, the AHE-based schemes are more
efficient than the SHE schemes in terms of encryption, decryption, and upload-payloads (or
cipher-size). With message packing, RLWE performance improves in all fronts — espe-
cially in terms of encryption and decryption efficiency. With randomized secret sharing, the
data owners need not encrypt their messages as the secret is divided into arithmetic shares
and distributed between the multiple parties. When using the GC-based CML frameworks,
the data owners either rely on the encryption schemes, the randomized secret sharing, or
arithmetic masking to preserve data confidentiality.
3.1.3 Composing Confidential Components into the Final CML Frame-
works.
.
In the DMC process, one decomposes the target machine learning algorithms into their
sub-components and map them to different cryptographic and privacy primitives. While the
expressive but expensive primitives of FHE and GC can translate arbitrary operations to
their confidential versions (at least theoretically), the less expressive but efficient prim-
itives of SHE, AHE, and randomized sharing can only translate a smaller and simpler
subset of operations. Sole reliance on FHE or GC in designing CML frameworks is not
always practical. I name the CML frameworks composed in such a homogenous manner
as the homogenous frameworks. These frameworks may disregard the associated cost im-
practicality and utility constraints of using one primitive. A more practical and beneficial
strategy is to map different sub-components of the target machine learning algorithm to
different cryptographic and privacy primitives to optimize the overall cost. I call such an
approach, the hybrid composition strategy. The idea is to choose an assortment of confiden-
tial components that result in the least cost burden when constructing a CML framework.
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I devote this subsection to outline the benefits of taking the hybrid composition strategy
over the straight-forward homogenous approach. Then, I look at the challenges of mixing
and switching between different primitives in the hybrid composition of the CML frame-
works, followed by a discussion on how some common switches are carried out. Finally, I
describe some automated approaches for composing the CML frameworks and associated
limitations.
Homogenous Composition and its Limitation
Homogenous frameworks rely on the expressive but expensive SHE (theoretically FHE)
or garbled circuits exclusively. These frameworks are easier to implement. However, due
to the associated cost bottlenecks and restrictions, homogenous frameworks prove to be
impractical.
Graepel et al. [15] present a SHE-based framework for learning Fisher’s linear dis-
criminant analysis and Linear Means Classifiers on encrypted data. However, the resulting
models are linear and fail to perform well with non-linearly separable datasets. Similarly,
Lu et al. [16] present a SHE-based framework for outsourcing principal component analy-
sis and linear regression. However, due to the limited message space of the selected SHE
implementation (60-bits in HELib) and no intermediate decryptions in between computa-
tions, the proposed algorithms were impractical beyond a few-dimensional data (about 20)
and a few iterations (thus generating sub-optimal models). Liu et al. [17] present a GC-
based KMeans involving two untrusted servers, however, the associated cost overburden
is far from practical in real-world settings. For example, the KMeans implementation re-
quired over 2,000 million AND gates and more than 200 GB communication for clustering
just 6,000 data points.
It is usually impossible to build homogenous frameworks with additive (partial) homo-
morphic encryption schemes, as the number and kind of operations over the encrypted data
is limited. Researchers depend on intermediate decryption and re-encryption aided with
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some masking techniques to construct CML frameworks with these primitives ( e.g. the
PrivateGraph framework [22]). Similarly, some privacy primitives may inherently rely on
other primitives for achieving certain operations. For example, randomized secret sharing
relies on OT or AHE schemes to perform multiplications [21].
Hybrid Composition Strategy
As I discussed above, depending on a cryptographic or privacy primitive in composing the
CML frameworks is not always practical. Most primitives are efficient in translating cer-
tain operations whereas lousy in translating the others. Interestingly, some primitives are
incapable of translating certain operations at all. One must take into factor this observa-
tion when composing a CML framework. An intuitive strategy thus is to map the various
components of the target machine learning algorithm to different cryptographic and pri-
vacy primitives to minimize the overall computation and communication cost. The idea
of hybrid composition is thus: mix and switch amongst different primitives to avoid the
associated cost bottlenecks and restrictions to finalize the most cost-effective assortment of
confidential components that will compose the final CML framework. Next, I explore some
of the pressing challenges in composing CML frameworks with the hybrid strategy, the dif-
ferent switching and mixing strategies that have been adopted by existing frameworks, and
finally, the research around automating the actual composition.
Challenges of Hybrid Composition. The foremost challenge of the hybrid strategy
is determining the most efficient mapping between the sub-components of the target algo-
rithm and the cryptographic or privacy primitives. Given the candidate confidential com-
ponents, one may have to extensively experiment and hand-pick the most practical assort-
ment of confidential versions of the sub-components. Second, when the chosen confidential
components depend on different cryptographic primitives, mixing them and switching the
computation flow from one primitive to another in the CML frameworks without any leak-
age can be tricky. One may have to incorporate a second party (e.g. a CSP) to simplify the
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CML frameworks[23, 21, 18, 19]. This facilitates intermediate decryptions, garbled circuit
constructions, and switching between different primitives in the CML frameworks. One
must patch any potential leakage during the switching adaptations, e.g. masking the inter-
mediate results with additive noise [18, 19, 23, 21, 22]. Third, it is vital to ensure the inputs
and outputs of the diverse components are inter-compatible, in terms of data encoding and
precision [23]. For example, in the SecureBoost framework (Chapter 5), the GC com-
ponent accommodates the number of bits in the homomorphically encrypted intermediate
results. Similarly, the GC security matches the security level of the AHE and SHE schemes
in that framework. One must also be mindful of the additional cost of switching and mix-
ing different confidential components in the CML frameworks and ensure the switching is
cheaper than continuing computations without switching. Finally, it is challenging to en-
sure a fair distribution of cost amongst the involved parties. The light-weight parties such
as the end-users should remain light-weight, whereas the heavier weight parties such as the
cloud provider must take over the majority of cost burdens. The three frameworks I present
in this dissertation succeed in maintaining such a fair cost distribution among the involved
parties.
Different Switching and Mixing Strategies. Switching from a HE component to a
GC component (HE →GC) requires a second server (e.g., CSP) in the framework. The
straightforward approach is to include a data decryption circuit inside the garbled circuit,
however, this is super-expensive [18]. A more practical strategy [18, 23] is to have the party
with the encrypted data to mask the data homomorphically and send it to the second un-
trusted party for decryption as in the SecureBoost framework. The second party constructs
the desired GC and the two parties continue with the GC evaluation, where their inputs will
be the masked data and the masking key respectively. A switch from randomized secret
sharing to a GC, SecSh→ GC, is straightforward as the two random in possession of the
two parties can their respective private inputs to the garbled circuits [21, 23]. A switch
from randomized secret sharing to a HE component, SecSh→ HE, needs the two involved
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parties to encrypt their respective shares and let one of the parties to homomorphically re-
construct the protected value from the shares. Similarly, a switch from a HE component to
a randomized secret sharing protocol, HE→SecSh, includes a masking mechanism (homo-
morphic noise addition) similar to the HE→ GC switch. These two switches are relevant
in the AHE-based multiplicative triplet generation protocol for randomized secret sharing
[21, 20]. The ABY framework [20] packages different adapter-like switching protocols for
the multi-party computation settings, where two servers hold the training data as arithmetic,
boolean, or Yao’s garbled shares. The work, however, disregards the switch from and to
the homomorphic encryption schemes.
Table 3.3 provides some examples of switching privacy and cryptographic primitives
in contemporary CML frameworks including the SecureBoost framework I present in this
work. I illustrate in the table, the respective operation switches that led to the primitive
switches in these examples. These switchings lead to simplification of the CML framework
and cost optimizations.
Table 3.3: Examples for primitive switching strategies in hybrid composition of CML
frameworks.
Framework Primitive Switch Operation Switch Justification
SecureBoost [23] (Chapter 5) SHE→ GC
Matrix vector multiplication→
Sign Check
Sign checking is impractically
expensive with SHE
whereas tolerable with GC.
Nikolaenko et al. [19] AHE→ GC
Matrix Additions→
Cholesky’s decomposition
The operations of division
and square root in Cholesky’s
decomposition were not feasible
with the AHE scheme.




over randomly shared secrets
leading the switch to
the garbled circuits.
Mohassel et al. [21] GC→ SecSh Comparison→ Vector Subtraction
Use of garbled circuits
for comparison was
unavoidable however
continuing GC on to vector
subtraction would result in
excessive cost overhead.
Demmler et al. [20] SecSh→ AHE/OT Data at rest→Multiplication
Multiplication with random shares
required switching to either
AHE or OT protocol involving the
two parties in the frameworks.
Automated Optimization of Composition. Most existing CML frameworks that em-
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brace the hybrid composition strategy [21, 23, 22, 19], including the CML frameworks I
present in this dissertation, are manually composed as there are myriads of problem-specific
details to address. Composition of a practical and working CML framework is possible only
with extensive insights on the target machine learning algorithms, the ability to decompose
them into the constituting components, mapping them appropriately to the cryptographic
or privacy primitives, and conducting extensive heuristics and experimentation before the
final composition. A line of research explores the possibility of automatically composing
the CML frameworks [59, 60]. Although promising, the automatic composition strategy
of Dreier and Kerschbaum [59] depends on the availability of an extensive performance
matrix for the different confidential versions of the target algorithms’ components. He-
necka et al. [60] propose the TASTY compiler that automatically compiles a given CML
problem as a mixture of garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption in a secure two-
party computation framework. However, the process is not fully automated. It requires a
privacy expert to design and specify the components together with the recommended map-
pings. As we will see in the next section, the successful construction of practical CML
frameworks involves one more crucial step that the automated approaches cannot do. One
must build an in-depth understanding and analysis of the target algorithms and their sub-
components to determine their “crypto-friendliness” before the actual composition of the
CML frameworks. A practical CML framework either completely restricts or limits the use
of algorithms and sub-components that are not crypto-friendly.
3.1.4 Composing with Alternative Crypto-friendly Algorithms or Com-
ponents
Once one decomposes the target machine learning algorithm to its sub-components and
maps them to at least one cryptographic or privacy primitive, the final composition of the
corresponding CML framework becomes almost trivial. With enough experimentation, one
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can maintain a performance matrix for different confidential versions of the common sub-
components and even automate the composition as we discussed earlier. However, a crucial
design step in composing CML frameworks is the identification of algorithms and their
sub-components that are going to hit cost bottlenecks or impracticality in implementation
of their confidential versions. One must either alter, replace, or optimize such crypto-
unfriendly algorithms or their sub-components to simplify the CML frameworks and reduce
the associated cost burden. One must also maximize any possible cost-cutting opportunities
that are available.
One can construct the crypto-friendly alternatives for the expensive and impractical
algorithms or their sub-components with a slight modification or with a substitution. Such
adjustments may or may affect the expected results of learning. For example, the use of
an approximate or sub-optimal component or algorithm may degrade the machine learning
model quality. Table 3.4 summarizes some example CML frameworks that take different
strategies to make their protocols crypto-friendly and reduce the overall cost. Mohassel
et al. [21], in their SecureML work, substitute the expensive softmax operation involving
inverses with a ReLU-based function involving only one division. This way, the framework
limits operations causing major cost bottlenecks in their random secret sharing and AHE
based protocol. Graepel et al. [15] cleverly avoid division of encrypted data in their con-
fidential linear means classifier and Fisher’s linear discriminant analysis by including the
division component as a multiplicative factor. Nikolaenko et al. [19] use the more efficient
Cholesky’s decomposition instead of the expensive LU decomposition in solving a sys-
tem of linear equations in their linear regression framework. Similarly, in the SecureBoost
framework [23] in Chapter 5, I propose learning a boosting classifier over encrypted data as
an ensemble of random linear classifiers (RLC) instead of decision stumps. An RLC takes
mereN encrypted comparisons, whereas a decision stump takes far too many comparisons.
Naehrig et al. [61] replace the exponential function (the sigmoid) in their logistic re-
gression protocol with the Taylor approximation of exponentiation. Computing the exact
41
exponential function would have led to computation of several levels of multiplications
over the encrypted message — which would have been intolerably expensive with SHE
schemes. Similarly, in the PrivateGraph framework [22] in Chapter 4, I replace the inher-
ently expensive eigen-decomposition O(N3) with cheaper eigen-approximations O(N2)
algorithms of Lancozs and Nyström in their spectral clustering framework. Although the
approximate algorithms introduce some degradation to the learned models, they deliver
desired cost practicality justifying the tolerable quality sacrifice.
Table 3.4: Example CML frameworks that replace the expensive algorithmic components
with their crypto-friendly versions.
Framework ML Algorithm Original Component Crypto-friendly Component Benefits
Mohassel et al. [21]
Logistic Regression,








Avoids division costs and
simplifies the protocol.
Nikolaenko et al. [18] Ridge Linear Regression LU decomposition Cholesky’s decomposition
Reduces the cost
complexity by half.




Naehrig et al. [61] Logistic Regression Exponentiation Taylor Expansion
Avoids costs involved in
multiple levels of multiplications.
PrivateGraph [22] (Chapter 4) Spectral Clustering Eigen decomposition
Eigen-approximation




Often, it becomes critical to take advantage of any available cost optimization oppor-
tunities, for example, preserving sparsity of data or sub-sampling. Nikolaenko et al. [18],
in their matrix factorization framework, use a sorting network to optimize a garbled circuit
based gradient descent algorithm by only updating it for the user ratings that are present
in the training dataset. I embrace this critical design factor in the PrivateGraph framework
[22] in Chapter 4 and propose a differential privacy based graph submission mechanism
which reduced total storage by over 15 times and costs involving encryptions and the as-
sociated homomorphic operations by over 20 times on the graph drastically when running
the secure Nyström method for spectral clustering.
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3.2 Avoiding Cryptographic Components Altogether.
Some CML frameworks that carefully follow the DMC process might still cost magni-
tudes more than the original plaintext algorithms. Especially if the learning algorithm is
intrinsically expensive and relies on a super-massive training dataset, the cryptographic and
privacy primitives that provide semantic security may become unrealistic. If one is satisfied
with the weaker security notions, one can adopt much cheaper alternatives to significantly
reduce the cost. For example, many perturbation-approaches do not guarantee semantic
security (e.g. ciphertext-only attacks) but enable efficient CML frameworks.
Figure 3.2 explains the idea of using perturbation techniques in constructing CML
frameworks as depicted by Chen and Liu [1]. The cost of data submission, computation,
and communication amongst the involved parties becomes minimal in the perturbation-
based frameworks, as no encryption is involved. The untrusted party carries out the com-
putations over the transformed data. As a consequence, the trained models are also in the
transformed space. Therefore, perturbation effectively hides both the data and models from
the adversary. Despite their efficiency, perturbation-approaches face two critical disadvan-
tages: 1) perturbation may cause some degradation to the model quality and 2) it may not
provide provable semantic security.
Chen and Liu [1] propose transforming sensitive training datasets with the geomet-
ric data perturbation (GDP) technique for outsourced learning of several transformation-
invariant data mining algorithms such as K-Nearest neighbor classifier and SVMs. GDP
involves an application of a sequence of random geometric transformations including mul-
tiplicative transformation, translation, and distance perturbation.
In the Disguised-Nets framework [62, 25] in Chapter 6, I disguise the training images
in their deep neural network learning framework with some transformation mechanisms.
The framework is considerably efficient than the deep learning framework constructed with
the expensive cryptographic primitives [21].
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Figure 3.2: The perturbation-based construction of a CML framework as depitcted by Chen
and Liu [1] . The data is transformed with cheaper perturbation mechanisms and the models
are trained over the transformed training data.
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PrivateGraph: Confidential Spectral
Analysis of Encrypted Graphs in Cloud
Big graphs, such as user interactions in social networks and customer rating matrices in
collaborative filters, possess great values for both businesses and research. They are not
only big but often keep involving, which entices data owners of big graphs to use cloud re-
sources to obtain storage and computation scalability. In this chapter, I present confidential
algorithms for one of the important graph analysis techniques - graph spectral analysis for
outsourced graph in the cloud. We consider a cloud-centric framework with three collab-
orative parties: data contributors, data owner, and cloud provider. Graphs are represented
as matrices such as adjacency matrix and Laplacian matrix, the elements of which are en-
crypted and submitted by distributed contributors. For a N × N graph matrix, my aim
was to design algorithms with the cloud handling expensive storage and computation in
O(N2) complexity, while data owner and data contributors’ algorithms take only O(N).
To achieve this goal, we follow the decomposition-mapping-composition (DMC) process
to develop the privacy-preserving versions of the two approximate eigendecomposition al-
gorithms: the Lanczos algorithm and the Nyström algorithm, considering two encryption




With the rise of social networks, mobile applications, and sensors, there has been a rapid
increase of data generation including graph data in areas of commerce, science, and health
industries [63]. Due to the sheer and continuously growing scale, data owners may want
to adopt the popularly available cloud resources to achieve both storage and computational
scalability. In this chapter, we study a cloud-centric graph spectral analysis framework that
protects privacy from curious cloud providers. Graph spectral analysis has many applica-
tions such as network partitioning [64], spectral clustering [65], and web ranking [66]. The
basic operation - eigendecomposition of big matrices has even broader applications such
as dimensionality reduction [67] and kernel-based learning methods [68]. To our knowl-
edge, there is no general framework that achieves a practical cloud-client work allocation
while providing strong security notions (e.g., semantic security) for complex data mining
algorithms such as graph analysis.
The cloud-centric framework consists of three major parties: the cloud, the data con-
tributors, and the data owner (or data curator), who collaboratively finish the mining task.
Under certain incentives, the data contributors will be willing to contribute their sensitive
data to the data owner and trust the data owner to properly protect their data privacy. On
the other hand, the data owner wants to use the public cloud resources to manage and mine
the ever-increasing user data, but does not trust that cloud providers will properly ensure
data privacy. As we consider only the privacy issues, we exclude the case that malicious
cloud providers will actively tamper the data or do not conduct the operations asked by
the data owner, which are being addressed by the orthogonal line of research on data and
computation integrity. Instead, we can assume that cloud providers will follow protocols to
honestly conduct the computations they are asked for. Therefore, the assumption “honest-
but-curious” cloud providers will be appropriate for our study.
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Scope and Contributions
The proposed framework aims to achieve the practical work partitioning between the cloud
and the client sides while preserving the privacy of data and analysis result. The cloud will
host the big encrypted graph matrix ofN×N dimensions (dense or sparse). In mining data,
the cloud will conduct the expensive (e.g., O(N2)) operations with parallel algorithms,
the data owner (and data contributors who may also participate) will take tasks of O(N)
complexity, which justifies the use of cloud for scalable and economical processing.
We consider two approximate algorithms for spectral analysis - the Lanczos method
[69] and the Nyström method [65]. Both can be possibly re-designed and cast to the cloud-
centric framework to achieve the practical work partitioning. The core of the Lanczos
method: matrix-vector multiplication (anO(N2) operation), and the core of the Nyströmethod:
matrix-matrix multiplication (an O(mN2) operation) should be done by the cloud. Both
involve only one level of multiplication, i.e., any element of matrix and vector involves in
only one multiplication, and multiple levels of additions. We study the application of two
types of homomorphic encryption methods: additive homomorphic encryption (AHE) and
somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE), which satisfy this special requirement and are
more efficient than the mentioned FHE and GC.
Our research addresses several challenges in applying the SHE and AHE methods un-
der the cloud-centric framework. (1) SHE allows one level of homomorphic multiplication
and thus it is straightforward to implement the cloud-side operations. However, their costs
are not fully understood yet. (2) AHE methods have smaller ciphertext size, which makes
storage and communication efficient, but they maintain only handicapped homomorphic
properties - one of the two operands have to be plaintext. Thus, the challenge to apply
AHE is twofold: to protect the privacy of the exposed operands, while make sure that data
owners’ costs stay in O(N).
Specifically, our research has four unique contributions listed below:
(1) Two data masking algorithms for protecting the exposed operands in matrix-vector
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and matrix-matrix multiplications, respectively, for AHE-encrypted data, while also main-
taining the client-side cost to stay in O(N). The first data masking algorithm is based on
the security guarantee provided by the Learning-with-Error (LWE) problem [70], designed
for the matrix-vector multiplication protocol. The second algorithm is based on matrix per-
turbation that is resilient to ciphter-text only attack, which is sufficient for one-time use of
perturbation matrix.
(2) We designed the AHE-based and SHE-based Lanczos algorithms and Nyström
algorithms that use the two data masking algorithms, respectively. The Nyström algorithms
are specifically designed to benefit from sparse graphs. Both achieve the practical work
allocation between the cloud and the client.
(3) We identify the privacy risk of submitting sparse graph matrices and design an effi-
cient local differentially private method for inserting fake edges that have indistinguishable
encrypted values E(0) (an important benefit by probabilistic public-key encryption) and do
not affect the accuracy of analysis.
(4) A thorough experimental evaluation has been conducted on AHE- and SHE-based
Lanczos and Nyström algorithms. Two most popular encryption schemes are used in the
evaluation: the Paillier method [37] for AHE and the Ring-LWE (RLWE) method [39] for
SHE. Our results show that the RLWE-based methods have lower computational costs for
data owners, while the Paillier-based methods have lower communication costs.
The remaining part of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we establish
the background knowledge about spectral analysis of large graph matrices and introduce
different AHE and SHE schemes. In Section 4.3 we give a detailed description of our
framework and the AHE- and SHE-based algorithms for privacy-preserving outsourced
graph spectral analysis, including the analyses on privacy guarantee and costs. We also
present the differentially private solution for sparse graph data submission.
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4.2 Preliminary
This section will setup the notations and give the background knowledge about the eigen-
decomposition problem for large matrices, the homomorphic encryption schemes we will
use, the integer conversion method, and differential privacy that will be used for privacy-
preserving sparse matrix submission. For clear presentation, we will use Greek letters for
scalars, lower-case letters for vectors, and capital letters for matrices, submatrices or sets.
Spectral Analysis
The core operation of graph spectral analysis is eigendecomposition of graph matrix, which
yields eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors. Eigenvalues and eigenvectors provide
valuable information about the structure of matrices and have been used in many data min-
ing algorithms such as social community detection [64], spectral clustering [65], web rank-
ing [66], dimensionality reduction [67], and kernel-based methods [68]. Specifically, for a
symmetric matrix A of size N ×N , we want to find the decomposition A = UΛUT , where
the matrix U consists of the eigenvectors and Λ is a diagonal matrix with eigenvalues on
the diagonal.
A complete eigendecomposition of aN×N matrix possesses a remarkable time com-
plexity of O(N3). Hence, approximate eigendecomposition algorithms are often used for
big N , including the power-iteration Lanczos [69] and matrix sampling based Nyström
methods [65]. These algorithms reduce the cost to O(kN2), k  N and return only the
top-k eigenvectors/values. The core and most expensive operation in these algorithms are
matrix-vector multiplication (for power-iteration methods) and matrix-matrix multiplica-
tion (for sampling methods). See Algorithm 1 and 2 for the fundamental steps of Lanczos
and Nyström methods respectively. These algorithms reduce the complexity with some
sacrifice in accuracy. Greater number of Lanczos iterations and greater sampling rate for
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Algorithm 1 Lanczos Method
1: b0← random N -dimensional vector;
2: for i← 1 to t do
3: bi ← Abi−1; // the most expensive step
4: αi ← bTi bi−1;
5: wi ← bi − αibi − βi−1bi−2, bi = 0fori < 0;
6: βi ←‖ wi−1 ‖;
7: bi ← wi−1/βi;
8: end for
9: αi and βi form a tridiagonal matrix Tt×t, the top-k eigenvalues and eigenvectors of which are
the approximation of A’s.
Algorithm 2 Nyström Method
1: s← generate random index set such that ‖s‖ = m < N ;
2: CN×m ← sample m column vectors from A;
3: Wm×m← matrix with rows and column indices in s;
4: decompose Wm×m to get top k eigenvalues Λk×k and eigen vectors Um×k;
5: compute CN×mUm×kΛ−1k×k;
Nyström account for better accuracy, which however, increase the computation cost.
Integer Conversion
For practical problems, the values are normally in floating-point representation. However,
all the discussed encryption schemes work on big integers. Thus, there are additional steps
to convert the data to integers for encryption and recover from the result integers to floating-
point numbers within acceptable precision losses. Since the homomorphic matrix-vector
operations we use include only multiple additions plus one multiplication at maximum, we
consider the following simple conversion. For a floating point value x, x ∈ R, if we would
like to preserve the precision of n-digit after the decimal point, we have
v = b10nxc mod q
where q is a large integer so that 10nx ∈ (−q/2, q/2). The modulo operation maps the
values to [0, q), where the negative values are mapped to the range (q/2, q). It is easy to
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check that x is recoverable: if v > q/2, x ≈ (v − q)/10n; otherwise, x ≈ v/10n. It’s also
easy to check that, if q is large enough to accommodate the operational results, the results,
including both sign and floating-point values, of addition and multiplication operations on
the converted values followed by mod q are preserved, and thus recoverable. We skip the
details. Aliasgari et al. [71] has a thorough discussion on this topic.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [47] is a standard notion in data privacy, which protects individual’s
privacy from the query-based privacy attacks. For two datasets A1 and A2 that differ in
exactly one record, let M(Ai) be the mechanism that outputs noisy statistics r ∈ R of the
datasets, then ε-differential privacy is satisfied if the following condition holds:
Pr[M(A1) = r] <= exp
ε Pr[M(A2) = r], (4.1)
where ε is the privacy parameter - the smaller it is, the better the preserved privacy. It has
been popularly applied to preserve data privacy in querying databases, where any users are
allowed to submit limited types of queries and a limited number of repetitive queries subject
to the ε setting. The mechanismM is defined as the additive perturbation of a specific query
function, such as the COUNT function: M(A) = COUNT(A) + random noise. The noise
in the output is engineered to approximately preserve the utility of the query function, yet
prevent distinguishing any individual records in the database. Laplacian noise is one of
the popular choices, where a noise is drawn from the Laplace distribution Lap(0, b), the




). The parameter b is determined by the user-
specified parameter ε and the sensitivity of query function: ∆ = max |M(A1) −M(A2)|,
and b = ∆/ε. For example, the COUNT function has the sensitivity ∆ = 1, and thus the
parameter b is set to 1/ε. In general, the smaller the ε setting is, the larger the ∆ value will

















Figure 4.1: A framework for cloud-centric privacy-preserving spectral analysis.
4.3 Framework and Core Algorithms
First, we will describe the privacy-preserving cloud-centric framework for graph spectral
analysis, the threat model, and security expectations. Second, we describe the AHE-based
Lanczos algorithm for dense matrices. Third, as many graphs are sparse, we study the
privacy issues with sparse representation, and design the privacy-preserving sparse-graph
submission protocol for data contributors. Fourth, we develop the AHE-based Nyström
method to benefit from the sparse representation. Finally, we will also describe the Lanczos
and Nyström algorithms based on the SHE schemes, and analyze the costs associated with
all the schemes. The cloud-side parallel processing will be briefly discussed due to the
simplicity of the related operations.
4.3.1 Framework
The involved parties in our framework are: 1) a data owner, denoted as “Owner”, who
owns the matrix data, 2) data contributors, denoted as “Contributors”, who agree on the
data owner’s privacy declaration and provide private data voluntarily (with or without re-
wards from the data owner), 3) a public cloud provider, denoted as “Cloud”, in a service
level agreement to provide scalable computation and storage, who is honest in providing
services, but curious about observed data.
Our aim here is to design practical privacy-preserving eigendecomposition algorithms
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for graph matrices where the public cloud learns nothing from the stored data, the com-
putations that occur within its infrastructure, and the interactions with other parties. One
of the key ideas is to let Owner and Contributors take a small amount of computation and
storage responsibility ofO(N) complexity, while Cloud takes more expensiveO(N2) parts
that can be implemented in parallel and scalable algorithms.
Specifically, Cloud stores the big encrypted matrix E(A) and conducts the expen-
sive homomorphic matrix-vector multiplication. Owner interacts with Cloud and assists
in the computation. When collecting data, Owner employs an asymmetric AHE or SHE
encryption scheme and publishes a public key for Contributors. Contributors encrypt their
submissions and use a web service or a mobile app to upload the encrypted data. Exam-
ples of such user data may include interactions between social network users, which are
used for detecting social network communities, or user ratings on products for training a
recommender system. This cloud-centric framework is particularly important for handling
continuously evolving matrix E(A), for which the analytic models should be periodically
updated, which are too expensive to be maintained locally by data owners.
4.3.2 Security Model
We make practical threat assumptions and only focus on the privacy threats from honest-
but-curious cloud providers. 1) The data contributors operate through secure systems and
no information is leaked to attackers. 2) The data owner’s infrastructure is secure. Our
framework cannot protect privacy from an insider attack issued by the data owner’s organi-
zation. 3) All communication channels are secure and data in transit is always protected. 4)
Our framework is not meant to ensure the integrity of data that is orthogonal to our work.
We are concerned with the confidentiality of the aggregated graph data which ties to
the data contributors’ privacy and the intermediate results. The final model is only revealed
to the data-owner hence protected from the adversarial Cloud.
Let us model a graph spectral analysis algorithm as a secure protocol GSA = (Enc,
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Prepare,Query), consisting of three polynomial-time protocols. After the initial stages
Enc and Prepare, the main body is a series of Query-Answering interactions between
Owner and Cloud: Owner queries Cloud and Cloud returns the result to Owner. Combined
with Owner’s local processing, it achieves the algorithmic goal.
(K,EG)← Enc(1h, G): is a multi-party protocol among three parties: Owner takes
a security parameter h and generates a key-pair K = (Pk, Sk); Contributors take Pk and
output an encrypted graph EG to Cloud.
(H)← Prepare(m): is a multi-party protocol among the three parties: Owner takes
some parameter m and works with Cloud (and Contributors) to get a helper data H . It’s a
one-time setup for securely processing queries later. For some algorithms, this step might
be skipped, or some parties may not participate.
(R)← Query(K, q, EG): is a two-party protocol between Owner that holds the key
K and a query q, and Cloud that holds the encrypted graph EG. Cloud processes q and
returns the query result R, which can be encrypted vectors or matrices depending on the
specific algorithm.
Security Definition. We define security guarantee as follows. (1) For graph encryp-
tion, the strongest definition is that given the encrypted graph, no adversary can learn any
information about the graph, which is used by the dense-matrix encryption method. (2)
We also define a weaker notion for the sparse-matrix encryption method, which does not
exactly protect each edge’s privacy, but uses differential privacy to protect each data con-
tributor from re-identification [72]. (3) The Prepare procedure does not leak any informa-
tion. (4) With either the dense or the sparse method, the protocol interactions do not leak
any additional information. Specifically, given the view of a polynomial number of Query
executions for an adaptively generated sequence of queries q = (q1, . . . , qn), no adversary
can learn any partial information about either G or q.
We adopt the idea of simulation-based security [73, 74] to formally define the protocol
security. The semi-honest adversary A (i.e., Cloud) observes the interactions between A
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and the challenger C (i.e., Owner), and tries to infer any useful information. Assume A
knows the encrypted graph EG, and the public key, but not the private key of K. S is a
simulator to simulate the interactions between A and C. The following gives the security
definition based on the Ideal and Real experiments.
IdealA,S(1
h): A generates a graphG and runs Enc(1h, G) with a public key provided
by S to generate EG. S runs Prepare to get the helper data. Then, A generates a poly-
nomial number of adaptively chosen queries (q1, . . . , qm). For each qi, A and S execute a
simulation of Query(K, qi, EG). S plays the role of Owner and A the role of Cloud.
RealA(1
h): A generates a graph G and runs Enc(1h, G) with a public key provided
by C to generate EG. C runs Prepare to get the helper data. A generates a polyno-
mial number of adaptively chosen queries (q1, . . . , qm). For each qi, A and C execute
Query(K, qi, EG).
In both settings, A computes a bit b that is the output by the experiment. We say
that the protocol is adaptively semantically secure if for all adversaries with probabilistic
algorithms running in polynomial time (i.e., PPT), there exists a PPT simulator S such that
|Pr(RealA(1h) = 1)− Pr(IdealA,S(1h) = 1)| = negl(h).
where negl(h) is a negligible function [75]. In proofs, we only need to show such a simu-
lator exists.
4.3.3 AHE-based Lanczos Construction for Dense Matrix
We first present the AHE-based Lanczos method (Lan-AHE) for dense matrix. The core
operation: Query implements the privacy-preserving matrix-vector multiplication with
client-cost O(N) and cloud-cost O(N2). Section 4.2 shows that the most expensive opera-
tion in the Lanczos iteration is bi+1 ← Abi1. Thus, the core of the algorithm is that Owner
uses Query to compute Abi1, which is combined with some O(N) local processing to
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implement the Lanczos algorithm. It also uses an IND-CCA secure AHE such as Paillier
to encrypt each element of the graph matrix in the dense form. The Prepare procedure
will generate some helper data for Owner quickly hiding bi and recovering the result Abi,
so that the desired security and efficiency goals are achieved. Cloud will take the expensive
task of computing Abi on the encrypted A. One key challenge is to compute E(Abi) with
E(A) and plaintext bi that needs to be protected to achieve the security guarantee - leaking
the set {bi} will allow the adversary to approximately reconstruct the matrix.
The basic idea is to submit a masked vector b̄i. The masking technique needs to
address two goals: (1) the masked vector does not leak any information to adversaries, i.e.,
b̄i cannot be distinguished from any uniformly random noise vector; (2) it is possible to
recover Abi from the result of Ab̄i efficiently, i.e., no more than O(N) complexity. The
design of the noise vector to meet these two goals is the key of this protocol. We describe
this protocol in detail as follows.
PrepareLan−AHE(h) :. This step consists of two substeps. (1) The data owner
selects h N -dimensional random vectors, {sj, j = 1..h}, where h is a constant related to
the security of the masking technique (e.g., h = 80), and sends them to cloud in plaintext.
These random vectors will be used to protect the vector bi in each iteration. The cloud will
compute E(Asj) and send back the results to the data owner, who will decrypt the results
to get the vectors cj = Asj, j = 1..h. After the initial setup, the masking results {cj}
will be incrementally updated when A is evolving. (2) The data owner also generates a
uniformly random vector b0 and distributes E(b0) to data contributors. b0 serves as a secret,
which is critical to the security of the whole protocol as shown in Section 4.3.5. Each data
contributor i computes E(Aib0) =
∑N
j=1AijE(b0j)), where b0j is the j-th element of b0 and
Aij is the j-th element of the row vectorAi, using pseudo homomorphic multiplication, and
sends back the single encrypted scalar E(Aib0) to the data owner. It follows that the costs
for data owner and data contributors in this step are O(N).
QueryLan−AHE(K,q,EG) : this protocol has two steps: the LWE-based masking to
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generate the query q (i.e., b̄i), and the efficient recovery method to get Abi from the query
result. Let q be the perturbed vector b̄i given as
b̄i = bi + ri mod p (4.2)
where bi is the vector to be protected, ri is a noisy vector, and p is a big random prime large
enough to contain all values and computation results in the application domain and guar-
antee the security of perturbed vectors (i.e., the brute-force enumeration is computational
intractable). The key of this perturbation is to guarantee ri cannot be distinguished from
any uniformly random vectors and still allow the efficient recovery of Abi from the result
of Ab̄i.
We design ri as follows to meet the two goals. Its security will be discussed later in
Section 4.3.5 based on the intractability of the Learning-with-Error problem in lattice [70].







βijbj + b0 mod p, (4.3)
where αil and βij are randomly drawn from Zp. This approach protects bi and its secu-
rity depends on the randomness of ri. Note that {sl} is already known by the cloud in
the preparation phase, which, however, does not compromise the security of ri due to the
learning-with-error (LWE) based security [70], as long as bj, j = 0..i− 1 are secret.
The recovery of Abi is performed at data owner as Ab̄i from the cloud is the result of







βjk(Abj) + (Ab0) mod p
with known ck = Ask and Abj, j < i in complexity O(N), Abi can be recovered with a
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O(N) cost. The correctness of this algorithm is easy to verify.
Algorithm 3 gives the detail of the privacy-preserving Lanczos algorithm. The cost
and security analysis will be discussed later.
Algorithm 3 AHE-based Lanczos Method
1: b0← random N -dimensional vector and encrypt E(b0) // data owner
2: download E(b0), compute E(Aib0), where Ai is a row of the matrix, and send back to data
owner // each data contributor
3: for i← 1 to t do
4: b̄i−1 ← perturbation based on {b0, .., bi−2} and seed vectors {s1, .., sh} and upload b̄i−1 //
data owner
5: compute E(Ab̄i−1) // cloud
6: download and decrypt E(Ab̄i−1) // data owner
7: recover bi from Ab̄i−1 // data owner
8: αi−1 ← bTi bi−1 // data owner
9: wi−1 ← bi − αibi−1 − βi−1bi−2, where bi = 0 for i < 0 // data owner
10: βi ← ‖wi−1‖ // data owner
11: bi ← wi−1/βi // data owner
12: orthogonalization of {bi} // data owner
13: end for
14: Post-processing to get k approximate eigenvectors //data owner
4.3.4 Construction of Secure Nyström with Differential Privacy and
AHE for Sparse Matrix
Many graphs are actually sparse, which has not been fully explored by the Lan-AHE al-
gorithm yet. This sparsity can be utilized to reduce the cloud data storage, cloud-side
computation, and the cost of contributors submitting data. For a matrix that has only M
non-zero elements on average per row, where M  N , with sparse representation the
submission cost is reduced to O(M) for each contributor, the cloud storage is reduced to
O(MN) fromO(N2), and the cost of the core matrix-vector computation is also reduced to
O(MN). This saving can be huge, as N is probably around millions while M is only hun-
dreds. However, straightforward sparse encoding may leak private information for graphs.
In the following, we will analyze this privacy risk, then present the specific Enc procedure
58
for sparse matrix, and finally develop the secure Nyström algorithm to take advantage of
the sparse matrix.
Privacy Leak on Sparse Graph Matrices and Our Protection Method
Let’s consider a typical graph matrix for spectral analysis: the normalized Laplacian graph
matrix. For an undirected graph, let D be the diagonal matrix with node degrees on its di-
agonal - Dii represents the degree of node i, i = 1..N . Let W be the adjacency matrix with
Wij =1 if and only if the edge (i, j) exists, and Wij = 0 otherwise. For undirected graphs,
W is a symmetric matrix, where each row(column) of W represents the corresponding
node’s adjacency edges. The normalized graph Laplacian matrix L is L = I − D−1W ,
where I is the N by N identity matrix. The eigenvectors of L can be used for graph
spectral clustering [76]. The matrix L is apparently sparse due to the sparsity of W . In tra-
ditional sparse encoding, the zero entries are skipped, while the non-zero ones are encoded
as (i, j, v) for entry index (i, j).
However, simply encrypting the non-zero entries does not preserve the privacy of the
matrix for several reasons. (1) The number of non-zero entries per row is the node degree
of the corresponding node. (2) The presence of a non-zero entry also implies the existence
of the corresponding edge. Both node degree and edge existence information can be used
in privacy attacks on social graphs [72].
Our method is to blend in fake edges to disguise both exact node degrees and edge
existence. As the encryption methods we use are all probabilistic, each time encrypting a
value (or evan the same value encrypted multiple times) will result in a different ciphertext
that cannot be distinguished from a uniformly random value. Therefore, the fake edges
(i.e., the zero entries in the matrix) cannot be distinguished from other entries as well.
Apparently, the added zero entries will not affect the result of matrix-vector operations.
The key question is to design a theoretically justified method for users to select the number
of fake edges, for which we apply the Laplace mechanism of differential privacy.
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The problem setting and data encoding method distinguish our method from previous
studies [72] on privacy-preserving graph publishing in several aspects. (1) Previous studies
aim to share data and models with curious parties but preserve node and edge privacy.
In contrast, we prevent data and models sharing from curious parties. (2) Most existing
methods change the authenticity of graph data by adding or removing nodes and edges.
Our method will completely preserve the authenticity of data as we add edges only and the
edges are encoded with indistinguishable E(0)s. (3) In our framework, data disguising is
done individually by each data contributor who only knows a little bit of global information
(i.e., a histogram of node degree distribution generated from sample nodes and distributed
by the data owner). Many existing methods have to work on the entire graph to determine
the graph perturbation scheme [72], which is impractical for big data hosting in the cloud.
Sparse Encoding for Graph Matrices
We briefly describe the sparse encoding method that preserves the eigen-structure and al-
lows the injections of encrypted zero entries. The following discussion will be specific to
sparse Laplacian graph matrices (i.e., the L matrix defined earlier) for spectral clustering;
other types of sparse matrices may need different encoding methods.
We use the following transformation that preserves the eigen-structure. Let H =
I − L = D−1W . Let the top-k eigenvectors of H be the eigenvectors corresponding to the
largest k eigenvalues. Clearly, we have the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. The top-k eigenvectors of H are the same as the bottom-k eigenvectors of
L.
It is easier for both the Lanczos and the Nyströ methods to obtain the top-k eigenvec-
tors than the bottom-k ones.
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Now, let Hi be the i-th row of H and its element hij, j = 1..N is
hij =
 1/Dii if Wij = 1 and i 6= j0 otherwise
With integer conversion and sparse encoding, the entries are encoded as (i, j, E(bγ/Diic)),
where γ is a large integer to preserve the desired precision if the edges exist; otherwise, with
some probability pi (to be described) it outputs (i, j, E(0)), i 6= j.
Bin-Based Differentially Private Graph Perturbation Algorithm
We will first describe the method to protecting node degrees and then discuss why it also
protects edge existence. Under the privacy assumption, the adversaries depend on counting
the submitted entries to estimate node degrees or the existence of edges. The basic idea
is to treat adversaries’ estimation on node degrees and edges as queries on the encrypted
matrix.
In the standard differential privacy definition, the goal is to disguise any specific per-
son among the entire set of persons that are related to the database. Thus, the key factor,
the sensitivity of function, is applied to the whole dataset, which, however, results in very
large sensitivity for functions related to node degree on graph datasets. As a result, data
contributors have to add many fake items to achieve the desired differential privacy, which
seriously impairs sparsity. Specifically, let the query function F () about node degree be
quite general, say finding the node degree ranked at k. Let A and A′ be the neighboring
graphs which differ by only one node. Thus, the sensitivity ∆ = max{F (A) − F (A′)} is
the difference between the largest and the smallest node degree. For a graph of N nodes,
this sensitivity can be up to N .
To achieve a better balance between privacy and sparsity, we use a bin-based method
to achieve weaker contributor indistinguishability, which is reduced from the whole graph
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to a subset of nodes in a bin. Specifically, we sort the nodes by their node degrees and then
partition the degree distribution by bins. The contributors in the same bin select the number
of fake edges with the bin-specific parameter, where the function sensitivity can be much
smaller. The node degree distribution can be estimated with the node degrees of randomly
sampled nodes. This can be achieved by the data owner asking some randomly selected
data contributors to submit encrypted node degrees before them submitting the graph data.
The data owner can then build a histogram to approximate the node degree distribution.
Apparently, this additional cost is quite low.
Specifically, we generate an equi-height histogram with the sample node degrees, e.g.,
for a 100-bin histogram, each bin contains about 1% of the nodes. The number of bins is
chosen so that each bin contains a moderate number of nodes, for example, a value in
(50, 100) to provide satisfactory indistinguishability. Let Ui be the maximum node degree
in the i-th bin, and Li be the minimum degree in the i-th bin. Now let A and A′ be the
neighboring graphs which differ from each other by only one node in the bin. We can
derive the sensitivity ∆i = max{F (A) − F (A′)} = Ui − Li, which should be much
smaller than N .
According to the noise design of differential privacy, we derive that the parameter b
of Laplace distribution Lap(0, b) to be (Ui − Li)/ε. However, this noise can be negative,
which asks the contributor to remove some edges and thus destroy the authenticity of data.
To avoid this problem, we add an offset to the noise to make it positive, which reduces the
overall sparsity but satisfactorily preserves both privacy and authenticity. For a specific b,
we can always identify the bound p for Pr(x < p) <= 0.01 (p ≈ 3.912 for b = 1 and p
linearly scales with b: p ≈ 3.912b ). That means, if we add an offset |p| to the distribution,
we can make sure the majority of population (> 99%) positive. With such an offset, the
number of fake links, ki,j is chosen as follows
ki,j = |pi|+ δi,j, (4.4)
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where |pi| is the offset and δi,j is a random integer drawn from Laplace(0, (Ui − Li)/ε) to
make ki,j > 0. With such a noise design, the nodes in the same bin satisfy ε-differential
privacy on node-degree based functions.
By preserving node-degree differential privacy, edge differential privacy is also satis-
fied. We define A and A′ as a pair of neighboring graphs, if they only differ by one edge.
The problem of checking the existence of an edge can be transformed to an edge counting
query function. Let’s look at any arbitrary edge counting functions. Clearly, the sensitivity
of such a function is 1. Thus, Laplace(0, 1/ε) is used to generate the noisy edges. Since the
parameter (Ui − Li)/ε used for disguising node degrees is no less than 1/ε, the fake links
generated for protecting the privacy of node degrees also protect edge privacy.
Algorithm 4 gives the details of our privacy preserving sparse submission algorithm.
Here, we only discuss two types of functions for querying node degrees and edges that are
already used to design privacy attacks. However, our result can be easily extended to other
types of query functions.
Algorithm 4 Privacy preserving sparse submission (H, ε, di,j).
1: input: H: histogram provided by the data owner. ε: user selected parameter for ε-differential
privacy. di,j : the actual node degree.
2: find the bin that contains di,j , whose upper bound and lower bound are Ui and Li, respectively;
3: b← (Ui − Li)/ε;
4: p← b ∗ 3.912;// for p ≈ 3.912 for b = 1 the p linearly scales with b: p ≈ 3.912b;
5: draw a value δi,j from the distribution Laplace (0, b);
6: ki,j ← |p|+ δi,j ;
7: add the di,j real links to the list with the sparse encoding;
8: randomly choose ki,j edges from the rest N −di,j edges and encode them as the encrypted zero
entries;
9: submit the items with index (i, j) for j ≥ i if it is an undirected graph, otherwise submit all
di,j + kij items.
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Construction of AHE-Based Nyström Method for Sparse Matrix
Note that by using the Lanczos method, data owner does not gain cost reduction from
sparse representation, as the {b̄i} and {Ab̄i} vectors are always dense. We thus turn to the
Nyström method to see whether it can benefit from the sparse representation.
Recall the key steps of the Nyström method in Section 4.2. Under the cloud-centric
framework, Cloud will do the sampling step and the final computation of CV , and Owner
will download E(W ) and decompose W . Typically, the size of W should be much smaller
than the whole matrix but still incurs a significant cost. In practice, m is often set to 0.1N ,
thus asymptotically still a parameter related to N . For this reason, the Nyström method
does not really fit the goal of O(N) complexity for data owner processing since W has a
size 0.01N2. However, W might be much smaller with sparse representations. Thus, we
can assume that E(W ) can be processed with a reasonable cost.
Challenges. Due to the large size C, N ×m, it is expected to compute DN×k = CV
in the cloud and return D. Since k  m, e.g., k = 10, this will save the communication
and computation cost significantly. An cost-effective solution seems to upload the matrix
V in plaintext so that E(CV ) can be computed with pseudo homomorphic operations.
The challenge is to protect V , as V contains the eigenvectors of W , which can be used to
approximately reconstruct the link structure of the corresponding nodes and thus does not
meet our security goal.
In the following, we describe the Nyström algorithm that meets our goals. The key
idea of our privacy-preserving Nyström algorithm is a matrix masking method and the
corresponding protocol.
PrepareNy−AHE(m): Owner asks Cloud to randomly select m columns as E(C)
and from E(C) selects the m rows for E(W ). Owner then decrypts E(W ) and eigen-
decomposes W to get V .
(P,Q)← QueryNy−AHE(K,q,EGsparse): The query q = (V̄ ,∆) is generated as
follows. First, Owner generates a uniformly random matrix ∆m×k ∈ Zm×kp and an invert-
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ible random matrix Rk×k ∈ Zm×kp . Then, V is masked by
V̄ = (V + ∆)R mod p, (4.5)
where p is a large non-secret integer, e.g., with 128 bits to preserve both privacy and pre-
cision. Both V̄ and ∆ are submitted to Cloud, who will compute both P = E(CV̄ )
and Q = E(C∆) and send them back to Owner. Owner then recovers CV by CV =
CV̄ R−1 − C∆ mod q. Algorithm 5 shows the detailed steps.
Algorithm 5 AHE-based Nyström Method
1: generate a random index of m items; // cloud
2: download matrices E(Wm×m); // data owner
3: decrypt E(W ); // data owner
4: decompose W to get the top k eigenvalues Λk×k and eigen vectors Um×k of W // data owner
5: Vm×k ← Um×kΛ−1k×k //data owner
6: generate the random matrix ∆N×k and the random invertible matrix Rk×k // data owner
7: submit V̄ = (V + ∆)R and ∆; //data owner
8: compute E(CV̄ ) and E(C∆); //cloud
9: download E(CV̄ ) and E(C∆), decrypt them, and recover CV ; // data owner
This algorithm has a few important features. (1) The expensive matrix-matrix multi-
plications E(CV̄ ) and E(C∆) of O(Nmk) complexity are conducted in the cloud, which
can be easily parallelized with a framework like MapReduce. (2) The computation by data
owner involves much smaller matrices: the sparse m×mW , and dense yet much smaller
m× k V and ∆. (3) The upload cost is small, involving only the plaintext V̄ and ∆.
4.3.5 Security Analysis for AHE-based Constructions
Our security analysis focuses on finding a simulator S to generate random queries that
an adversary cannot (computationally) tell from real queries. The proofs will be sketchy.
Figure 4.2 summarizes the interactions in these constructions for easier understanding.
Security Analysis for Lan-AHE. In the Lan-AHE algorithm, Cloud knows the seed
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(a) AHE-based Lanczos (Lan-AHE) (b) AHE-based Nyström (Ny-AHE)
Figure 4.2: Interactions among cloud, data owner, and data contributors for the AHE-based
algorithms.
vectors {sj} and the perturbed vectors {b̂i}. As {sj} is random vectors that do not leak
information, we want to show that each b̂i cannot be distinguished from random vectors
and thus any query sequence q is no different from a randomly generated one. Therefore,
the simulator can use any random queries instead.
Proposition 2. b̄i, i = 0..t, cannot be computationally distinguished from uniformly ran-
dom vectors by the curious cloud who knows {sj, j = 1..h}.
Proof. We will prove the b̄0 case, and other cases are similar. Let ai = (αi1, . . . , αik)T be
the random parameter vector for the round i, and S = (s1, ..., sh) be the matrix consisting of
sj, j = 1..h, as the column vectors. We represent the Equation 4.2 with matrix operations
for i = 0: b̄0 = Sa0+b0 mod q, with adversary-known S and b̄0, and unknown a0 and b0. If
S, a0, and b0 are drawn uniformly at random, the problem of distinguishing < S, b̄0 > from
uniformly random samples over ZN×mp ×ZNp is exactly the decision version of the Learning
with Errors (LWE) problem [70]: it says that b̄0 cannot be computationally distinguished
from any uniformly random vectors if b0 is a random vector and a0 is secret [70]. Therefore,
b0 is securely protected. The same conclusion can be extended to the cases i ≥ 1 with more
unknowns included.
The setting of h determines the security level of the protocol. According to Regev
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[70], finding approximate solutions for the LWE problem costs O(2h). Thus, we consider
h = 80 for providing roughly 80-bit security in our experiments.
Security Analysis for Ny-AHE. As Owner’s query exposes the masked matrix V̄ and
the random matrix ∆ of the masking V̄ = (V + ∆)R mod p to the cloud, we need to
show that the masking algorithm effectively preserves the desired security of V . We can
safely assume V 6= 0 for practical cases. We address this problem from two aspects: (1)
since the matrix V contains the clustering structure of W , we show that the masking will
surely hide the clustering structure; and (2) we show that it’s computationally intractable
to distinguish V̄ from a randomly generated one of the same size (so that the simulator can
use the random ones).
First, let’s understand how the noise addition disguise the clustering structure for the
rows of V , in (V + ∆)R. One of the key use of V is the clustering result of the V rows
indicating the clusters in the graph of W , which is the basic idea of spectral clustering [76].
Consider each column vector of V as sample values from a random variable. Then, the
signal (e.g., the distribution and the clustering structure of V ) is covered by the noise if the
noise’s strength (the mean and variance) is large enough. Typically if the signal-to-noise
ratio is 1, the signal cannot be recovered. As mentioned in Section 4.2, if we preserve
10 fractional digits for normalized values in [−1, 1], the values in V are represented with
about 30 bits. In contrast, the values in ∆ are uniformly sampled from [0, q], which has a
mean q/2 and variance q2/12. q can be selected large enough, e.g., 128 bits, to cover the
information in V . In this case, the signal-to-noise ratio based on variances is around the
scale (230/2128)2  1. Thus, the distribution of V + ∆ is dominated by ∆ and almost
uniformly random, which is not changed by a random transformation (V + ∆)R.
Second, we study the complexity of the attack that distinguishes a uniformly random
matrix from a normal V̄ . The attack is to decide whether there is a valid pair (V,R) that
generates the given V̄ . There are two choices: either enumerating R candidates or V
candidates. For each possible R, notated by R̂, the estimate of V is V̂ = V̄ R̂−1 − ∆.
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The attacker then checks the orthogonality of the column vectors in V̂ to further screen the
candidates. On the other hand, given a valid orthogonal column matrix V̂ , the test is done
as follows. Let X = V̂ + ∆. To check whether there is a R to fit V̄ = XR, one can first
apply linear regression to find R̂, i.e., R̂ = (XTX)−1XT V̄ . If XR̂ == V̄ , then the test
passes. The complexity of these attacks is determined by the number of valid R̂ and V̂ .
The following proposition shows that this attack is computationally intractable.
Proposition 3. For values encoded in the h-bit finite field, there are O(2hk) candidate R
or O(2hm) candidate V .
Proof. According to the theory of general linear group of degree k in a finite field Zp, where
p is h-bit, the number of k × k invertible matrices is Πk−1i=0 (pk − pi) [77]. It follows there
are O(2hk) such matrices as the valid candidate R̂ to be checked. Similarly, according to
the theory of orthogonal matrix group, there are O(pm) orthogonal matrices in Zm×mp [77].
Thus, for h-bit p, there are O(2nm) orthogonal matrices. As V contains k of m orthogonal
vectors, there are also O(2nm) valid V̂ .
Clearly, for a sufficiently large h i.e., h = 128, the attacks are computationally in-
tractable.
4.3.6 SHE-based Constructions
We also consider the SHE-based schemes, as they have been discussed as practical options
for outsourced computation [61, 15]. The purpose is to understand how they can be used to
construct the solutions and whether they have advantages over the AHE-based solutions.
SHE-Based Lanczos Method. The core operation E(bi) = E(Abi−1) can be im-
plemented directly when both A and bi−1 are encrypted with a SHE scheme with only
one-level of multiplication as we have shown in Section 4.2. Due to the limited one-level
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multiplication, the data owner needs to help recover the result of E(bi) = E(Abi−1) and
re-encrypt it for the next round. Algorithm 6 in Appendix gives the detail of the SHE-Based
Lanczos Algorithm.
Algorithm 6 SHE-Based Lanczos Method
1: b0← random N -dimensional vector; // data owner
2: encrypt and transfer E(b0) to cloud // data owner
3: for i← 1 to t do
4: compute E(bi) = E(Abi−1) // cloud
5: download and decrypt E(bi) to get bi, // data owner
6: αi−1 ← bTi bi−1 //data owner
7: wi−1 ← bi − αibi−1 − βi−1bi−2 where bi = 0 for i < 0// data owner
8: βi ← ‖wi−1‖ // data owner
9: bi ← wi−1/βi // data owner
10: encrypt and upload E(bi) to cloud // data owner
11: end for
Compared to the AHE-based algorithm, this algorithm simplifies the interactions. (1)
It does not need data distributors to participate in the computation. (2) It does not have
the Prepare stage and the query, E(bi), passed to Cloud is encrypted by SHE. However,
decrypting, local processing, encrypting, and uploading E(bi) are now becoming the major
costs for the data owner. The actual costs will be evaluated in experiments.
SHE-Based Nyström Method. The Nyström method involves homomorphic matrix-
matrix multiplication CV , which consists of a set of vector dot-products. Similarly, SHE
schemes can be applied directly to this operation. The SHE-Based Nyström method is a
slight revision of the original Nyström method since V can be encrypted now. The data
owner has the responsibility to download and decrypt sparse E(W ), locally decompose
W , encrypt and upload the dense V matrix, and finally download and decrypt the dense
E(CV ). We show the details in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 gives the steps of the Nyström method for SHE schemes. It differs from
the AHE-based algorithm in several aspects. (1) The perturbation and recovery steps are
gone due to the encrypted V and thus the client side computation is simplified. (2) The
upload cost will increase due to the increased size of encrypted V . (3) The download cost
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depends on the specific SHE method. The number of download items is reduced but each
item’s ciphertext size may increase.
Algorithm 7 SHE-Based Nyström Method.
1: k ← preset number of top k eigenvectors and sampling rate //data owner
2: s← generate random index set such that |s| = m //cloud
3: E(CN×m)← sample m column vectors from E(A) //cloud
4: E(Wm×m)← a reduced matrix from C with rows and column indices in s // cloud
5: download and decrypt matrix E(W ) // data owner
6: decompose W to get W = Um×mΛm×mUTm×m// data owner
7: get top k eigenvalues Λk×k and eigenvectors Um×k of Wm×m //data owner
8: Vm×k ← Um×kΛ−1k×k //data owner
9: encrypt and upload E(Vm×k) to cloud // data owner
10: compute E(CN×mVm×k) // cloud
11: download and decrypt E(CV ) // data owner
Security Analysis. Note that for both SHE-based algorithms, the queries {qi} in
the operation Query are all encrypted by SHE. For an IND-CPA [75] SHE like RLWE,
the simulator can choose random queries to encode and thus the protocols are adaptively
semantically secure.
4.3.7 Cost Analysis
Table 4.1 compares the asymptotic costs for all the algorithms, where k is the number of
top eigenvectors/values, t is the number of Lanczos iterations, and m is the number of sam-
ples in the Nyström method. These parameters have the relationships: k  m < N and
k < t N . h is the number of seed vectors in LWE-based masking. The communication
costs consider only the encrypted traffics as other traffics are much smaller. The contrib-
utors’ cost O(N) only occurs in the Lanczos AHE algorithm and not included. Note that
the initial matrix setup costs are the same for all the methods and thus not included. The
dominating computational costs for data owner are encryption and decryption, compared
to other linear-cost operations on plaintext. The acceptable m for the Nyström method can
be smaller for a dense matrix that have clearly separated clusters. However, in reality it has
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to be considerably large to preserve the data utility when we do not know the underlying
cluster distribution. As Kumar et al. [78] suggested, m is often set to 0.05N ∼ 0.1N to
get good data utility, which makes the client-side costs non-linear to N for dense matrices.
Thus, Ny-* algorithms are not appropriate for dense matrices. Finally, the costs for the
same algorithm (AHE or SHE) implemented with different encryption methods are asymp-
totically same, and thus we have to look at the real costs to see the effects of different
encryption methods.
Table 4.1: Cost distribution between cloud and data owner
Algorithm Cloud Data Owner Comm. cost
Lan-AHE O(tN2) O((t+ h)N) O((t+ h)N)
Lan-SHE O(tN2) O(2tN) O(2tN)
Ny-AHE O(Nkm)) O(m2 +mk2 +Nk) O(2Nk + 2km+m2)
Ny-SHE O(Nkm)) O(m2 +mk2 +Nk) O(Nk + km+m2)
4.3.8 Cloud-Side Parallel Computation
Data encrypted with the mentioned encryption schemes are significantly larger than the
unencrypted values. For example, with a 1024-bit key for Paillier encryption, a 64-bit
double-type value becomes a 2048-bit ciphertext, a 32-time increase. For RLWE, it’s even
larger. The encrypted matrices literally turn a common-size problem to a “big data” prob-
lem, which requires us to exploit the parallel processing power with the cloud.
In the following, we show the parallel processing algorithm for homomorphic matrix-
vector multiplication with AHE-encrypted data. It is straightforward to extend the algo-
rithm for data encrypted with SHE schemes and for matrix-matrix multiplication. For clear
presentation, we describe the algorithm with the MapReduce programming model [79].
The MapReduce program consists of the Map and Reduce functions. The Map function
takes the masked vector sent by the data owner as the parameter. It applies the vector dot-
products to the encrypted rows and emits the results indexed by the row number. The Map
outputs are partitioned and sent to Reducers which automatically sort the items by their
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row numbers and write the result to disk. Readers can check details of MapReduce [79] for
a better understanding of the algorithm.
4.4 Experiments
We have shown that all the developed algorithms provide privacy guarantee under the as-
sumption of the framework. The experiments will evaluate various costs associated with
these methods to find out whether any of these algorithms are more efficient. Specifically,
our evaluation has three aspects: (i) comparing the basic setup costs for the cloud and data
contributors with different encryption methods; (ii) comparing the costs occurring in exe-
cuting the AHE and SHE based privacy-preserving Lanczos algorithms for the data owner;
(iii) the cost-benefit of sparse submission, and the comparison between the AHE and SHE
based privacy-preserving Nyström algorithms.
4.4.1 Setup
Resources. Our setup simulates the framework we described in Section 4.3. The data
owner’s system has 128 GB of RAM and four quad-core AMD processors. The cloud
infrastructure consists of an in-house Hadoop cluster with a 16-node setup (1 master node
and 15 work nodes: each has two quad-core 2.6GHz AMD CPUs and 16GB memory).
Datasets. Three graph datasets in the SNAP database (snap.stanford.edu) are used
in our evaluation. They were originally used to study social circles in the three popular
social networks - Facebook, Twitter, and GPlus. We make the edges undirected for easier
processing in the evaluation.
Evaluation Methods. The costs of proposed algorithms are inherently linked to the
following parameters: the number of iterations, t, for the Lanczos method, and the sampling
size, m, for the Nyström method, respectively, which both in turn are related the quality
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(a) Number of iterations vs. clustering accuracy for
Lanczos




















(b) Sample rate vs. clustering accuracy for
Nyström
Figure 4.3: The relationship between clustering accuracy and number of iterations for
Lanczos Algorithm, and between clustering accuracy and sampling rate for Nyström Algo-
rithm
of results. To untangle this intricate relationship, we use spectral clustering [65] as the
application of eigendecomposition to determine the appropriate setting of these parameters.
Specifically, we will fix the quality criterion to derive the corresponding parameter setting,
and then evaluate the cost of each algorithm under this setting. First, we set the number of
clusters to k = 10 and derive the ideal clustering results by running the spectral clustering
algorithm on plaintext data with the exact eigendecomposition algorithm using functions
from the Armadillo C++ library (arma.sourceforge.net). Then, the Lanczos method and
the Nyström method use different settings of t and m, respectively, to get approximate
clustering results. The clustering accuracy is computed by matching the approximate result
to the ideal result. The settings are selected as the clustering accuracy becomes stable.
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show how the parameter settings affect the accuracy of the ap-
proximate spectral clustering algorithm. Table 4.2 shows the minimum parameter settings,
with which the clustering accuracy becomes stable. They will be used in the cost evalua-
tion.
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Table 4.2: The number of iterations (t) for Lanczos and sampling size (m) for Nyström to
reach stable clustering accuracy.
Datasets N Accuracy m t
Facebook 3959 82% 396 30
Twitter 76244 90% 3050 25
Gplus 102100 92% 8168 30
4.4.2 Implementation
We implemented the Paillier encryption for the AHE-based algorithms. The core algo-
rithms are implemented with C++ using GMP big integer library and Armadillo linear
algebra library. We also implement the cloud-side MapReduce program with Java and Java
native library that accesses the C++ encryption libraries. We use the 80-bit security level
to setup the encryption parameters, and preserve 10 fractional-digit precision for floating-
integer conversion (Section 4.2). The results generated by the AHE-based algorithms are
verified with those from the normal algorithms on plaintext data. A demo system can be
downloaded1.
We use the HELib library (github.com/shaih/HElib) for the RLWE scheme. 32-bit
plaintext encoding is used, which is also the maximum number of bits allowed by HELib.
HELib uses the ciphertext packing technique [80], which can be used for encoding dense
matrices efficiently. For 80-bit security and 32-bit plaintext, one ciphertext can encode a
vector of 630 encrypted values and thus greatly improve the efficiency. However, sparse
matrix cannot use ciphertext packing and thus the cost for encoding each value will be 630
times larger. We have also tested the PBC library (crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/) for the pairing-
based scheme. However, because its decryption involves solving the expensive discrete
logarithm problem, e.g., a 20-bit value encrypted will take about 1 second to decrypt, the
aggregated high cost for big matrices will become impractical for the data owner. Thus, the
pairing scheme is not included in evaluation.
Table 4.3 summarizes the costs of basic operations. The Ciphertext-size (C-size),
Enc., and Dec. columns represent the costs for encoding, encrypting, and decrypting one
1sites.google.com/site/privategraphdemo/
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value, respectively. RLWE-P represents RLWE using ciphertext packing and the numbers
are the average per-element costs based on 630 elements that are encoded in one ciphertext.
HELib uses the text format to store the ciphertext. We also zip the ciphertext to minimize
the costs. Since the size may vary slightly due to the text-based encoding, the RLWE costs
are based on the average of 10 runs. The cost of homomorphic dot-product (dot-p) is based
on vectors of 630 elements for an easier comparison crossing different encryption schemes.
The dot-p cost can be roughly scaled up for estimating matrix-vector multiplication and
matrix-matrix multiplication in different sizes. Note that the RLWE-P costs for encryption
and decryption are really low, while the ciphertext is much larger than Paillier.
Table 4.3: Basic costs for different encryption methods in 80-bit security. C-size: Cipher-
text size, B:bytes, and ms: milliseconds.
Method C-size Enc(ms) Dec(ms) dot-p(ms)
Paillier 256B 1.7 1.6 36.0
RLWE 489.3KB 25.3 120.0 5.5E5
RLWE-P 795.3B 0.04 0.2 875.0
4.4.3 Results on Dense Matrices
The results are organized in three parts: (1) the basic initialization costs including the cloud
storage and the data contributors’ costs on encoding and submitting the vectors, and (2) the
related costs for the cloud and the data owner running the AHE- and SHE-based Lanczos
methods. Since the Nyström methods are mainly designed for sparse data, they will be
discussed later.
Setup Costs
The setup costs include the contributors’ cost and the cloud storage cost. In our framework,
we assume each distributed data contributor submits a row (or a few rows) of the matrix
E(A). Examples may include a social network user who submits their interactions with
others; or a customer that submits ratings/preferences on products. They will download the
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public key from the data owner, encrypt their share of rows with the selected encryption
scheme, and transmit to the cloud. Two costs involved here are the encryption cost and the
transmission cost that is represented by the amount of encrypted data. As shown in Table
Table 4.4: Contributor’s costs for dense submission
Scheme Encrypt Ai (seconds) Upload E(Ai) (MB)
FB Twitter GPlus FB Twitter GPlus
Paillier 6.7 129.6 173.6 1.0 18.6 24.9
RLWE-P 0.2 3.1 4.1 3.4 58.3 77.9
4.4, data contributor’s encryption costs are the lowest for the RLWE-P method, thanks to
the packing technique. However, RLWE-P’s communication cost is several times higher
than Paillier’s.
Table 4.5 lists the basic cloud-side storage costs for the datasets with different encryp-
tion methods. Clearly, the dense form of matrix is really expensive. For data of this scale,
only cloud infrastructures can handle the storage.
Table 4.5: Cloud Storage Costs for Dense Submissions
Dataset Facebook Twitter Gplus
Paillier 3.7GB 1.4TB 2.5TB
RLWE-P 12.9GB 4.3TB 7.8TB
Privacy Preserving Lanczos Algorithms
We compare the costs of SHE- and AHE-based Lanczos algorithms to see which one has
the cost advantage. For the AHE-based algorithm, there is an additional setup cost for data
contributors to compute and submit E(Aib0), which is the same as the cost of initial data
submission as shown in Table 4.4 and thus skipped in the report. In the following, we show
the accumulated costs of all rounds to have a clearer comparison.
Data owner’s costs. Figure 4.4(a) shows the accumulated encryption (only RLWE
has) and decryption costs for all iterations of the Lanczos method. For the AHE-based





























(b) Accumulated communication costs.
Figure 4.4: Data owner’s costs for privacy-preserving Lanczos methods.
shows the total communication costs. The Paillier-based method takes much less commu-
nication costs, but its computational time is significantly higher.
Table 4.6 shows detailed data owner’s costs for the most expensive Gplus dataset. Note
that in the AHE-based algorithm, the data owner has no encryption cost. It is clear that the
high decryption time is the major shortcoming of Lan-AHE, among which about 80% is
used for setting up the masking matrix. This can be partially addressed by multi-core
computers. Overall, the RLWE-P based method spends about two times of the Paillier-
based method, while the computational time is much lower.
Table 4.6: Data owner’s accumulated costs on the Gplus dataset. h: hours; GB: Gigabytes
Schemes Enc.(h) Dec.(h) Upload.(GB) Dwnld.(GB)
Paillier(Lan-AHE) - 5.0 0.05 2.7
RLWE-P(Lan-SHE) 0.04 0.16 2.3 2.3
Cloud-side computation. The cloud-side computation can be easily parallelized. The
computation of E(Abi) can be decomposed to dot-products between a matrix row and bi,
which can be directly mapped to a MapReduce program. With sufficient resources, the
computation cost is proportional to the cost of per dot-product. Figure 4.5 (a) shows the
cost of per dot-product for the datasets. Pseudo homomorphic multiplication with Pail-
lier has much lower costs than RLWE-P’s. Figure 4.5 (b) shows the nice scalability of
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Table 4.7: The perturbation parameters and results. “orig. |E|”: the number of original
edges. “pert. |E|”: the number of edges after perturbation. “%inc.”: percentage of increase.
Dataset nbins nodes/bin orig. |E| pert. |E| % inc.
Facebook 100 40 84243 99965 18.66
Twitter 1000 76 1242390 1527286 22.93
GPlus 2000 52 12113501 13228599 9.21
the MapReduce implementation for the Paillier-based matrix-vector multiplication, where
most work is done in the Map phase and thus the overall cost is proportional to the number















(a) Cost of vector dot-product.



































(b) Excellent MapReduce scalability.
Figure 4.5: Cloud-side processing.
4.4.4 Sparse Submission and Nyström Algorithms
In this section, we focus on the cost savings of the differentially private sparse matrices and
the Nyström algorithms working on the sparse matrices. In the sparse format, the element
will be encoded in the sparse format (i, j, E(.)), where E(.) is the encrypted non-zero or
zero items. The total number of submitted elements depends on the personalized privacy
parameter ε, as described in Section 4.3.4. We select the number of bins so that the number
of nodes in each bin is in [50, 100] to provide sufficient indistinguishability within the bin.
With ε = 1.0, we have the results in Table 4.7. The numbers in the column “|E| pert.” are
the average of 10 runs. Apparently, the size of increased edges are quite manageable.
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We have shown that for the same number of elements, the pairing scheme has about
the same ciphertext size as the Paillier’s and the RLWE has about four times of the Pail-
lier’s. In the following we show only the Paillier cost difference between dense and sparse
representations if the vector/matrix is the same for different encryption methods.
Data Contributors’ Costs. Table 4.8 shows the average contributors’ costs for sparse
submission with different encryption methods. The actual costs for each data contributor
should vary according to their original node degree. The ciphertext packing of RLWE
cannot be used for sparse encoding anymore. Comparing it with the dense submission costs
in Table 4.4, we can see that sparse encoding for the Paillier-based method can dramatically
reduce the contributor’s costs, while the RLWE’s costs are about the same with the RLWE-
P’s costs for dense submission.
Table 4.8: Contributor’s Average Cost for sparse submission.
Method Encrypt Ai (seconds) Upload E(Ai) (MB)
FB Twitter GPlus FB Twitter GPlus
Paillier 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.006 0.005 0.032
RLWE 0.64 0.51 3.28 12.1 9.6 61.9
Cloud-side Costs The cloud side storage cost is the sum of all data contributors’
submitted data. Table 4.9 summarizes these costs. The costs are about 100-1000 times
less than the dense-matrix ones for Paillier, while RLWE without ciphertext packing has
slightly less costs than the dense matrix with packing.
Table 4.9: The cloud storage costs with sparse submission. (MB: megabytes, GB: giga-
bytes, TB: terabytes)
Format Facebook Twitter GPlus
Paillier 24.4MB 372.9MB 3.2GB
RLWE 47.8GB 729.8GB 6.3TB
Data Owner’s Costs. Note that for the Lanczos method, sparse representation does
not affect the data owner’s costs, as in both sparse and dense matrix representations dense
vectors have to be used in data owner’s computation. Thus, our comparison will be on the
Nyström method.
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According to the protocol, the data owner’s communication costs in the AHE-based
Nyström method include downloading E(W ), E(CV̄ ), and E(C∆), and uploading V̄ and
∆ (in 128 bits per value) in plaintext. The computation cost is dominated by decrypting
E(W ), E(CV̄ ), and E(C∆). In contrast, the communication costs in the RLWE-based
method consist of downloading E(W ) and E(CV ) and uploading E(V ), where E(W ) are
encoded without packing due to the sparse nature, but E(V ) and (CV ) can use packing.
Similarly, the computation cost is dominated by encrypting V (packed) and decrypting
E(W ) (non-packed) and E(CV ) (packed).
Figure 4.6 summarizes the comparison. Due to the randomness of the sparse submis-
sion results, the numbers are the averages based on the statistics given by Table 4.7. Inter-
estingly, it shows a similar pattern to Figure 4.4 for the Lanczos method, i.e., the Paillier-
based method has lower communication costs but higher computational costs for the data
owner. Table 4.10 shows the detailed comparison on the data owner’s costs for Lanczos
and Nyström on the largest matrix Gplus. The computational costs of the Nyström method
is about 1/4 to 1/5 of the Lanczos method’s, while the savings on communication are even
larger: reduced to about 1/6 for the Paillier-based method and 1/11 for the RLW-based
method. This is consistent with the earlier complexity analysis (Table 4.1). For example,
in terms of Lan-SHE and Ny-SHE, with t = 30 and k = 10, Lan-SHE’s cost is about
5-6 times of Ny-SHE’s. Between the Nyström algorithms, the Paillier-based method has a
lower cost in communication (501MB vs. 840MB), while the RLWE-based one has much
less computational time (about 1/18 of the Paillier-based), which seems more appealing for
the data owner. However, the RLWE-based method still needs much larger cloud storage as
shown in Table 4.9, which might be improved by a better RLWE storage encoding scheme.
Table 4.10: Data owner’s costs by using Nyström on sparse data and Lanczos on dense/s-
parse Gplus data, encrypted by Paillier and RLWE, respectively. h: hours
Method Ny-Sparse Lanczos-Sparse/Dense
Comm. Compute Comm. Compute
Paillier 501MB 0.9h 2.8GB 5h





























Figure 4.6: Data owner’s costs for the privacy-preserving Nyström methods.
4.5 Summary
I present a cloud-centric framework for privacy-preserving spectral analysis of large ma-
trices, which provides strong privacy guarantee protecting from honest-but-curious cloud
providers using the DMC construction process. PrivateGraph allows data contributors to
submit encrypted graph data to the cloud, and the analysis is done via secure protocols
between the data owner and the cloud. The framework succeeds in outsourcing the ex-
pensive O(N2) computations to the cloud in a secure manner, and limiting in-house com-
putations to O(N) for the resource-restricted data owner and data contributors. I design
two privacy-preserving algorithms for spectral analysis: privacy-preserving Lanczos and
Nyström algorithms, and study their constructions with somewhat homomorphic encryp-
tion (SHE) methods (e.g., the RLWE encryption method) and additive homomorphic en-
cryption (AHE) methods (e.g., the Paillier encryption). The AHE methods need to protect
the plaintext operands from adversaries, for which we designed masking methods that pro-
vide desired privacy guarantee and allow the data owner to recover in O(N) complexity.
The privacy-preserving Nyström method benefits from sparse big matrices, for which we
have designed the privacy-preserving sparse data submission algorithm for data contrib-
utors to achieve the balance between data sparsity and privacy. The Nyström method on
sparse data brings significantly cost reductions to data owner. Among different construc-
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tion methods, the RLWE-based methods have less computational costs due to the ciphertext
packing technique, while the Paillier-based methods save significantly in cloud storage and
data owners’ communication costs.
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SecureBoost: Confidential Boosting with
Random Linear Classifiers in Cloud
In this chapter, I present a confidential learning framework, SecureBoost, for data owners
that want to learn robust classification models from aggregated user-generated data but of-
fload the storage and computational burden to Cloud without having to worry about protect-
ing the sensitive data. SecureBoost allows users to submit encrypted or randomly masked
data to designated Cloud directly. SecureBoost is constructed with the decomposition-
mapping-composition (DMC) process. SecureBoost framework utilizes random linear clas-
sifiers (RLCs) as the base classifiers in the boosting framework to dramatically simplify
the design of the proposed confidential protocols, yet still preserve the model quality. A
Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) is used to assist the Cloud’s processing, reducing
the complexity of the protocol constructions. I present two constructions of SecureBoost:
HE+GC and SecSh+GC, using combinations of homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits,
and random masking to achieve both security and efficiency. For a boosted model, Cloud
learns only the RLCs and the CSP learns only the weights of the RLCs. Finally, the data
owner collects the two parts to get the complete model.
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5.1 Introduction
While deep learning methods [81] have dominated the image and sequence-based learning
tasks, boosting is among the most powerful methods such as SVM and Random Forest [82]
for other prediction tasks. For example, it has also been a popular method (e.g., XGBoost
[83]) in learning to rank [84] and a top choice of many Kaggle competition winners. Sur-
prisingly, no work has sufficiently explored the power of boosting in confidential learning
in the outsourced scenario.
While constructing hybrid frameworks with the DMC process is a promising ap-
proach, it does not fundamentally address the basic complexity of building a confidential
version of boosting-like powerful algorithm. We believe it is more critical to modify the
original algorithm or adopt a “crypto-friendly” alternative algorithm to significantly re-
duce the associated complexity. The current CML frameworks for classification are mostly
focusing on translating the original algorithms to confidential ones, from simple linear
algorithms with weak prediction power, such as linear classifiers and linear regressions
[15, 19, 21], to powerful yet enormously expensive models, such as shallow neural net-
works [21].
The core idea of our SecureBoost approach is to fully utilize the powerful boosting the-
ory [85] that requires only weak classifiers (e.g., each classifier’s accuracy is only slightly
exceeding 50% for two-class problems) to derive a powerful prediction model. This flex-
ibility allows us to revise the original boosting algorithm (i.e., AdaBoost [85]) that uses
non-crypto-friendly decision stumps to adopt crypto-friendly random linear classifiers as
the base classifiers. We consider our work as the first step towards developing confidential
versions for other boosting algorithms such as gradient-boosting [86].
In the popular AdaBoost framework for classification [85], decision stumps (DS) have
been used as the weak classifiers for their simplicity and fast convergence of boosting.
Although the training algorithm for a decision stump is quite simple, it is expensive to
implement its confidential version due to the associated complexity of secure comparisons.
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Our core design of confidential boosting is to use random linear classifiers (RLCs) as the
weak classifiers. For a linear classifier f(x) = wTx, where x is the feature vector and w
is the parameter vector to learn, an RLC sets w to be random using a specific generation
method independent of training data. This random generation of classifier dramatically
simplifies the training step and it only requires to determine whether the random classifier
is a valid weak classifier (e.g., accuracy> 50%). In experiments, we found that our random
RLC generation method works satisfactorily - for every 1-2 random tries we can find a valid
weak classifier. The resulting boosting models are comparable to those generated by using
decision stumps as base classifiers, although it converges slightly slower. The use of RLC
also allows us to conveniently protect feature vectors and labels and to greatly reduce the
costs of other related steps.
Scope and Contributions
We have designed two secure constructions to implement the RLC-based boosting frame-
work to understand the effect of different cryptographic primitives on the associated com-
plexities and expenses. The constructions are based on the non-colluding honest-but-
curious Cloud-CSP setting that has been used by recent related work [19, 18, 21]. CSP
is a cryptographic service provider that will be responsible to manage encryption keys and
assist Cloud with the intermediate steps of the boosting framework. Cloud takes over the
major computation and storage burden but is not interested in protecting user privacy. Both
of our protocols result in models with distributed parameters between the Cloud and the
CSP: the Cloud holding the RLCs’ parameters and the CSP holding the base classifier’s
weights of the boosted models. An alternate setting (i.e., our SecSh setting) is that two
servers take an equal share of computation and storage. For simplicity, we unify the two
settings to Cloud-CSP.
We carefully analyze the security of the constructions based on the universally com-
posable (UC) security paradigm [87, 88] and show that no additional information is leaked
85
except for CSP knowing a leakage function. Both the constructions of SecureBoost expose
a leakage function to CSP - the correctness of RLC’s prediction on training examples. We
analyze the leaked information of the function and show that it is safe to use under our
security assumption.
We summarize the unique contributions as follows:
• We propose to use random linear classifiers as a crypto-friendly building block to
simplify the implementation of confidential boosting.
• We develop two hybrid constructions with the DMC process: HE+GC and SecSh+GC,
with the combination of GC, SHE, Secret Sharing, AHE, and random masking to
show that the RLC-based boosting can be elegantly implemented.
• Our framework provably preserves the confidentiality of users’ submitted data, in-
cluding both feature vectors and their associated labels, and the generated boosting
models from both curious Cloud and CSP.
• We conduct an extensive experimental evaluation of the two constructions with both
synthetic and real datasets to fully understand the costs and associated tradeoffs.
5.2 Preliminary
We use lowercase letters for vectors or scalars; capital letters for matrices and large integers;
and single indexed lowercase or capital case letters for vectors.
Boosting. Boosting is an ensemble strategy [89] that generates a high-quality classifier
with a linear combination of τ weak base classifiers (whose prediction power is slightly
better than random guessing). Specifically, given training examples {(xi, yi), i = 1 . . . n},
where xi are feature vectors and yi are labels, it learns a model H(x) =
∑τ
t=1 αtht(x),
where ht is a weak classifier that outputs the prediction ŷ for the actual label y and αt is
the learned weight for ht. Algorithm 8 outlines the boosting algorithm for the two-class
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problem. The most popular weak classifier has been the decision stump [85], which is
merely based on conditions like if Xj < vj , output 1; otherwise, -1, where Xj is a certain
feature and Xj < vj is some optimal split that gives the best prediction accuracy among all
possible single-feature splits for the training dataset.
Algorithm 8 Boosting(T , τ )
input: training data samples T = {(xi, yi), i = 1 . . . n, where xi ∈ R and yi ∈ {1,−1}},
number of base classifiers: τ
Initialize the sample weights δ1i ← 1/n for i = 1 . . . n;
for t← 1 to τ do
learn a weak classifier ht(x) with sample weights δt,i,i = 1 . . . n;
for i← 1 to n do





αt = ln((1− error)/error);







Figure 5.1 shows the SecureBoost framework and the involved parties: the data owner,
the cloud service provider (Cloud), the users who contribute their personal data for model
training, and the Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP). The learning protocol consists of
multiple rounds of Cloud-CSP interactions, which builds a boosted model on the global
pool of user-contributed training data. Ultimately, Cloud learns the parameter of each base
classifier but no additional knowledge about the protected user data; and CSP learns the
weights of the base classifiers and a certain type of leakage information that does not help
breach the confidentiality of protected user data. The learned models can be either down-
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Figure 5.1: SecureBoost Framework.
submitting encrypted new records to Cloud and undergoing Cloud-CSP evaluation.
Data owner designates a cloud provider to collect user-generated data in encrypted
form and undertake the major storage cost and the major computation-intensive compo-
nents of the confidential learning protocol. CSP is a party with limited resources. It mainly
assists Cloud in intermediate steps, e.g. encrypting or decrypting intermediate results and
constructing garbled circuits. CSP is allowed to learn some leakage function but remains
oblivious to users’ data or the learned models. The concept of CSP has been used and justi-
fied by other related works [18, 19] as a practical semi-honest setting to release data owner
from complex interactions. If using randomized secret sharing, the users upload shares of
their submissions to both Cloud and CSP as depicted by the dotted lines in Figure 5.1.
5.3.1 SecureBoost Learning Protocol
In this section, we describe the rationale and benefits of using RLCs as the base classifiers,
the major components of the SecureBoost protocol, and the security goals.
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RLCs as Base Classifiers
The original boosting framework has used decision stumps as the base classifiers. RLCs
are overly ignored due to its slower convergence rate. However, it is expensive to imple-
ment decision stumps on encrypted data due to the O(kn log n) comparisons in the optimal
implementation, where n is the number of records and k is the dimensionality. It is known
that comparison on encrypted data is expensive for both homomorphically encrypted data
[16] or garbled circuits [54]. To reduce the cost involving comparisons, we use randomly
generated linear classifiers (RLC) instead. An RLC generates a classification plane in the
form of h(x) = wTx+ b with randomly selected w and b, which can be done by one party,
i.e., Cloud. Thus, no comparison is needed in base-classifier generation.
However, blindly selecting w and b is not efficient. As Figure 5.2 shows, the generated
plane needs to shatter the training data space into two partitions of significant sizes. For
this purpose, we require the submitted data to be normalized so that the training vectors
are distributed around the origin. In practice, with the standardization procedure, i.e., each
dimension Xi is normalized with (Xi−µi)/σi, where µi is the mean and σi is the standard
deviation of the dimension Xi, most dimensional values should be in the range [−2, 2].
Thus, we can choose b, the intercept, in the range [−2, 2], while each element of w is
chosen uniformly from [-1, 1]. Note that µi and σi can be roughly estimated by the data
owner with low-cost sampling and aggregation of users’ submissions and shared with the
users. For clarity, we ignore the details of such simple protocols. With this setting, we find
in our experiments that a valid random linear classifier can be found in about 1-2 tries. We
have also verified with our experiments that boosting with RLCs can generate high-quality
models comparable to those with decision stumps.
RLCs have extra advantages. First, they allow learning with both the feature vectors
and labels protected. We can transform the training data as x ← (x, 1) and w ← (w, b),
















Figure 5.2: Effective Random Linear Classifier Generation
lem with labels y ∈ {−1, 1}, if the result h(x) gives a correct prediction, i.e., the same
sign as the label y, we always get h(x)y = wTxy > 0; otherwise wTxy ≤ 0. Note that
xy stays together in the evaluation, and thus users can submit the encrypted version of xy,
E(xy), protecting both feature vectors and labels. Second, they simplify the learning of
base classifiers. As w is randomly generated, there is no need for Cloud to consider sample
weights during learning. Meanwhile, the learning of the αt weights can be individually
done by CSP. Finally, this process allows only the CSP to learn the weights of base models,
and Cloud to learn the base classifiers, preventing either party learning the complete final
model.
SecureBoost Protocol
The SecureBoost learning protocol is defined with a 4-tuple: SB-Learning = (Setup, BaseAp-
ply, ResultEval, Update). Algorithm 9 depicts the use of these components in the boost-
ing framework. For a boosted model H(x) =
∑τ
t=1 αtht(x), Cloud learns the base models
{ht(x) = wTt x, t = 1..τ}, and CSP learns the model weights {αt, t = 1..τ}.
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Algorithm 9 SecureBoost Framework
1: (K,E(Z), {wi, i = 1..p}, δ1)←Setup(1k, τ , p);
2: for t← 1 to p do
3: {E(ht(xi)), i = 1..n} ← BaseApply(K, E(Z), wt);
4: It ← ResultEval(K, {E(ht(xi), i = 1..n});
5: (δt+1, αt, et)← Update(K, δt, It); //by CSP only
6: if τ effective base models have been found then
7: stop the iteration;
8: end if
9: end for
(K,E(Z), {wi, i = 1..p}, δ1) ←Setup(1k, τ , p): (1) The key K is generated by a
certain party or parties (CSP, Cloud, or both) as required, with the desired security level
1k; all public keys are published. (2) CSP initializes δ1 with 1/n. (3) The training data Z
of n instances contains row vectors zi = xiyi, which is protected with either a public-key
encryption scheme or random masking (e.g., in the secret-sharing construction) to generate
E(Z). (4) Data owner sets the desired number of classifiers, τ , and instructs Cloud to
generate a pool of prospective RLCs with parameters wt for t = 1 . . . p, where p is the pool
size proportionally larger than τ , e.g., p = 1.5τ .
{E(ht(xi)), i = 1..n} ← BaseApply(K, E(Z), wt): With the encrypted training
data E(Z) and a model parameter wt, the procedure will output the model ht’s encrypted
prediction results on all training instances.
It ← ResultEval(K, {E(ht(xi)), i = 1..n}): With the encrypted prediction results,
ResultEval allows CSP (not Cloud) to learn the indicator vector It of length n, indicating
the correctness of ht’s prediction for each training instance.
(δt+1, αt, et) ← Update(δt, It): CSP takes It, δt to compute the weighted error rate
et = I
T
t δt and if ht is a valid base classifier i.e. accuracy > 50% (or accuracy < 50% with
the RLC decisions reversed), updates its weight αt = 0.5ln((1−et)/et) and computes δt+1
for the next iteration with sample weight updating formula.
In the end, Cloud learns {wt, t = 1..p} and CSP learns {αt, t = 1..p}. A two-party
function evaluation protocol can be easily developed for Cloud to apply the model for
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classification, which, however, is not the focus of this chapter. The data owner can simply
download the model components from the two parties and reconstruct the final model for
local application. The design of leaking It represents a careful balance between security
and efficiency. While it is possible to hide It, the complexity of Cloud and CSP processing
will be dramatically increased. We have carefully studied the implication of It in Section
5.3.6 and found its impact on security is minimal.
5.3.2 Security Model
We make some relevant security assumptions here: (1) Both Cloud and CSP are honest-
but-curious parties, i.e., they follow the protocols exactly and provide services as expected.
However, they are interested in the users’ data. (2) Cloud and CSP do not collude, (3)
The data owner owns data and models thus is a fully trusted party, (4) All infrastructures
and communication channels are secure. While the integrity of data and computation is
equally important, we consider it orthogonal to our study. We are mainly concerned with
the confidentiality of the following assets.
• Confidentiality of training data. User-generated training data may include personal
sensitive information. We consider both feature values and the labels sensitive. For
example, a user’s fitness activity dataset may contain sensitive features such as heart
rate and locations, while the labels, i.e., the type of activity, may imply their activity
patterns and health conditions.
• Confidentiality of prediction models. The learned models are proprietary to the
data owner and can link to confidential users’ data. Therefore, the model parame-
ters are split and distributed between Cloud and CSP. No single party can learn the
complete model.
We adopt the universally composable (UC) security [87, 88] to formally define the
protocol security. We consider an ideal protocol π implementing the ideal functionality F
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corresponding to a SecureBoost protocol, involving Cloud and CSP. In the Real world, an
honest-but-curious adversary A can corrupt any of the parties and gain access to all the
inputs and outputs of that party. We say that π securely realizes F (or π is UC-secure) if
for any A in real world there exists an ideal-process simulator S in ideal world running
probabilistic algorithms in polynomial time (i.e., PPT), such that for any environment Z
and inputs m = (mZ ,mA/S ,mCloud/CSP ),
|Pr(Realπ,A,Z(k, z,m) = 1)− Pr(IdealF ,S,Z(k, z,m) = 1)| = negl(k),
where negl(k) is a negligible function [75]. In Section 5.3.6, we propose two theorems that
can be proved to show that SecureBoost protocols are UC-secure.
5.3.3 Construction with HE and GC
In this section, we present the homomorphic encryption (HE) and GC based construction
of SecureBoost. With the HE encrypted data, the BaseApply procedure is essentially the
homomorphic operation E(Z)wt that is allowed by both Paillier [37] and RLWE [39] cryp-
tosystems. We use a garbled-circuit based protocol to allow only CSP to learn the indicator
vector It, without leaking any other information to the parties. In the following, we first
describe the construction of the protocol components and then discuss several key technical
details.
Setup. CSP generates the HE public and private key and distributes the public key
to the users and Cloud. The private key accessible to the data owner when necessary.
Users encrypt their submissions. Cloud generates the pool of p prospective weak classifier
vectors, {wt, t = 1..p}.
BaseApply. With the matrix-vector homomorphic operations enabled by HE, Cloud
computes {E(ut) = E(Zwt), t = 1..p}. As this step can be done locally by Cloud, Cloud
may choose to conduct this work offline before the protocol interactions start.
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ResultEval. The problem setting is that Cloud holds E(ut) and CSP securely identi-
fies the sign of each element of ut, i.e., Zwt > 0 implying correct prediction by the RLC,
which sets the corresponding element of It to 1; otherwise to 0. The sign of element is
related to the specific integer encoding, which we will elaborate more. With our encod-
ing scheme, we only need to check a specific bit to determine whether Zwt > 0 is true.
To satisfy all the security goals, we decide to use a GC protocol for this step that will be
discussed in more detail.
As the last step Update does not involve crypto operations, we can skip its discussion.
Figure 5.3 (a) depicts all the associated Cloud- CSP interactions in this construction.
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Figure 5.3: (a) Cloud-CSP interactions in HE+GC construction. E1 represents HE encryp-
tions whereas E2 represents GC labels for the GC outputs. (b) GC-based sign checking
protocol.
Technical Detail
Now, we discuss the key problems mentioned in the sketch of the construction above.
Choice of HE Schemes. We consider two choices of HE: Paillier [37] and RLWE
[39] in our evaluations. Paillier scheme provides a large bit space allowing to preserve
more precisions in floating-integer conversion. Our evaluation shows that with message
packing, all RLWE operations including encryption, decryption, addition and one-level
multiplication are much faster than Paillier, although the ciphertext size might be larger
than that of Paillier.
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Integer Conversion. The HE schemes work on integers only. For a floating-point
value x, x ∈ R, to preserve m-digit precision after the decimal point upon conversion
and recovery, we have: v = b10mxc mod q, where q is a large integer such that 10mx ∈
(−q/2, q/2). Let the modulo operation map the values to [0, q), in such a way that the neg-
ative values are mapped to the upper range (q/2, q). It is easy to check that x is recoverable:
if v > q/2, x ≈ (v − q)/10m; otherwise, x ≈ v/10m. The modulo additions and multipli-
cations preserve the signs and are thus recoverable. Furthermore, this encoding simplifies
the evaluation of the RLC base classifiers, which involves checking the sign of ht(x). Let b
be the total number of bits to represent the values in [0, q). It is trivial to learn that if the b-th
bit of a value in the range [0, q) is 1, then the value is in the range (q/2, q), which is nega-
tive; otherwise, the value is positive. With large enough q we can accommodate the desired
multiplication and addition results without overflow. An n-bit plaintext space that allows
one multiplication followed by α additions, as used in our protocol, spares (n − α)/2 bits
to encode the original value. For easier processing, we normalize the original real values
in the same dimension of training data before converting them to b bit integers.
Secure Matrix-Vector Multiplication. The core operation E(Zwt) involves en-
cryptedE(Z) and Cloud generated random plaintextwt. Thus, both AHE and SHE schemes
can be applied.
Securely Checking Signs of E(ut). CSP needs to check the result of base classifier
prediction, E(ut) = E(Zwt) to learn the correctness of prediction on each instance, so
that the error rate, the model weight, and the sample weight update can be computed.
With the described integer conversion encoding method, the sign checking ut,i < 0? is
determined by a specific bit in the result. Note that letting CSP know ut directly may reveal
too much information significantly weakening the security. To balance between security
and efficiency, we decide to let CSP only learn the signs indicating if the base classifier ht
correctly classified the training instances, and nothing else is leaked. Lu et al. [16] have
proposed a comparison protocol based only on RLWE, however, it is extremely expensive
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to be adapted to our framework. Therefore, we rely on a noise addition procedure to hide
the decrypted ut from CSP and a GC-based de-noising and bit extraction procedure to let
CSP learn the specific bit for sign checking. We give the details of these procedures next.
To hide the plaintext ut from CSP, we use a noise addition method that can be easily
implemented by Cloud on the encrypted vector with homomorphic addition: E(ut,0) =
E(ut) + E(λt), where λt is a noise vector generated by the pseudo-random number gen-
erator G. Then, CSP can decrypt E(ut,0) to learn the noisy result. Let ut,1 = λt held by
Cloud. Now the problem is turned to using a GC to securely compute ut = ut,0 − ut,1 and
return the specific bit of each element of ut.
Figure 5.3 (b) shows the GC based de-noising and bit extraction protocol. CSP’s input
to the circuit is the binary form of u′t elements whereas Cloud’s inputs are the binary form of
λt elements. With associated oblivious transfer (OT) protocol and wire label transfers, the
circuit can securely evaluate u′t−λt and extract the most significant bit,msb(ut,j), j = 1..n,
of the result without leaking anything else. Cloud evaluates the circuits and returns the
extracted encrypted bits (represented as output labels in GC) to CSP. CSP can then decrypt
(re-map) the labels to generate the indicator vector It.
5.3.4 Construction with SecSh and GC
Alternatively, we design our framework with a mixture of secret sharing and garbled circuit
techniques. We call this construction “SecSh + GC”. A somewhat similar approach was
taken by [21] in constructing confidential gradient-descent based learning. It differs from
the HE based construction in two aspects: 1) user data protection uses secret sharing, and
2) matrix-vector multiplication happen over secret random splits of training data held by
Cloud and CSP.
Instead of encryption, users randomly split their training data into two shares, one
for Cloud and the other for CSP. The sum of shares recovers the original values. Any
intermediate results that need protection are also in the form of random shares distributed
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between Cloud and CSP. As a result, multiplication of two values, say, a and b, each as
random shares (e.g., Cloud holds a0 and b0 while CSP holds a1 and b1, where a0 + a1 = a
and b0 + b1 = b), needs the help of AHE encryption to compute each party’s random share
for ab. As for sign checking, we reuse the GC protocol designed earlier for HE+GC.
Setup. Each user splits their data Z into a random matrix Z0 and Z1, where Z1 =
Z − Z0, and securely distributes Z0 to Cloud and Z1 to CSP. Cloud also generates a key
pair for a chosen AHE scheme and shares the public key with CSP.
BaseApply. With Cloud holding Z0 and wt, and CSP holding Z1, BaseApply will
generate random shares of the result ut = Zwt = ut,0 − ut,1: ut,0 and ut,1 held by Cloud
and CSP, respectively. This is implemented with a special matrix-vector multiplication
algorithm, which we will describe later.
ResultEval. With the random shares: ut,0 and ut,1 held by Cloud and CSP respec-
tively, we can apply the same GC protocol presented in the last section for computing
u = ut,0 − ut,1 and extracting the specific bits.
Technical Detail
The SecSh+GC construction reuses the integer conversion and the GC-based sign checking
components. Here, we focus on the major difference: the protocol for computing matrix-
vector multiplication with random shares.
Random-Share-Based Matrix-vector Multiplication. To initiate, Cloud and CSP
respectively hold the two shares Z0 and Z1 of user data in plaintext, and Cloud also holds
wt in plaintext. The goal is to derive random shares of Zwt and each party learns only one
of the shares.
Cloud computes the part Z0wt in plaintext by itself. The challenge is to collect the
other part Z1wt without CSP knowing wt and no party knowing the complete result, Zwt.
We use the following procedure to achieve this security goal. (1) Cloud encrypts wt with
an AHE scheme and sends E(wt) to CSP so that CSP can apply pseudo-homomorphic
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Table 5.1: BigO estimation for SecureBoost constructions
Construction Party Encryption Decryption Enc. Mult/Add Enc. Comm. GC Comm. Storage
HE+GC
User O(nk) - - O(nk) - -
Cloud O(pn) - O(pnk) O(pn) O(pnb) O(nk)
CSP - O(pn) - - - -
SecSh+GC
User - - - - - -
Cloud O(pk) O(pn) - O(p(n+ k)) O(pnb) O(nk)
CSP O(pn) - O(pnk) - - O(nk)
multiplication to compute E(Z1wt) = Z1E(wt). (2) CSP generates a random vector λt
with the pseudo-random number generator G, encrypts it with the public key provided by
Cloud, and apply homomorphic addition to get E(Z1wt +λt), which is sent back to Cloud.
(3) Cloud decrypts it and sums up with the other part Z0wt to get Zwt + λt. In the end,
Cloud gets ut,0 = Zwt + λt and CSP gets ut,1 = λt. At this point, Cloud and CSP use the
GC protocol for sign checking in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.5 Cost Analysis
Table 5.1 summarizes the associated big-O estimation of communication and computation
broken down into different operations/components. The notations are the same as defined.
In summary, we observe that HE+GC constructions demand no CSP storage and CSP only
needs to conduct decryptions and GC constructions. In contrast, the workload and storage
are almost equally distributed between Cloud and CSP in SecSh+GC. However, as user-
generated data is not encrypted but split into random shares in SecSh+GC, users’ costs and
overall storage costs are much lower.
5.3.6 Security Analysis
According to the security model outlined in Section 5.3.2, we focus on the subcomponents
of the protocols that involve both Cloud and CSP and implement a specific ideal function
F . The security is proved by finding a simulator S in the ideal scenario corresponding to
the adversary A in the real scenario such that the environment Z cannot distinguish the
probabilistic outputs of Ideal and Real.
The major interaction happens in computing the indicator vector It for an iteration t.
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The corresponding ideal function is defined asF(mCloud,t,mCSP,t)→ It, wheremCloud,t,mCSP,t
are Cloud’s and CSP’s inputs to the function and the function’s output is the indicator vec-
tor It as defined by our protocols. We present two theorems next, the proofs which can be
read in the extended version of this chapter 1.
Theorem 4. If the random number generator G is pseudo-random, and both the HE scheme
and GC are CPA-secure, then the HE+GC construction of SecureBoost is secure in com-
puting It with an honest-but-curious adversary.
Theorem 5. If the random number generator G is pseudo-random and both the AHE
scheme and GC are CPA-secure, then the SecSH+GC construction is secure in comput-
ing It with an honest-but-curious adversary.
Implication of Revealing It to CSP.
CSP learns the indicator function It,i(ht(xi) == yi), for i = 1..n in the iteration t of
SecureBoost. It is clear that this leakage does not help CSP learn the complete boosted
model H(x) as long as Cloud randomly generates and holds {wt, t = 1..τ} as secrets.
However, we must understand if such leakage may help CSP learn anything about the
training data.
Recall that an element of indicator vector It(ht(xi) == yi) represent if the base RLC
ht classifies the training instance xi correctly or incorrectly (1 and 0, respectively). At
the end of learning, each record xi gets p prediction results for p base classifiers ht, t =
1..p, respectively, which is denoted as ci = (ci,1, . . . , ci,p), ci,j ∈ {0, 1}. Let ci be the
characterization vector (CV) for the record xi. The intuition tells that two similar records
(i.e., relatively small Euclidean distance) with the same label will lead to similar CVs.
However, our experiments show that the reverse is clearly false (Figure 5.7 in Section
1https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.08288
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5.4) — if the reverse was true then adversaries could utilize CV similarity to infer record
similarity. In particular, the records having identical CVs have distances (and their standard
deviations) not significantly different from those having other types of CVs.
5.3.7 Confidential Decision Stump Learning
As there is no confidential DS learning algorithm reported, we present our initial design
of DS learning that fits our boosting framework. Learning DS involves finding the optimal
split for each feature in the training data with maximum information gain. The original al-
gorithm takes O(n log n) comparisons to sort the values for each feature. However, sorting
the dimensions may reveal the ordering information and breach data confidentiality, there-
fore, sorting may not be used in the confidential version of DS learning. Instead, we use
a fixed binning scheme - i.e., partitioning the domain of each normalized dimension (e.g.,
(-4, 4)) into s bins and enumerate all possible decision stumps - for two-class problems and
k dimensions, there are 2sk such stumps (each split value gets two conjugate stumps: e.g.,
Stump 1: if Xj < vj return 1 else return 0, Stump 2: if Xj ≥ vj return 1 else return 0). We
will describe the HE+GC construction for DS learning here.
The users encrypt their records E(xi) and labels E(yi), with yi ∈ {0, 1}, separately
with the public key distributed by the CSP. (1) Cloud will start to evaluate each of the
sk decision stumps for every record with a slightly modified version of GC described in
Section 5.3.3. Specifically, for each instance (xi, yi), it will securely check whether the
class label yi matches the classifier output, e.g., if Xj < vj return 1 else return 0. Similarly,
the evaluation of each DS will give an indicator vector Ir, r = 1..sk, where 1 represents
prediction error, reverse to the indicator vector described in Section 5.3.1, Ir is known
to both Cloud and CSP. We can flip the indicator vector for the conjugate DS. (2) CSP
starts a base classifier selection process, and computes the weight αt for each selected DS
ht(x). Specifically, with training sample weights (initialized to 1/n), wi, at iteration i,
CSP will find one of the sk DSes that minimizes the weighted error, arg minr (̇Ir, wi), for
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r = 1..sk. In the end, CSP only knows the index of the DS. It does not know the base
classifier parameters, i.e. neither Xj nor vj . Note that this step does not involve decryption
and encryption. (3) The indices of the selected DSes and αi are submitted by CSP to Data
Owner. Data Owner can retrieve the actual DSes from Cloud.
Therefore, the overall cost is dominated by the sk rounds of evaluation in stage (1),
not subject to the number of selected base classifiers. To get results close enough to the
DS-based boosting model, we may need to take finely divided bins, e.g., s=100. For a 10-
dimension dataset, the cost is about equivalent to trying 1000 base classifiers in the RLC
protocol. Furthermore, CSP takes a significant amount of storage and computing burden
— it will need to keep all the sk indicator vectors for DS selection, the size of which is
much larger than the original data, and conduct skτ dot products on plaintext if the final
model contains τ base classifiers.
5.4 Experiments
We design our experiment set on both real and synthetic datasets with three goals: (1)
show random linear classifiers are effective weak classifiers for boosting; (2) evaluate asso-
ciated computation, communication, and storage costs, and their distributions amongst the
users, Cloud, and CSP for both the constructions; and (3) understand the trade-off between
costs and model quality, including a comparison with another state-of-the-art confidential
classification learning framework.
Implementation. We adopt the HELib library [40] for the RLWE encryption scheme,
implement the Paillier cryptosystem [37] for the AHE encryption scheme, and use the
ObliVM (oblivm.com) library for the garbled circuits. ObliVM has included the state-
of-the-art GC optimization techniques such as half AND gates, free XOR gates, and OT
extention. The core algorithms for data encoding, encryption, matrix-vector multiplica-
tions, and additive perturbation are implemented with C++ using the GMP library. Users’
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submissions are encoded with the 7-bit floating-integer conversion method (Section 5.3.3).
We use the scikit-learn toolkit (scikit-learn.org) to evaluate the model quality for existing
classifier learning methods selected for comparison purpose.
Parameter selection. We pick cryptographic parameters corresponding to 112-bit se-
curity. The RLWE parameters allow 32-bit message-space overall, 1 full vector replication,
and at least 2 levels of multiplication. The degree of the corresponding cyclotomic poly-
nomial is set to φ(m) = 12, 000 and c = 7 modulus switching matrices, which gives us
h = 600 slots for message packing. The Paillier cryptosystem uses 2048-bit key-size to
achieve approximately 112-bit security. Our GC-based sign checking protocol accommo-
dates (2b + log2(k))-bit inputs, where b is the bit-precision (i.e., b=7 in experiments) and
k is the dimension of the training data. Note that HELib uses a text format to store the
ciphertext which we zip to minimize the costs.
Datasets. We test SecureBoost with both the synthetic and real datasets. Table 5.2
summarizes the dataset properties. Datasets are selected to cover a disparate range of
dimensions and number of instances. All selected datasets contain only two classes to
simplify the evaluation. The real datasets come from the UCI Machine Learning Reposi-
tory [90]. The synthetic dataset is deliberately designed to generate non-linearly separable
classes. It is used to conveniently explore and understand the behaviors of RLC-based
boosting and the quality of non-linear classification modeling methods.
Table 5.2: Dataset statistics.
Dataset Instances Attributes Adaboost Accuracy Number of decision stumps
ionosphere 351 34 92.02% +/- 4.26% 50
credit 1,000 24 74.80% +/- 3.50 % 100
spambase 4,601 57 92.31 % +- 4.40 % 75
epileptic 11,500 179 86.95 % +- 3.40 % 200
synthetic 150,000 10 89.51 % +-2.10 % 75
5.4.1 Effectiveness of RLC Boosting
The performance of boosting is characterized by the convergence rate and the final accu-
racy. The speed of convergence is directly related to the overall cost of the SecureBoost
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protocols. We look at the number of base classifiers (τ ) needed to attain a certain level of
accuracy. As a randomly generated RLC may fail (i.e., RLCs having ≈ 50% accuracy for
the two-class datasets) and be discarded in some of the rounds, we also assess the actual
number (p) of RLCs that are tried to generate the final model. All the accuracy results are
for 10-fold cross-validation. The following results can be reproduced and verified with the
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Figure 5.4: (a) Convergence of boosting with RLCs. (b) Convergence of boosting with
RLCs, LMCs, and DSes for the synthetic dataset. (c) Model quality: boosting with RLCs
vs. boosting with DSes. (d) Bit precision vs. model accuracy
Figure 5.4(a) analyzes the convergence of RLC-based boosting for each dataset. We
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observe that overall only about 200 base classifiers are sufficient to reach a stable model
accuracy level for the considered datasets. Figure 5.4(b) compares boosting with differ-
ent base classifiers: RLC, decision stumps (DS), and linear means classifiers (LMC) when
learning on the synthetic dataset. Clearly, DS has the advantage of converging faster in
about 75-80 rounds. On the other hand, boosting with LMC does not reach the desired
accuracy, because the centers of class (i.e., the “means”) that are used to define the classifi-
cation plane stay stable even with changed sample weights. The result is a bunch of highly
similar base classifiers in the final boosting model, which does not take advantage of the
boosting framework.
Figure 5.4(c) shows the final model quality produced by RLC boosting and the DS
boosting (i.e., the default boosting method). We use 200 RLCs and varying number of
DSes as shown in Table 5.2 as the base classifiers for the datasets. In every case, both
methods generate models with almost identical accuracy. All of the above results suggest
that RLC boosting is robust and generates high-quality classification models.
Encoding Bits. The number of bits for encoding affects the cost of GC-related compo-
nents and the precision in floating-integer conversion, which in turn affects the final model
quality. Figure 5.4 (d) shows the effect of preserved bits on model accuracy. It seems
preserving 7 bits is sufficient to get optimal quality models.
Cost comparison with DS. As there is no DS learning algorithm on encrypted data
(possibly due to its high expense), we develop a DS learning protocol that fits our frame-
work to estimate the costs as shown in Appendix 5.3.7.
5.4.2 Cost Distribution
We now inspect the associated costs for each involved party in the two constructions. Table
5.3 shows the parameter settings for different datasets that led to the desired model quality.
τ is the number of base classifiers in the final boosting model. p represents the total number
of RLCs that are tried in the modeling process, which determines the actual protocol costs.
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Overall, in about 1-2 tries on average, we can find a valid RLC (with accuracy > 50%).
Table 5.3: Parameter setting for cost evaluation. τ and p - number of desired and tried
RLCs
Dataset τ p Accuracy
ionosphere 200 226 91.5% +/- 3.1%
credit 200 342 73.4 % +/- 2.4 %
spambase 200 229 87.4 % +/- 4.8 %
epileptic 200 331 84.41% +/-2.9 %
synthetic 200 244 87.91% +/-3.2 %
User’s Costs. A user’s costs depend on the size of training data, i.e. the number of
training records n, and the number of dimensions k per record. The Paillier+GC construc-
tion requires each user to encrypt their submission element-wise in streaming or batched
manner. The RLWE+GC construction requires each user to batch her submissions and
encrypt them as a column-wise matrix E(Z) with message packing. For the SecSh+GC
construction, users simply apply the one-time padding method to generate the masks and
distribute the splits to Cloud and CSP, respectively.
Table 5.4: User’s cost for a batch of 600 records
Dataset HE+GC (RLWE / Paillier) SecSh+GCEnc. (secs) Upload (MB) Upload. (MB)
ionosphere 1.54 / 235.83 38.50 / 10.25 0.04
credit 1.09 / 168.45 27.50/ 7.32 0.03
spambase 2.54 / 390.80 63.80/ 16.99 0.07
epileptic 7.91 / 1,212.84 198.0 / 52.73 0.09
synthetic 0.48 / 74.12 12.1 / 3.22 0.05
Table 5.4 depicts the user’s costs in encrypting and submitting one batch of records
with the batch size h = 600. The HE+GC constructions are more expensive than SecSh+GC
in all aspects, but still quite acceptable in most cases. RLWE+GC results in larger cipher-
text but far less computations than Paillier+GC.
Cloud and CSP Cost distribution. As Cloud’s and CSP’s costs are highly inter-
related in the SecureBoost constructions we discuss them together. Note: We use the Pail-
lier cryptosystem in SecSh+GC as the required AHE scheme. Table 5.5 sums up the costs
for all the components. For the smaller datasets, the RLWE+GC construction does not
show much benefit over the other two. For datasets with the larger number of records such
as the synthetic dataset, both Cloud and CSP take less computational time with RLWE+GC
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construction in comparison with the other two. For datasets with larger dimensions such
as the epileptic dataset, RLWE+GC is more onerous to the Cloud whereas beneficial to the
CSP in terms of computation cost. As for storage and communication costs, Paillier+GC
and SecSH+GC are favorable across the board.
Table 5.5: Overall Cloud and CSP Costs: Storage, Comp. (computation),
Comm.(communication)
Dataset
HE+GC (RLWE / Paillier) SecSh+GC
Storage(MB) Comp. (minutes) Comm. (MB) St.(MB) Comp. (minutes) Comm.(MB)
Cloud Cloud CSP Cloud CSP Cloud CSP
ionosphere 38.5 / 6.0 13.5 / 21.1 3.5 / 16.3 286.2 / 81.0 2.6 2.6 17.8 19.6 84.8
credit 55.0 / 12.2 28.0 / 83.2 12.9 / 70.5 1,119.2 / 537.2 8.1 8.1 72.1 81.6 541.3
spambase 510.4 / 130.3 129.5 / 358.6 33.3 / 268.6 3,842.6 / 1,876.6 76.4 76.4 271.8 355.3 1,885.1
epileptic 3,960.0 / 1,010.7 932.2 / 1,453.0 128.2 / 777.0 12,291.6 / 6,868.3 653.4 653.4 788.1 1,441.8 6897.4
synthetic 3,025.0 / 805.7 1,414.7 / 8,147.3 1,175.4 / 7,424.0 106,891.1 / 57,662.2 383.9 383.9 7,424.5 8,146.8 57,663.5
5.4.3 Cloud and CSP Cost Breakdown and Scaling
First, we analyze the shared GC components for the selected real and synthetic datasets
in Table 5.2. Then, we analyze the cost growth of the constructions for with increasing
number of records and dimensions.
As all the constructions share the same GC component for sign checking, we list the
GC costs together in Table 5.6. The number of AND gates represents the size of GC. The
computational and communication costs include the total of both Cloud’s and CSP’s. GC’s
associated costs are linear to n and bit precision b. By comparing Table 5.5 in Section 5.4.2
and Table 5.6, it is clear that the GC-component dominates the overall communication cost
of our protocols.
Table 5.6: Costs of the GC component: Computation (comp.) and Communication
(Comm.)
Dataset AND Gates Comp.(m) Comm.(MB)
ionosphere 2,016,846 5.1 43.1
credit 8,840,000 20.3 371.2
spambase 37,268,100 47.2 1,202.6
epileptic 87,549,500 101.3 5,009.6
synthetic 695,400,000 927.4 39791.1
Now, we try to understand the relationship between the size of training data and as-
sociated costs using synthetic datasets of several sizes and dimensions. First, we fix the
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number of dimensions k = 20 and see how number of records n affects the costs. Figure
5.5 (a) shows that both Cloud’s and CSP’s costs in RLWE+GC grow much slower than the
other two’s. CSP’s growth rates are almost same for SecSh+GC and Paillier+GC, as they

































































Figure 5.5: Computation cost. (a) Over increasing records(n) with fixed number of dimen-
sions (k = 20). (b) Over increasing dimensions(k) (bottom) and fixed number of records
(n = 10, 000).
Figure 5.5 (b) depicts the effect of increasing the dimensions while fixing the number
of records to n = 10, 000. We observe that RLWE+GC cost for Cloud grows much faster
for the larger dimensions. This is due to the associated dimension-wise RLWE replica-
tion cost in the matrix-vector multiplication. On the other hand, CSP’s cost when using
RLWE+GC is much lower than with the other two constructions, as the RLWE decryp-
tions are much cheaper than that of Paillier. Both Cloud’s and CSP’s costs when using
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Paillier+GC and SecSh+GC stay almost flat as only n dominates the overall cost.
5.4.4 Comparing with Other Methods
In this section, we compare SecureBoost with the recently developed SecureML method
[21]. It implements the stochastic gradient-descent (SGD) learning based on secret sharing
[20], which is then used for logistic regression (LR) and neural network (NN) [89]. We
tried different shapes of inner hidden layers and found the minimum-cost setting for sat-
isfactorily handle the non-linearly separable synthetic dataset. SGD is conducted with a
mini-batch size of 128 records in training. Both algorithms are run enough iterations until
convergence.









































Figure 5.6: (a) Comparison of model accuracy: Secure-Boost vs. SecureML - Logistic
Regression and Neural Network. (b) Overall cost comparison: SecureBoost constructions
vs. SecureML neural network and SecureML logistic regression for the synthetic dataset.
Figure 5.6 (a) shows that SecureBoost and SecureML-NN perform similarly, while
SecureML-LR due to its inherent linearity [89] underperforms significantly on the non-
linearly separable data. This result can also be reproduced and verified with the scripts we
have uploaded online 2. Figure 5.6 (b) shows that SecureBoost constructions are more effi-
cient than SecureML neural network. The cost patterns will vary for different datasets due
to the varying number of training epochs. For this specific dataset, SecureBoost takes 200
iterations, while SecureML NN takes 20 epochs to converge. Logistic regression converges
2https://sites.google.com/site/testsboost/
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quickly within 10 epochs but gets stuck at a non-optimal result. It appears the per-iteration
cost of SecureML NN is much higher.
5.4.5 Effect of Releasing It
We want to verify if similar characterization vectors infer similar training records to under-
stand the leaked information by It. Figure 5.7 measures the average Euclidean distances
between the training record pairs corresponding to the characteristic vectors differing by k
bits. It is evident that the similarity of characterization vectors does not infer the similarity
of training records as shown by similar average distances and standard deviation for all val-
ues of k. An attacker may suspect the training records that generate the same characteristic
vector as the anchor (attack) record to be closer to the anchor vector as compared to other
training records, however it is evident such is not the case. A further analysis on leakage of
































































I present the SecureBoost protocol for data owners to learn high-quality boosted classifica-
tion models from encrypted or randomly partitioned users’ data using public Cloud. The
construction followed the DMC process. The key idea is to use random linear classifiers
as the base classifiers to simplify the protocol design. Two constructions: HE+GC and
SecSh+GC have been developed, using a novel combination of homomorphic encryption,
garbled circuits, and randomized secret sharing to protect the confidentiality and achieve
efficiency. I formally analyze the security of the protocol and show that SecureBoost con-
structions satisfy the universally composable security for multiparty computation. The
experimental evaluation examines the intrinsic relationships among the primitive selection,
cost distribution, and model quality. The results show that the SecureBoost approach is very
practical in learning high-quality classification models. The constructions in this disserta-
tion are the first batch of boosting protocols with practical costs, compared to the expenses
of the start-of-the-art implementation of other major predictive modeling methods (e.g.,
Neural Networks by SecureML).
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Disguised-Nets: Image Disguising for
Confidential Deep Learning in Cloud
Deep learning model developers often use cloud GPU resources to experiment with large
data and models that need expensive setups. An adversarial cloud provider may be inter-
ested in: 1) personally identifiable information or objects encoded in the training images,
and 2) the models trained with sensitive data to misuse them or launch model-based ex-
ploratory attacks. An efficient solution is the cloud-client partitioning setting that partition
data/tasks into sensitive and non-sensitive ones and employ the cloud storage and resources
over the non-sensitive portions only. However, such frameworks have been shown vulner-
able to Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) attacks — the adversarial cloud exploiting
the model learning protocol to generate sensitive training data. Alternatively, constructing
deep neural network (DNN) learning frameworks over encrypted / protected data, with the
DMC process, is possible, however, it comes with an impractical cost and higher com-
plexity. Differential privacy (DP) has been applied in model and data sharing however
does not exactly fit the outsourced setting that requires protecting both data and model
during the training itself. Furthermore, we find that models including the DP-models that
reveal their outputs to the adversary seem to be vulnerable to a new kind of adversarial
attack if the training data class labels are sensitive in nature. we call such an attack class-
membership attack. In this chapter, I present an image disguising mechanism to address
111
the privacy concerns and the two adversarial attacks in outsourced DNN learning. I also
design a DNN-based visual re-identification attack on the protected/sanitized images the
outsourced protocols must be immune to. With extensive experimental results, I show that
our image-disguising mechanisms can provide a high level of protection against the adver-
sarial attacks.
6.1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) generate robust modeling results across diverse domains
such as image classification, natural language processing, speech recognition, and recom-
mendation systems [91]. However, DNN training is resource-intensive and time-consuming.
Model developers often utilize cloud GPU resources to train large-scale models. A ma-
jor concern is the confidentiality of the sensitive data and the trained models that may be
stolen and traded to breach intellectual property, or exposed models are possibly explored
to breach training data privacy such as model inversion [27] and membership inference [30]
attacks.
The first and possibly the most economical solution is to partition the entire data and
learning task into sensitive and non-sensitive partitions for cloud-client partitioned pro-
cessing, where only the non-sensitive portion, assuming it is the much larger portion, is
exported to and processed by the cloud. Correspondingly, the learning process is also
partitioned and distributed to the cloud and the client and the intermediate information ex-
changed between the two parties should not breach privacy. Zhang et al. [31] have utilized
such a partitioning scheme for MapReduce processing. It appears the collaborative deep
learning framework proposed by Shokri et. al [32] can also be applied to this partition-
based scenario. However, Hitaj et. al. [34] has shown that an adversarial cloud provider
is able to generate images resembling the sensitive classes owned by the client, using a
GAN-based attack.
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Another possible approach is to train encrypted models over encrypted or protected
data by following the DMC process of constructing CML frameworks. However, due to the
large training data and expensive training process in deep learning, cryptographic model
training approaches are too expensive to be practical so far. A recent study on training
small scale neural networks [21] (e.g., just 2 layers with maximum of 128 neurons per
layer) has shown astonishingly high communication, computation, and storage costs. As a
result, cryptographic approaches are practically limited to testing DNNs as in CryptoNets
[92].
The third possible approach is based on Differential Privacy(DP). Shokri et al. [32]
study a collaborative learning problem where multiple data owners collectively learn a
deep learning model without leaking private training data to each other. This solution can
be possibly adapted to the cloud-client partitioning setting as mentioned earlier. Another
possible DP solution is to synthesize differentially private datasets and then export them to
the cloud for training using GAN-based approaches [93]. However, this solution requires
expensive pre-processing by the data owner, e.g., training a GAN model locally, lessening
the purpose of outsourcing.
Most importantly, the DP based approaches still expose the class definitions and the
trained model, as they are designed to share models without breaching privacy. In the case
where class labels are sensitive, e.g., user IDs are the class labels for face recognition, any
model-exposing approach does not work. We call the attack on sensitive class labels the
class-membership attack, which we will explore in more detail later.
In summary, there is no satisfactory solution for protecting data and model confiden-
tiality in outsourced deep learning yet.
Scope and Contributions
Our work is focused on image training data and classification tasks. In this work, we
thoroughly study the problems with possible candidate approaches for confidential out-
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sourced deep learning and propose the image disguising approach to addressing the two
identified attacks: the GAN-based attack on cloud-client partitioning framework and the
class-membership attack on sensitive class labels. In addition, we define the visual re-
identification attack for any image protection mechanisms that export protected images to
the cloud. The minimum requirement to pass this attack is that adversaries cannot visually
understand and detect protected image content.
The proposed image disguising mechanism protects both the training data and the
learned models, while deep learning can still work on the disguised images. The intu-
ition is that with appropriately transformed images, the powerful deep learning techniques
can still pick up the unique topological/geometric features preserved in the transformed
spaces to effectively distinguish the classes of the transformed images. Our image disguis-
ing mechanism combines block-wise permutation and multidimensional transformation to
address the three identified attacks. Surprisingly, high-quality deep learning models can
still be learned from the disguised images. Notably, the disguising mechanisms can be ap-
plied to both the cloud-client partitioning setting and the complete outsourcing setting. We
summarize our contributions as follows:
1. We have carefully analyzed the potential attacks under the outsourced deep learning
settings and concluded that no existing approach can be directly applied to fully
preserve data and model confidentiality.
2. We have designed an image disguising mechanism for image-based DNN learning
in the outsourced settings that thwart the identified attacks, while still allowing ex-
isting (unmodified) deep learning algorithms to generate high-quality models on the
disguised images.
3. We have conducted extensive experimental evaluations on several public datasets to
show the trade-offs of related parameter settings for the image disguising mecha-
nisms and their resilience to the identified attacks.
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Next, we briefly outline this chapter. Section 6.2 describes DNN outsourcing frameworks,
the threat model, the candidate approaches and their shortcomings. The section then intro-
duces the GAN and two new visual re-identification and class-membership attacks on the
DNN outsourcing frameworks. In Section 6.3, we introduce our image disguising mech-
anism that enables confidential deep learning in the outsourced setting while tackling the
GAN-based, visual re-identification and class-membership adversarial attacks. Section 6.4
analyzes the security of Disguised-Nets mechanisms. Section 6.5 presents the results for
the experimental evaluations in terms of model quality, resiliency against the adversarial
attacks, and the related trade-offs.
6.2 Candidate Approaches and Attack Analysis
In this section, we describe the setting of outsourced deep learning and define two types of
attacks that a viable privacy-preserving solution has to address.
6.2.1 DNN Outsourcing Frameworks
DNN learning is resource and time intensive for massive data and larger and intricate ar-
chitectures such as ResNet [94]. Resource-constrained data owners outsource their data to
public cloud providers such as AWS’s elastic GPUs to benefit from their high-performance
GPU computation resources.























Figure 6.1: A data owner outsources her images to a cloud provider for storage and DNN
modeling using GPU clusters. She may retain the sensitive images to process them lo-
cally in the cloud-client partitioning setting; the two parties share the intermediate model
parameters during the DNN training.
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Data owners may adopt the cloud-client partitioning framework [31], which limits
outsourcing to a portion of images (e.g. images belonging to the non-sensitive classes).
The data owner retains a small portion of the images (e.g. the sensitive ones) and carries
out DNN model updates related to those images locally. The cloud carries out the DNN
learning over the outsourced images. In an interactive learning framework, the two parties
share with each other just the intermediate model updates (e.g. SGD updates). One can
consider this setting as a collaborative framework [32] with just two parties, however, the
cloud is the major work-horse.
Alternatively, in the complete DNN outsourcing framework, the data owner offloads
all of her training data to the cloud provider and deploys the cloud provider’s GPU re-
sources in training complex DNN models. The data owner is not involved in the actual
learning process.
After training, in both the settings, the data owner can either download the learned
model for local use or just upload newer testing data to the cloud for prediction depending
on how the model and test images are protected. Figure 6.1 shows the two settings for
outsourced deep learning.
6.2.2 Threat Modeling
We are concerned with the confidentiality of both the training data and the DNN models
trained in an outsourced setting. We consider the adversarial party has access to the out-
sourced data and the trained model, however, no other background knowledge. Given the
white-box access to the models and their outputs, we regard GAN and other exploratory
adversarial attacks on the DNN models as potential threats that need to be addressed. Our
work does not address evasive and poisoning attacks [95] , where adversaries may tamper
the training data or modify the learned model.
Security Assumptions. Here, we will make some relevant security assumptions we
will base our disguising mechanisms for image-based deep learning on: 1) We consider the
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parameters for the disguising mechanisms are secret to the data owner and no disguised
image and its original image pair is known to the adversary; 2) The adversary possesses no
prior knowledge of the images being outsourced, but they can use any publicly available
images to explore the trained model; 3) The adversary knows the structure of the DNN
architecture, metadata for learning, e.g., the number of iterations — white-box access, and
size and shape of training data; 4) The adversary can probe the trained models freely and
observe the outputs of the DNN model; 5) The adversary is free to corrupt the learning
algorithm or run its own algorithms over the collected data however its integrity in de-
livering desired results to data owner is assumed and data owner can cross-examine the
cloud’s performance at any time; 6) All infrastructures and communication channels must
be secure. We consider an honest-but-curious adversary, who may be interested in the con-
tents and categorization (classes/labels) of the training images. The adversary might also
want to misuse the models to distinguish or identify the domain of the training data with
class-membership attacks.
6.2.3 Candidate Approaches and Problems
Both the partitioning and complete outsourcing settings have their advantages and disad-
vantages. The partitioning setting requires the active involvement of the data owner during
the DNN learning whereas the complete outsourcing setting does not. Existing distributed
(or federated) deep learning [96, 32] frameworks can be possibly applied to the partition-
ing setting, leading to more efficient solutions. The cloud-client partitioning setting can
become inefficient and under-use the cloud resources if the number of sensitive images
supersedes the non-sensitive ones. Now we describe some candidate solutions related to
these settings next and identify their advantages and disadvantages.
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Partitioning Approaches
The partitioning frameworks keep the data and computation pertaining to the sensitive data
locally and outsource the non-sensitive portions to the cloud. One can consider the col-
laborative framework of Shokri et al. [32], with just two parties – a client and the cloud
provider. Such frameworks can deploy simpler DNN learning algorithms as there is no
need to translate the DNN learning protocols to their cryptographic versions. Both the par-
ties know the global DNN architecture including the number of classes and the learning
attributes such as the number of iterations. In an iterative manner, each party carries out
the target model learning over their respective portions of images and share with each other
the intermediate SGD updates until the models converge finally. To further strengthen the
privacy, Shokri et al. envision data owner sharing the model parameters selectively and
apply differential privacy to the SGD updates.
This setting faces two critical challenges: 1) the determination of what is sensitive and
what is non-sensitive is not always straightforward; 2) An adversarial cloud provider can
misuse the learning process and construct a GAN attack to generate images belonging to
the sensitive classes private to the client as shown by Hitaj et al. [34] as we described in
Chapter 2 Section 2.2.
Figure 6.2 depicts a GAN attack in the distributed system where the adversary A builds
a GAN using the parameters of the deep learning model being trained by the framework.
With a successful GAN attack, the adversarial cloud provider generates images associated
with the labels that exclusively belongs to data owner. Figure 6.3 shows the sample images
that are generated by a GAN attack performed by the adversarial cloud party in the cloud-
client learning protocol in the partitioned outsourcing.
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Figure 6.2: Generative adversarial network (GAN) attack as shown by Hitaj et al. [34] in
a collaborative learning framework. The adversary A (cloud in cloud-client partitioning
framework) constructs a GAN and generates false records that closely resemble the private
training data of the victim V.
Figure 6.3: GAN generated images (bottom) corresponding to the private images (top) in
the collaborative framework as shown by Hitaj et al. [34].
Complete Outsourcing Approaches
In the complete outsourcing setting, all of the training images and learning is outsourced
to the cloud provider. The data owner needs to protect her submissions and establish a
protocol that enables confidential DNN learning over the protected images. The biggest
advantage of this setting is that the data owner need not be involved in the training proto-
col. However, it is essential that the final model and its outputs must not be revealed to
the cloud provider. For example, the SecureML framework by Mohassel et al. [21] ap-
plies randomized secret sharing, additively homomorphic encryption scheme, and garbled
circuits to learn simpler neural networks over protected data. The framework actually in-
volves two non-colluding cloud servers to carry out the learning over randomly shared data
and hide the trained models from the adversarial cloud parties. The biggest disadvantage of
the complete outsourced setting using cryptographic primitives is the involved computation
and communication expenses making them impractical in real-world usage. Attaining alge-
braic operation such as matrix-vector multiplication and sign comparisons over encrypted
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or protected data become cost bottlenecks. As a result, the cryptographic approaches are
limited to DNN applications only as in CryptoNets [92].
DP-based Solutions
Differential Privacy (DP) is commonly applied in DNN model sharing [32, 33]. The goal
of these DP-solutions is to hide the inclusion or exclusion of a certain individual example
in the training dataset from exposure of the final model to the model consumers. The idea
is to add noise to the intermediate model update parameters (SGD updates, differentially
private noise during the DNN learning. In an alternative setting, the DP mechanism is used
to synthesize noisy data from the distribution of the original data before outsourcing to
the cloud for DNN learning [93]. However, though, to our knowledge, no such solution
has been published for image data, synthesizing noisy images for deep learning requires
expensive pre-processing, for instance, to train GAN models [97], defying the need for
outsourcing.
Fundamentally, the DP solutions do not fit well in the outsourced setting where the
DNN learning needs to happen over the sensitive data using an untrusted cloud service
provider. Besides the intellectual property concern, the exposure of the trained model in
DP-based solutions leads to another privacy concern that we identify in this work. In sce-
narios when the class labels of the training images are sensitive in nature, e.g., identifica-
tion of an individual by face recognition, with our class-membership attack, we are able to
identify if a certain class of images (e.g. a certain individual) were present in the training
dataset by probing of the models with publicly available images. As a matter of fact, the
class-membership attack works on any method that have sensitive class labels and the final
trained models are available for free probing.
In summary, there is no practical method for protecting the confidentiality of training
data yet in outsourced deep learning. The cloud-client partitioning setting is susceptible
to GAN attacks, the cryptographic methods in the completely outsourced setting are still
120
too expensive, and the DP-based solutions do not exactly fit the outsourced setting and
vulnerable to class-membership inference attacks.
6.2.4 Beyond GAN-based Attacks
In the outsourcing frameworks we described earlier, we consider the adversaries can com-
promise the cloud infrastructure thus see the training data and the learned model if no
protection mechanism is applied, or in case of the cloud-client partitioning setting, launch
GAN attack to generate images from the sensitive classes kept private by the data owner.
In addition, we assume that adversaries can use the model as a black box - feeding the
model with testing images and getting the prediction labels - even if the training data and
the model is protected with some mechanism while the output labels are still revealed.
Our work is motivated to address GAN-like attack by protecting the sensitive images with
some efficient disguising mechanism to break the link between the protected images and
their original counterparts. In this section, we will present two new attacks specific to out-
sourced image-based deep learning that any privacy-preserving framework must address:
1) Visual re-identification attack aimed at compromising the visual privacy of protected im-
ages, and 2) the class-membership attack that we have mentioned for exploiting a trained
model in determining if a certain sensitive class of images was included in the training
dataset. Then, we will elaborate on the security assumptions we will base our work on.
Visual Re-identification Attack
As homomorphic cryptographic approaches [37, 14, 13, 39] incur extremely high expen-
sive, researchers have started exploring efficient solutions [35, 98, 99] with weaker security
notions (i.e., not semantically secure) that may work for the outsourcing scenarios. Essen-
tially, they are all some kind of image disguising mechanism, i.e., exporting transformed,
yet utility preserving, images to the cloud. Noticeably, most such approaches still allow
an attacker to simply browse the disguised images to find out sensitive information. Thus,
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we explore the basic requirement for protecting the confidentiality of image data: no ad-
versary should be able to visually identify sensitive objects from the protected image data.
We name this characteristic visual privacy. We found that none of the existing metrics can
precisely capture or define visual privacy for non-cryptographically protected images. Use
of pixel-level mean square error by Fan et al. [99] and peak signal-noise ratio by Li et al.
[35] do not capture the semantic understanding level that humans’ visual perception can.
We propose a DNN-based visual re-identification “examiner” to serve as the agent of
a human attacker. The recent advances in high-accuracy DNN models [100] have shown
that DNN models have exceeded human experts in image classification. Inspired by this,
we propose to use DNN models to impersonate the visual attackers to scan the protected
images. We call such DNN models the “DNN examiners”. Specifically, we can train a DNN
examiner on the original training data and deploy it to distinguish the protected images. A
high-accuracy result of the re-identification attack suggests the protection mechanism under
scrutiny fails to maintain visual privacy. We define then visual privacy as (1-Accuracy of
DNN examiner in classifying the protected images).
Class-membership Attack
Given a protection mechanism that thwarts the visual re-identification attack successfully,
we need to eliminate any potential abuse of the exposed model trained on the protected
images in exploring the training images. After carefully examining the outsourced deep
learning scenarios, we identify a new exploratory attack known as class-membership attack
on exposed models that have not been identified or explored yet by the related work [99,
35, 95].
In the following, we design an attack that enables adversaries to learn whether a certain
class of images was used as training examples by observing the target model’s outputs.
Figure 6.4 shows the basic setting that adversaries can use (and thus explore) to try the
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DNN Model
{ti |ci ∉ C} 
Test ObservePr(c’ | ti)
Figure 6.4: Class-membership Attack. Given a DNN model, an attacker analyzes the pre-
diction outcomes of a series of testing images to determine if a certain class of images was
included in the training set.
model with any testing data in their hand and observe the model’s outputs. The intuition
is that a well-trained model should work nicely on records similar to the ones belonging to
the training data classes whereas poorly on images from unrelated categories. For example,
a face recognition DNN trained on 10 persons’ face images must work much better on
test images belonging to the same 10 individuals on test images belonging to others. Let
us denote the two categories of image classes as “in-training” and “out-training” classes
respectively.
We can define this attack formally. Given a fully trained DNN model and known out-
put labels {ci|ci ∈ C}, the adversary prepares a set of images, {ti, i = 1..m}, belonging to
some class c (a target class) that may or may not be one of the output labels. The adversary
launches the class-membership attack to determine if c ∈ C, i.e. if the training dataset
included images belonging to the target class c. The attacker’s strategy is to characterize
the output distribution Pr(c′|{ti}) that will aid in inferring class memberships, where c′
represents the model’s prediction outputs. Test images belonging to an in-training class
are consistently classified by the model to the same class with high probability for a rea-
sonably good model; whereas test images belonging to an out-training class may see more
uncertain outputs. Figure 6.4 illustrates the idea of class-membership attack. A pointy
histogram infers the target class (or a closely related class) was likely included in the train-
ing set whereas a flatter histogram suggests the target class was not likely included in the
training set. Such distribution differences can be captured with entropy or Fano factor.
Fano factor, similar to the variance-to-mean ratio (VMR), measures the index of disper-
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sion and can be used in determining how two sets of observed occurrences are clustered
or dispersed. Correspondingly, in-training examples of the same class will show smaller
entropy or higher Fano factor than out-training examples. In experiments, we have shown
that unprotected models are extremely vulnerable to class-membership attack.
Expanding on the class-membership attack, an attacker may determine if a certain
dataset was likely the training data, partially or fully.
6.3 Image Disguising for Deep Learning
Our goal is to design an efficient mechanism to protect outsourced image-based deep learn-
ing from the GAN-based attacks and the two other adversarial attacks we described earlier
— the visual re-identification attack and the class-membership attack. The mechanism is
going to be adaptable in both the cloud-client partitioning and complete outsourcing set-
tings. The current work will only address the challenges with image-based classification
tasks.
Figure 6.5 depicts the Disguised-Nets framework. A data owner disguises her pri-
vate images before outsourcing them to the cloud for storage and DNN learning. She can
either fully outsource the entirety of the images and learning to the cloud or selectively
retain sensitive images to learn the related parameters locally in a cloud-client partitioning
setting. She transforms all of her images using one secure transformation key, K, which is
comprised of the transformation types and the involved parameters. It is computationally
difficult to guess the security key K with brute-force and the transformed images do not
leave sufficient information for adversaries to guessK or launch the visual re-identification
attack. She uses the cloud resources to train the DNN models from the transformed images
with acceptable model quality.
Specifically, assume the data owner owns a set of images for training, notated as pairs












Figure 6.5: Disguised-Nets: Image disguising framework for DNN learning.
define the disguising process as follows. Let the disguising mechanism be a transformation
TK , where K is the secret key which depends on the selected perturbation techniques. By
applying image disguising, the training data is transformed to {(T (Xi), yi)}, which is used
to train a DNN, denoted as a function DT , that takes disguised images T (X) and outputs
a predicted label ŷ. The models trained on images transformed with the image disguising
mechanisms only work on transformed images thus cannot be exploited with other image
data as long as the transformation keys are secured. For any new data Xnew, the model
application is defined as DT (T (Xnew)), the new data transformed with the same key.
A remarkable characteristic of Disguised-Nets is that there is no need for one to alter
or tailor the existing DNN architectures to make them compatible with the defense mecha-
nisms. One can simply import successful architectures such as ResNet and VGG to train the
desired privacy-preserving models on the transformed data. In our opinion, this simplifica-
tion is a great advantage over using traditional encryption or garbled circuit schemes which
requires transforming the target DNN algorithms to their privacy-preserving versions, often
a complex task, which results in expensive and impractical solutions.
The success of this approach depends on the transformation, TK , that preserves cer-
tain properties of the transformed data allowing DNN to learn the classification task. We
consider a suite of image disguising mechanisms that can be combined with one another
to achieve the desired level of confidentiality and utility. Candidate mechanisms must hide
the visually identifiable features of the images, i.e., attain good visual privacy and provide
a sufficiently large key space to be resilient to brute-force attacks. As a result, these mech-
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Figure 6.6: Different disguising mechanisms on MNIST and CIFAR-10 images.
anisms inevitably affect the quality of the learned DNNs. Therefore, finding the settings
that provide both high security and model quality is crucial. While we have not theoreti-
cally justified the utility preserving mechanisms of these transformations yet, the empirical
evaluation shows surprisingly good modeling results.
6.3.1 Image Encoding and Partitioning
An image Xl×m with lm pixels may have three RGB channels or just a single grayscale
channel. We encode grayscale images as matrices of size l ×m whereas the color images
as three channel matrices of size 3× l ×m. The matrices might be partitioned into smaller
blocks for block-wise transformations to improve the visual privacy. In classification mod-
eling, the image labels ci are mapped to 0, 1, . . . without revealing their mapping to the
actual classes.
6.3.2 Block-wise Permutation
The block-wise permutation simply partitions an image and re-arranges the image blocks
randomly. An image Xl×m is partitioned into t blocks of uniform size r × s. If we label
the blocks sequentially as v =< 1, 2, 3, 4, ...t >. A pseudorandom permutation of the
image, Tπ(X), shuffles the blocks and reassemble the corresponding image accordingly.
The permutation may break the global patterns of the images and achieve good visual
privacy already. However, the block-wise characteristics such as boundaries, color, content
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shape, and texture of the original neighboring blocks may provide clues for adversaries to
recover the original image - imagine the jigsaw puzzle! Figure 6.6 (a) shows an example.
For large t, it might be difficult to apply such a jigsaw attack due to the vague similarity
between block boundaries. In practice, however, the image size might be small, which
leads to smaller settings of t insufficient to protect from the jigsaw attack. Thus, we will
need another layer of transformation to address the jigsaw attack.
6.3.3 Randomized Multidimensional Transformations (RMT)
To address the block-wise jigsaw attack, we proceed with establishing a more resilient
transformation mechanism that hides the visual attributes that aid in distinguishing the
images from their transformed counterparts. For an image represented as a pixel matrix X ,
a general linear transformation can be defined as G(X) = RX , where Rm×m is a random
orthogonal matrix generated following the Haar distribution [101], or a random projection
matrix [102]. When an image is partitioned into t blocks for random permutation, we will
need a list of random matrices {Ri, i = 1..t}, one for each image-block. The list of matrices
{Ri} acts as a secret key across the dataset and apply to the corresponding image-blocks.
Such transformation is known to preserve (or approximately preserve by random pro-
jection) the Euclidean distance between columns of the matrix X . For non-image datasets,
it is not possible to recover the original data from the perturbed data without certain prior
knowledge of the data [46], due to the large parameter space (we will discuss in Section
6.4). However, for images, we found that without block-wise application, i.e., with one
RMT for the entire image, RMT leaks information about sparse contents in images such
as in MNIST dataset, as the zero-valued columns do not change after the transformation as
shown in Figure 6.6 (b). Thus, it is often beneficial to combine block-wise permutation and
RMT. Interestingly, when combining permutation and RMT, smaller block sizes preserve
better model quality, while the block size may not matter much in protecting from visual
re-identification attack, as shown by our experiments.
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To tackle the challenges presented by sparse images, we can also add noises into the
transformation as (X + ∆)R, where ∆ is a random noise matrix, re-generated for each
image (or image block) X , and drawn uniformly at random from [0, N ] where N is the
tunable noise level. Incorporation of additive noise before applying rotation perturbation
converts the zero-pixel areas to noisy non-zero areas. Figure 6.6 (c) shows the effects of
RMT on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets with and without the additional ∆ noise. Note
that the dense images, or even some sparse images, may have been well protected by block-
wise permutation and RMT, and thus noise addition may not be needed as we will show in
our experiments later.
6.4 Against Identified Attacks
Disguised-Nets assumes that the parameters for the disguising mechanisms are secret to the
data owner and no original-disguised image pairs are leaked to the adversary. Similarly, the
adversary has no background knowledge of the classification domain, however, is able to
probe the learned models with publicly available images freely. The adversary may freely
observe the architecture and outputs of the DNN model. With our disguising mechanism,
existing DNN learning algorithms are directly applied to the disguised images.
This mechanism directly results in immunity against the GAN-based attack in the
cloud-client framework as the attack tries to re-generate the training images that are pumped
into the DNN learning algorithm — in our case, they are the disguised images hosted by
the data owner. The disguised images successfully hide the visual attributes in the images
recognizable to the human eyes or the DNN-examiners.
Similarly, probing the disguised models with the publicly available images to launch
the class-membership attack is unsuccessful as the trained models work only with the dis-
guised images. Any publicly available image, unless transformed with the same disguising
parameters, are treated as noisy images by the model, leading to no distinction between the
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model output distributions for the in-training and out-training class images.
Therefore, the resilience to these attacks is essentially determined by the hardness of
breaking the disguising mechanism, under the assumption the adversary only knows the
disguised images.
Brute-force Exploration of Parameter Settings
Our mechanism is a combination of random permutation and block-level transformation.
Let us start with the block-level transformation for any block i. With X ′i = (Xi + ∆i)Ri,
the adversary knows only X ′. To explore possible Xi in a brute-force manner as no other
information is known, the overall attacking complexity is determined by the number of
possible Ri matrices. We show that the number of possible Ri (even limited to orthogonal
ones) can be exponentially large for given parameters.
Proposition 6. For values encoded in h-bit finite field, there are O(2hm) candidate orthog-
onal matrices Rm×m.
Proof. With h-bit encoding, there are p = 2h distinct values. The theory of orthogonal
matrix group on finite fields states that there are O(pm) orthogonal matrices in Zm×mp for a
p-element field [77]. Hence, there are O(2hm) orthogonal matrices.
We can then extend the analysis to the case combined with the random permutation.
For simplicity, let each dimension of the matrix is partitioned into r shares. Thus, there
are r2 matrix blocks, each of which has the size of m × m. Correspondingly, there are
O((r2)!2hm) combinations for all possible permutations and matrices. With a typical setting
in our experiments, e.g., h = 32, m = 7, and r = 4 for the MNIST dataset, the overall
complexity is O(2224).
By knowing pairs of disguised and original images, adversaries might be able to
launch more powerful attacks, e.g., by combining the visual re-identification attack. Yet,
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the noisy block-wise transformation still blurs the boundary between blocks as we have
shown in the image samples in Figure 6.6, which provides a good level of protection if
the number of blocks is sufficiently large. We briefly describe an attack with known two
pairs of examples — one for exploration and one for validation. Due to the blurred block
boundary, the adversary will try each possible blocking factor and derive the block-level
mappings with the exploration example, and then try each of the r2! permutations on the
recovered blocks of the disguised image in the validation example. The recovered whole
image is compared to the original image in the validation example, e.g., via a visual re-
identification attack. Apparently, the blurred block boundary and the factor r2! are key in
determining the level of resilience. An alternative method to further increases the number
of possible permutations (and thus increase the attack complexity) is to include irregu-
lar blocking methods. For example, blocks are not necessarily small squares — they can
also be rectangles and the image can be partitioned with more degrees of freedom. Further
studies on the resilience of our image disguising mechanism will be conducted in our future
work.
6.5 Experiments
This experimental evaluation1 has two specific goals. First, we will show how effective
the image disguising methods in preserving the model quality, with different parameter
settings. Second, we show whether our methods are also resilient to the two attacks, with
the empirical attack evaluation methods described in Section 6.4.
Datasets. We test our disguising mechanisms with three prevalent DNN benchmark-
ing datasets: MNIST, FASHION, CIFAR-10 and a subset of face recognition dataset LFW
faces. MNIST (handwritten digits) and FASHION (fashion items) image-sets both con-
sists of 60,000 training and 10,000 testing gray-scale 28× 28 pixel-images with 10 classes.
1Source code and scripts uploaded to https://github.com/datascale/DisguisedNets
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CIFAR-10 image-set consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 testing color-images of size
32 × 32 belonging to 10 classes. The subset of LFW faces dataset we use consists of a
relatively smaller number (1,400 training and 150 testing) of color-images belonging to 12
classes. As LFW has images of a size larger than the images in CIFAR-10, we resize down
the LFW images to 32x32 for assessing the class-membership attack.
6.5.1 Model Quality and Setup Cost
Table 6.1 details the mechanisms, block size, and additive noise level used for the datasets.
We used a simple DNN architecture for MNIST and FASHION implemented with Ten-
sorFlow, and the more powerful ResNet [94] architecture implemented on PyTorch for
CIFAR-10 and LFW datasets. For MNIST and FASHION, we set the learning rate to 0.001
and train the network for 1,000 iterations. For CIFAR-10 and LFW, we adaptably adjust
the learning rate from 0.1 to 0.001 as the models are trained for 350 iterations. We use an 8-
GPU cluster to train the models and each experiment was carried out 5 times to capture the
variances of results. Table 6.2 shows that the models trained on disguised images perform
closely to the optimum models trained on the undisguised images. The cost of the image
Table 6.1: Parameter settings and CNN Architectures.
Datasets Mechanisms Block size Noise Level Architecture
MNIST block-wise RMT + Permutation {7× 7} 100 Simple
FASHION block-wise RMT + Permutation {7× 7} 100 Simple
CIFAR-10 block-wise RMT {2× 2} 25 ResNet
LFW block-wise RMT {2× 2} 50 ResNet
Table 6.2: Results of applying image disguising mechanisms.
Model Accuracy
Datasets With Disguise Without Disguise
MNIST 96.6 +/- 0.4% 96.7 +/-0.2%
FASHION 85.1 +/- 0.6 88.7 +/- 0.3%
CIFAR-10 89.3%+/-0.1% 93.4 +/-0.2%
LFW 90.6 +/- 1.3% 94.3 +/-2.0
disguising transformations are generally very cheap, (per image cost is less than 10ms)
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and can be comfortably done by any PC. For the experiments in following subsections,
we keep all the parameters in Table 6.1 constant and vary the parameter under discussion
unless noted otherwise.
6.5.2 Effect of Parameter Settings on Model Quality
Our objective here is to understand the effect of different parameter settings on model qual-
ity. From Figure 6.7 (left), it is clear that the DNN models were significantly more effective
when applying RMT with the orthogonal matrices as compared to applying RMT with pro-
jection matrices for MNIST and FASHION. However, we observe the variation results in
comparable model quality for CIFAR-10 and LFW. On the other hand, the permutation
of RMT blocks, which intuitively reduces the model quality, deteriorates the model qual-
ity negligibly for MNIST, moderately for FASHION and LFW, and a bit alarmingly for
CIFAR-10 as seen in Figure 6.7 (right). We prefer orthogonal matrices for the optimum
setting.
Figure 6.8 (left) shows that the model quality for LFW and CIFAR-10 datasets in-
creases with smaller block sizes i.e. with the increasing number of blocks. However, we do
not observe much effect on MNIST and FASHION. Intuitively, larger noise levels should
degrade model quality. Figure 6.8 (right) shows the expected effect is prominent for the
CIFAR-10 and LFW with significant degradation of model quality with increasing noise
levels. Again, the effect is absent on the MNIST and FASHION datasets, the model quality




































Figure 6.7: Effect on Model Quality: Orthogonal vs. Projection (left). Permutation (right)





































Figure 6.8: Effect on Model Quality: Varying block counts (left). Varying noise levels
(right)
6.5.3 Attack Evaluation
Resilience to Visual Re-identification Attacks
For the visual re-identification attacks, we train a DNN examiner with the original training
data and apply it to distinguish the disguised images from one another. We measure the
overall accuracy of these applications. The result (1 - accuracy of DNN examiner) is used
for empirical visual privacy. We observe that both the orthogonal and projection matrix
based RMT successfully thwart the visual re-identification attacks (i.e. preserve high visual
privacy) for all datasets as seen in Figure 6.9 (left). Further permutation of the RMT blocks
prominently increases the visual privacy for the sparse MNIST and FASHION datasets
whereas not so much for the denser CIFAR-10 and LFW datasets as seen in Figure 6.9
(right).
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Figure 6.10 (left) shows that the variation of the block sizes or the block counts does
not affect visual privacy for the denser datasets of CIFAR-10, LFW, and sparser FASHION
dataset. However, we observe a detectable drop in visual privacy for MNIST when using
a single RMT for the entire image. On the other hand, the introduction of the additive
noise does not seem to reduce the effectiveness of the DNN-examiners in compromising
visual privacy as seen in Figure 6.10 (right). As we observe high visual privacy across the
parameter settings mostly, we can be flexible in choosing the parameters that maximize the
model quality. As Figure 6.8 shows, in general, we can choose smaller block sizes (larger



































Figure 6.9: Effect on Visual Privacy: Orthogonal vs. Projection (left). Permutation (right)



































Figure 6.10: Effect on Visual Privacy:Varying block counts (left). Varying noise levels
(right)
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Resilience to Class-membership Attacks
Next, we examine the resilience of our method to the class-membership attack. We mimic
the class-membership attack by applying the disguised DNN models to both in-training
and out-training classes of images in their original form. We measure the class-wise Fano
factors for both the in-training and out-training classes of images and see if the classes of the
images are statistically distinguishable. Specifically, for a series of images {Xi, i = 1..n},
the output label distribution over the classes forms a histogram. Let ncj be the number of
labels for cj , j = 1..k. The estimated mean of the distribution is µ = (
∑k
j=1 ncj)/k and
the estimated variance σ2 is (
∑k
j=1(ncj − µ)2)/k. The Fano factor is σ2/µ. We expect
all in-training classes to have significantly higher Fano factor values than the out-training
classes.
We measure the class-wise Fano factors for the prediction output probabilities for
both the in-training and out-training datasets. We use different datasets to test how class-
membership attacks perform on the DNN models. Specifically, we partition the datasets by
class and then feed the images in the same class into the model, one class at a time. We then
summarize the output distribution with the Fano factor. Without applying image disguising,
we observe in Figure 6.11, the Fano factor values for the in-training classes are clearly
distinguishable from those of the out-training classes, with statistically significant margins
(p-value ≤ 0.005 with Wilcoxon 2. In contrast, for the transformed models, we observe
in Figure 6.12 the in-training classes and out-training classes are not distinguishable from
each another - a small difference between average values with p-value > 0.5 in Wilcoxon
test.
Discussion. At its current state, Disguised-Nets only considers learning DNN models
that classify images to individual labels. It will be important to assess if these results carry
over to other learning objectives such as multi-label classification and regression. Further-














Figure 6.11: Effective class-membership attack on the unprotected models. In-training
class-wise Fano factors are significantly different from Out-training Fano factors. Wilcoxon













Figure 6.12: Ineffective class-membership attack on the protected models. In-training
class-wise Fano factor are indistinguishable from the Out-training Fano factors. Wilcoxon
test with p− value > 0.5.
more, adapting our disguising mechanism in transfer learning, which has proven extremely
useful in building powerful models, is a challenging yet interesting task. In future, we
would like to explore in an expansion of this work, how closely a malicious adversary
can estimate the Ri matrices in RMT given some leaked pairs of original and disguised
images. Lastly, we would like to assess effectiveness of visual re-identification and class-
membership attacks on differentially private mechanisms although not in the outsourced
setting.
6.6 Summary
While outsourcing images for deep learning to the cloud has been an economical option,
only a few studies address the related adversarial and confidentiality concerns. In this
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chapter, I explore the existing approaches and their limitations including the GAN-based
adversarial attacks they face. In addition, I identify and elaborate on two new types of
adversarial attacks on outsourced deep learning: the visual re-identification attack and the
class-membership attack, which the existing candidate solutions cannot satisfactorily ad-
dress. I propose our image disguising mechanism: Disguised-Nets for deep learning in
multiple outsourced settings that thwarts the GAN-based attacks and the two new adver-
sarial attacks. Disguised-Nets employs a combination of block-wise secret permutation
and multidimensional transformations on images. Without any modification, existing deep
learning algorithms can be directly applied to disguised images. The rationale is that, while
disguised images are difficult to recognize and reconstruct, the deep learning algorithms
can still pick up the information hidden in the disguised images and generate good-quality
DNN models. Experimental results show that the Disguised-Nets approach preserves the
model quality surprisingly well while being resilient to the adversarial attacks. Although,
we relaxed the security of the framework, we were able to produce significantly practical
cost and utility in confidential DNN learning in the outsourced setting.
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Related Work
In this chapter, I look at some of the related works around constructing confidential CML
frameworks.
The current implementations of FHE are still too expensive to apply to complex ma-
chine learning. ML Confidential [15] shows that simple linear models can be learned by a
semi-honest Cloud from FHE-encrypted data with acceptable costs. However, these simple
models are unable to handle non-linearly separable datasets. Lu et al. [16] show that PCA
and linear regression can be implemented on FHE encrypted data with reasonable costs for
a strictly small number of iterations in the algorithms. Moreover, the comparison opera-
tion based on FHE is very expensive [16], which hinders the FHE’s application in many
algorithms.
Despite new optimization of GC with techniques, such as free XOR gates [42], half
AND gates [43], and OT Extension [41], its adaptation in confidential frameworks is still
costly. Nikolaenko et al. [18, 19] use FastGC [44] and AHE to implement matrix factor-
ization and linear ridge regression solutions. Use of GCs in the expensive operations led
these protocols to suffer from unbearable communication costs between CSP and Cloud.
In designs presented in dissertation, we carefully craft the primitive operations to minimize
the performance impact of the GC-related operations.
Demmler et al. [20] have shown that basic matrix operations can be implemented
to work with random shares held by different parties when using secret sharing secure
multi-party computations. SecureML [21] utilized these operations and GC to implement
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the gradient-descent learning method with a two-server model. However, I note that these
models are more expensive than the models produced by our SecureBoost and Disguised-
Nets frameworks (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) to achieve the same level of model quality. The
crypto-approach for training DNNs in the complete outsourced setting is very expensive
even for small-scale neural networks.
Several matrix computation approaches have been proposed with methods other than
encryption to ensure security. Atallah et al. [103] present secure outsourcing solutions that
are specific to large-scale systems of linear equations and matrix multiplication applications
with random noise masking. Their solutions fall short as they leak private information, de-
pend on multiple non-colluding servers, or require a large communication overhead. Wang
et al. [104] use an iterative approach for solving linear equations via client-cloud collabo-
ration and matrix perturbation. However, several problems are making it difficult to apply
in practice. First, it requires that the entire unencrypted matrix be present at the client-side
in the initial setup. Secondly, the client-side must perform a problem transformation step
with a computation cost of O(N2). These weaknesses render this approach as impractical
for big matrices and do not fully utilize the cloud infrastructures.
Shokri et al. [32] propose a collaborative framework for DNN learning which can be
adapted to a cloud-client partitioning setting. However, the approach is vulnerable to the
GAN-based attacks which generate the images in the sensitive classes private to the data
owner. Abadi et al. [33] and Shokri et al. [32] propose training differentially private DNN
models that hides inclusion or exclusion of individual images in the training data from the
model consumers with noisy SGD update algorithms. These techniques are unsuitable in
the outsourced setting for DNN learning as they do not directly protect the content of the
images or the learned models. Similarly, they present a significant trade-off between model
quality. Furthermore, the DP-based models are susceptible to the class-membership attack
we described in this dissertation (Chapter 6. Users may also submit locally perturbed data
that satisfy locally differential privacy (e.g., RAPPOR [105]) before outsourcing. However,
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the model quality is significantly affected by the reduced data quality, and the models are
also exposed to model-inversion attacks [27, 30].
Bost et al. [106] consider applying already learned classifiers in an encrypted form
(i.e., encrypted classifier parameters) to encrypted data to get classification results. How-
ever, applying classifiers is more about evaluating a function, which is a small-scale prob-
lem. Thus, many expensive operations can be possibly applied, which are impractical for
mining large datasets. A set of research focuses on the confidential evaluation of DNN
models, which is easier to build and less costly than privacy-preserving DNN learning
frameworks. Nathan et al. [92] present the homomorphic encryption-based CryptoNets
framework for evaluating a DNN with encrypted input data. Similarly, Rouhani et al. [107]
propose a garbled circuit based DNN evaluation protocol.
Privacy-preserving graph data publishing [72] is slightly related to the PrivateGraph
work. However, it has a totally a different problem setting. Graph data publishing wants to
share the graph data but needs to address the privacy attacks from the curious data miners.
However, the attacks with background knowledge cannot be thoroughly discovered and
understood. Thus, differential privacy for graph analysis becomes popular in recent years
[108, 109]. We do not aim to publish graph structures. However, since most graph matrices
have special structures (i.e., non-zero entries represent the edges), simple sparse encoding
exposes too much information. Our method is equivalent to adding fake edges to satisfy
differential privacy [72]. However, this edge addition does not change data integrity: the
added entries are encrypted 0s, which do not affect the matrix computation.
Gamb’s et al.[110] proposed algorithms enabling two or more participants to construct
a boosting classifier, however, their goal is to train a combined model without sharing
the horizontally partitioned training data, not outsourcing it. Chen and Guo [24] consider
using a pool of random linear classifiers in their random space perturbation (RASP) based
boosting framework for cloud computing. Unlike our framework, the framework does not
provide semantic security.
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Fan et al. [99] applied a differentially private mechanism to hide certain pixels in
images for image pixelation, however, the obfuscated images are visually identifiable from
the global perspective. Mao et al. [98] propose learning shallower neural networks lo-
cally by the data owner and sharing the intermediate representation to the cloud for further
learning with differentially private noise added to the intermediate outputs. However, the
approach reveals the visually identifiable features of the images to the adversarial party.
Fredrikson et al. [27] show that it is possible to reverse engineer a machine learning
model to explore the private training data the model was trained with given the adversary
has some background knowledge about the training data. The success of the model in-
version attack depends on unrestrained access to the target machine learning models. The
three frameworks in this dissertation need not worry about such an attack as the models are
either exposed to the data-owner only, split between two non-colluding parties, or disguised
altogether.
The idea of class-membership attack (Chapter 6) is slightly related to the membership
inference addressed by [30], however completely a different concept. Membership infer-
ence attack aims to determine inclusion or exclusion of exact data points in the training
set whereas class-membership attack determines inclusion or exclusion of a certain kind or
category of images in the training dataset. Shokri et al. [111] assess the attack specifically
on DNN models. With Disguised-Nets, this attack becomes irrelevant as it is impossible
for an adversary to design and launch the attack without knowing the exact transformation
keys we deploy.
Shan et al. [112] present a survey on practical secure outsourced computation. The
work focuses on the fundamental tasks of outsourced computation such as matrix multipli-
cation, matrix inversion, solving linear equations, etc., and briefly reviews some application-
specific algorithms in the context of outsourcing machine learning, graph algorithms, im-
age processing, and biometric algorithms. Surveys around privacy-preserving data mining
(PPDM) exist [113, 114, 115, 116], however, these work focus on sharing the data (and
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the models) while preserving individual’s privacy — the models are eventually leaked even
when built over sanitized data. Ji et al. [117] and Sarwate and Chaudhuri [118] present
surveys on differentially private machine learning algorithms which involve either learning
on plaintext data and make the final models’ output noisy or add noise to the intermediate
steps of the machine learning process.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I summarize the dissertation and discuss potential future works.
Despite the potential risk of data and model leakage, cloud outsourcing is unavoid-
able due to the increasing amount of data and computationally-intensive machine learning
analytics. Meanwhile, strictly enforcing laws and regulations governing privacy and confi-
dentiality in outsourced computing is impracticable and cannot detect or reverse the effect
of privacy violations. Therefore, it has become crucial to incorporate cryptographic and
privacy technologies in outsourced frameworks to protect data and model confidentiality
without reducing the benefits of modern data analytics and cloud computing.
In this dissertation, I present the three confidential frameworks for outsourced ma-
chine learning: a) PrivateGraph — for unsupervised spectral analysis, b) SecureBoost —
for supervised boosting, and d) Disguised-Nets — for image-based deep learning. The first
two frameworks follow the decomposition-mapping-composition (DMC) process of con-
structing CML frameworks and provide semantic security whereas Disguised-Nets relies
on the perturbation techniques with relaxed security to implement practical deep neural
networks in an outsourced setting.
While developing the first two frameworks that followed the DMC process, I dis-
sect the target machine learning algorithms into their constituting analytic sub-components,
map the sub-components to appropriate cryptographic and privacy primitives to construct
the confidential versions of those sub-comopnents, and finally compose the overall frame-
works with these confidential components. Relying solely on the expressive but expensive
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techniques such as FHE and GC in designing CML frameworks in a homogenous manner
would turn out to be either expensive or limited to sub-optimal analytic results. Instead,
I switch and mix different cryptographic and privacy primitives in these frameworks to
minimize the overall cost. A critical juncture in these frameworks is the identification of
algorithms and their sub-components that were not crypto-friendly, i.e., causing a cost bot-
tleneck or too difficult to design and implement confidentially. The success of these frame-
works depended on alteration, simplification, or replacements of those algorithms and their
sub-components with crypto-friendly algorithms and sub-components. In the PrivateGraph
framework, I replace the expensive eigen-decomposition components of spectral analysis
with the cheaper approximate Lanczos and Nyström methods. To further optimize cost
when dealing with sparse graph datasets, I present a differentially private mechanism for
encrypting the graph datasets sparsely while preserving node and edge confidentiality. In
the SecureBoost framework, I alter the boosting ensemble method for classification by re-
placing the crypto-unfriendly decision stumps with relatively simpler but cheaper random
linear classifiers (RLCs) as the base classifiers.
For intrinsically expensive DNN learning, following the DMC process and applying
the cryptographic primitives such as FHE, SHE, and GC becomes impractical altogether.
Therefore, I rely on cheaper perturbation mechanisms to disguise the training images and
use Cloud’s resources to train the DNN models with the transformed data in the Disguised-
Nets framework. Although the perturbation techniques resulted in cost-practicality and
simplicity in constructing the confidential DNN learning framework, they provided weaker
privacy guarantees and some loss in model utility.
I present formal cost and security analysis for the three CML frameworks and showed
that they are cost-practical yet provide the desired confidentiality guarantees. I design and
present two unique attack models to measure the Disguised-Net framework’s confidential-
ity guarantees. Finally, I design and perform extensive experiments to assess the involved
trade-offs amongst cost, privacy, utility, and scalability in these frameworks.
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There are several interesting future research directions. Adopting these CML frame-
works in real-world application scenarios (e.g. healthcare, education, social media, and
entertainment) will be impactful. A study on using the emergent trusted hardware solu-
tions, such as Intel SGX, in constructing these frameworks may eliminate the complexities
associated with the traditional cryptographic approaches. However, it will be essential to
understand the advantages and disadvantages of such hardware-based solutions. Similarly,
constructing confidential machine learning frameworks with data sanitized with localized
differential privacy will be an interesting problem however quite challenging. Further un-
derstanding and mitigation of the security concerns of the perturbation techniques used in
the Disguised-Nets are going to be crucial. This may include designing additional attack
models and measuring their success against the perturbation mechanisms. Finally, under-
standing the effect of class-membership attacks on different existing CML frameworks will
be a valuable line of work on its own.
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